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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Considering how much has b«n said and written on the subject of industrial 
facilities of multinational corporations (MNCs) in developing counrries, it 
is astonishing how little is known (outside perhaps the corporate circle) about 
the actual events leading to establishment of such enterprises and about the 
forces that shape the environment, health, and safety (EH&S) performance 
at such facilities. How is it that some indusrrial plants perform better in 
EH&S than others? To what extent docs a corporation influence that out-
come and how much can be attributed to a host country or other forces? 
What motivates and constrains the .. key actors in their interactions during 
negotiations, construction, and start-up of the facility-siting process? What 
trade-offs are made during that process to ,"commodate the tension among 
desirable yet competing objectives? 
Underlying these questions is a fundamental issue of values related to host 
country development, to environmental and health protection, and to cor-
porate development. Even a amory exploration of international develop-
ment and MNC experience during the last decade suggests that concurrent 
pursuit of growth, social and political development, and EH&S is laden 
with potential conflicts and the necessity of making trade-offs, the reconcili-
ation of which is neither .. lf~dent nor automatic. Acting in their best in-
terests, both MNCs and host counrries face a plethora of rompcting demands 
and priorities originating from intcmal and cxtcmal sources. Value conflicts 
ari .. becau .. multiple desirable ends cannot be simultaneously achieved in a 
a world of finite resources. Consider these typical compromises: 
• increased automation, designed and adapted to promo!C safety and environmental 
pro<rction, ""y be incompatible with labor-intensive practices designed to promote 
local employment or to increase profitability; 
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• location in a densely populated area, intended to improve access for a large number 
of employees and to facilitate the transportation of materials and productS, may 
be incompatible with community safety; 
• location in a poorly developed region, intended to increase employment and equi-
table sharing of economic gains, may impede efficient mobilization of resources. 
reduce corporate growth and profitability, and deter response to emergencies; 
• reliance on foreign expertS. intended to increase safety and environmental perform-
ana:, may be incompatible with the desire for local control and with the technology 
assimilation objectives; 
• adoption by the MNC of parent country's occupational and environmental stan-
dards, motivated by a desire to promote safety and equivalence in protection, may 
be incompatible with the notion of host country self-determination and with the 
development of host country regulatory capacity . 
Some conflicts may compete in the short term but prove amenable to 
medium-term reconciliation. Others may be problematic even in medium-
term, though compatible in the context of long-run sustainability. Some may 
be reduced or eliminated through redesign of technology, social arrange-
ments, or institutional changes. Yet others may require substantial trade-offs 
between competing goods. Although recognition of the value conflicts is the 
first necessary step in achieving reconciliation or trade-offs, in the nonnal 
conduct of business firms and host countries rarely recognize, much less ar-
ticulate, them, preferring instead to preserve the notion for themselves and 
the outside world that all desirable objectives may be jointly pursued without 
sacrificing one for the other. In the post-Bhopal atmosphere of intense inter-
national activities aimed at prevention or mitigation of such tragedies in the 
future, these value issues clearly need to be better understood if substantial 
international gains are to be made. 
It is these questions about values and value trade-offs that are the theme 
of this book. The book is based on a three-year study focusing on the expe-
rience of three large U.S.-based multinational corporations-Du Pont Agri-
cultwal Products, Oa:idental Chemical, and Xerox-in establishing hazardous 
industrial facilities in two developing countries, India and Thailand, in the 
1980s. These are stories of success. The study departed from the familiar 
impulse to learn from disasters and problems and concentrated on corpora-
tions that claim to be socially responsible in business ventures and that pride 
themselves in being profitable, safe, and environmentally sound. 
The projett was based on the assumption that both the host countries and 
the corporations have, as one of their key objectives, an environmentally 
and occupationally sound facility, and that both share two sets of values: 
those related to environment, health, and safety (EH&S) goals and those 
related to development, equity, and independence (DE&I) goals. Further, it 
was assumed that these two sets of values manifest themselves through 
country- and corporation-specific policies in relation to siting of MNC for-
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eign affiliates. The study examines the influence and interaction of these two 
clusters of values upon decisions and activities of the key aaors, including 
any value conflicts and trade-offs that may oemr in the course of facility 
development. 
The book has three broad objectives: 
1. to examine the may of the two value sets in the decision-making proc:as and their 
recognition by corporate and host country officials; 
2. to assess the degree to which these values are compatible or in conflict (distin-
guishing between apparent and real conflicts, and between the conflicts), within 
and between the two setS; and 
3. to elucidare how value interactions contribute to EH&S outcomes on a facility 
level. 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, AND EH&S 
The emergence of MNCs as the dominant force in post-World War 11 in-
ternational capital markets is a much studied and often controversial phe-
nomenon. From their pre-war involvement in extractive activities in the 
agricultural and mineral sectors, MNCs aggressively entered the manufac-
turing sector in developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, led initially by 
U.S. firms but soon joined by European and Japanese enterprises. Facilitated 
by rapid advances in transport and telecommunications technologies, and 
induced by import-substitution policies of developing countries, industrial 
countries continue to move manufacturing operations into developing coun-
tries to gain access to new markets, cheap labor, and raw materials. 
Data compiled by the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corpora-
tions (UNCfC 1991) show that the average ratio of foreign to domestic in-
vestment among developing countries is approximately twice the ratio in 
Western nations. An estimated 60 percent of all industrial investment in 
developing nation. originates outside such countries, with Western MNC. 
representing a large proportion of that figure (United Nations Environmental 
Programme [UNEP] 1984, cited in Covello and Frey 1990). Some 500 
MNCs accounted for 80 petcent of all direct foreign investment (Stopford 
and Dunning 1983, cited in Jenkins 1987). MNCs remain the principal 
source of technologies in the most dynamic industrial sectors. With the glo-
balization of product production and marketing, and attendant expansion 
of intra-finn transfer of capital and technology, the role of MNC. in the 
next decade will become even more pivotal in shaping the nature and pace 
of technology transfer to developing countries. 
During the post-war years, the multinational-host country dynamics under-
went fundamental changes, driven by both economic and political shifts in 
North-South relations. The end of de jure colonialism, which had lasted well 
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into the 1960s, together with the rapid industrialization in certain Latin 
American and Asian nations, spawned aggressive efforts to take conttol of 
development and to fashion new strategies for retaining the fruits of such 
development within host countries. These changes manifested themselves 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s in a gradual tightening of controls on own· 
ership and management of MNC operations which, until then, had operated 
largely unfettered by host country controls. In free market and socialist coun-
tries alike, MNCs entered in a period of high visibility, the subject of a 
growing array of legal and economic instruments aimed at appropriating a 
portion of the MNC surplus for the benefit of host country development. 
What had once been a relatively invisible presence evolved into a more scru-
tinized and public activity_ 
In a parallel development, the r<placement of extractive activities with 
manufacturing activities as the dominant form of MNC investments in devel-
oping countries introduced a wave of technological hazards in the form of 
occupational exposures t() hazardous materials, air and water pollution, 
and the risk of large-scale industrial accidents. In many developing countries, 
the pace of industrialization outstripped the capacity of host governments to 
properly regulate the hazards imported by MNCs, whether or not such haz-
ards were inherendy greater than those pr<Sent in parent country operations. 
For some firms, the absence of a regu12toty infrastructure was an invitation 
to cut comers, import obsolete equipment, and expose workers, communi· 
ties, and the environment to inertased pollution. For other firms committed 
to achieving greater equality or equivalence with parent country operations, 
their mer< status as foreigo-owoed enterprises made evety mishap, large or 
small, vulnerable to stigmatization of the corporation as a symbol of Western 
control and domination. 
Collectively, by the 197()s these trends had helped shape the relationship 
of developing countries and MNCs into one characterized by a mixture of 
caution, mistrust, and political ideology. The notion that MNCs were a dis-
tinctive breed of economic enterprise requiring both international and 
domestic sautiny and controls was a position that gained substantial cur-
rency among those responsible for fosteting Third World development. 
Underlying this view was a perception that hosting MNCs involved certain 
unavoidable trade-offs stenuniog from the intrinsic conflict between corpo-
rate and host country development objectives. These views are evident, for 
example, in the United Nations' Code of Conduct for Transnational Corpo-
rations, initiated in theearly 19705 (UNCTC 1976), and its contemporary, 
Organization for Eronomic Co-operation and Development (OECO) Guide-
lines for Multirtatiortal Enterprises (OECD 1976). Both dCKllments clearly 
assume an inherent conflict of MNC business objectives and host country 
developmcru and EH&S obieaives. These voluntary codes, although designed 
to guide MNC5 in dealing vnth their hosts, also sent an IlDmistalceahle mes-
sage of caution to those tatgeted for MNC investment. 
INTRODUCTION s 
By the 1980s, the theme of conflict and competition had run its course 
and had given way to a more pragmatic approach built on the notion of loog-
term shared interest. The realization that a=ss to global capital and consu-
mers is requisite to sustained economic growth has been reinforced by greater 
sophistication and experience on the pan of host countries in negotiating 
with MNCs. In a remarkable contrast to the 1976 Codes of Conduct, the 
1988 United Nations document on transnational corporations and world 
development str .... d cooperation between MNCs and host countri .. , the 
need for flexibility on the pan of host countries to accommodate the MNCs' 
business objectiv .. , and need for greater .. If-regulation by MNCs themselv ... 
The language of the discussion mirrors this shift toward accommodation, 
mutuality, and compromise: "corporate environmentalism," "public~private 
pannership," and "product stewardship" exemplify this conciliatoty tone 
(UNCTC 1988; International Chamber of Commerce 1990). At the same 
time, many Western MNCs have altered their view of environmental pro-
tection as a mandated burden to one in which environment and safety are 
good business from a product, productivity, and public profile standpoint. 
Thus, without diminishing the need for the developing countri .. to maintain 
an active role in influencing the activities of MNCs, the growing con .. nsus 
in the 1980s and 1990s bas been to view all the key players as panners, 
mutually and fundamentally dependent on each other, and having shared 
responsibilities for the direction of the development of the Third World. 
As this new view of MNC-host country interdependence and co-r .. ponsi-
bility has emerged, so has a new large-scale vision of sustainable develop-
ment, in es .. nce the global and national scale counterpart to the finn-level 
model described earlier. Starting with the .. minal Founa Report (Ozorio 
del Almeida et a!. 1971) and Stockholm Conference (UNCESI 1972), gather-
ing momentum with the World Conservation Strategy (International Union 
for Con .. rvation of Nature [IUCN] 1980), Brandt Commission Report (In-
dependent Commission on International Development Issues [lODl] 1980), 
and World Industry Conference on Environmental Management (United 
Nations Environmental Programme [UNEP] 1984), and culminating with 
the landmark Our Common Future repon (World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development [WCED] 1987), the concept of the long-term com-
patibility of the environment and economic and social development has 
replaced the pr .. umption of conflict and incompatibility. 
Notwithstanding the conciliatoty tone of the last decade, translating ear-
nest intentions into working procedures, especially with regard to exportS 
of hazardous products and processes, remains an unfinished task. Develop-
ing countries in particular are vulnerable to technology-related risks because 
of limi~ financial resources, inadequate access to data and teclmical exper-
tise, inadequate regulatory infrastructure, and limited public participation 
in bazard management (Ashford and Ayers 1985; Covello and Frey 1990). 
Among the exported hazardous products, international trade in medicines, 
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pesticides, consumer products, and hazardous wastes, has been the focus of 
much adverso publicity and lingering conctrn over the responsibilities of 
MNC in dtveloping countries. Partly in responst to thest conctrns, during 
the past two dteades multiple legal constraints have been imposed in the 
Unittd States on the export of hazardous products to the developing world. 
Some of thtst took the form of special provisions in laws otherwise primarily 
applicable to the domestic management of these hazard., such as the Ftderal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Resourct Conser· 
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA), tho Toxic Substanct Control Act (TSCA), 
the Food and Drug Act, the Public Health Servict Act, and the Consumer 
Product Safety Act. Others, such as the Export Administration Act, were 
more general. In the arta of hazardous waste trade, perhaps the most volatile 
of aU exports issues, the 1988 Bastl Convention, stt forth a framework for 
regulating transboundary movements of such substancts. 
To varying degrtes, the core principles behind these laws and conventions 
is prior informed constnt. Under this principle, each country is entitled to 
make its own decisions about risks and the stUer has a rtSponsibility to inform 
the trade partner about the risks according to its best knowledge. Thus, 
proper labeling, information disstmination, notification of the appropriate 
U.S. agencies, and informed constnt by the rectiving country are the primaty 
policy tools for protecting the dtveloping nations from adverse effects of these 
technological hazards. In practict, these requirements translate into a shartd 
responsibility for hazardous product exports between the host country gov· 
ernment, which may directly aectpt or reject these materials, and the parent 
country government, through its role in monitoring and enforcing its own 
domestic laws and regulations. 
The export of hazardous processts has also been the subject of a flurry of 
international activity, especially in the aftermath of the 1984 Bhopal tragtdy. 
Industrial trade organizations, governments, corporations, and various na-
tional and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations 
have since announctd codes of conduct, policies, guidelines, protocols, and 
international agreements. The legal liability laws of many countries also 
underwent major changes after Bhopal, CItating powerful disinctntives to 
careless management of hazardous technologies by MNCs. 
While thest activities will no doubt lead to further risk reduction, in con-
tIast to hazardous product exports (including wastes), the management of 
EHIlcS at fortign subsidiaries of MNC is primarily in the hands of the cor-
poration and the host country, with other organizations and governments 
playing only indirect roles. In principle, this responsibility can be exercistd 
by both parties at aU stages of facility establishment and operation. The 
licensing-and-permitting process aUows a host country to influence the design 
and operating conditions of an MNC facility or to reject it altogether if seri-
ous incompatibility occurs. Once establishtd, a facility may be monitored 
through inspections and licence renewals. The corporation, for its part, 
may develop formal policies rtgarding hazard management at fortigo subsid-
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iaries, including design, consttuction, management, training and education, 
and may respond to the host country's requirements through adaptation or 
withdrawal. 
EARLIER STUDIES 
The complex issues related to the: export of hazardous manufacturing 
facilities-driving forces, trends, implications, and prognosis-have been 
the object of extensive research. The resulting literature can be divided into 
three broad categories, each deserving of notice. 
The first category of studies is corporation<entered and examines the 
role of firms as agents of EH&S technology transfer through their foreign 
affiliates. This literature includes analyses of corporate policies and man· 
agement systems for implementing EH&S in their international facilities 
(Flaherty and Rappaport 1991; Gladwin 1977; Rappaport and Flaherty 
1991; Morrison 1991, pp. 16-17; UNCTC 1991b); studies of organiza' 
tional behavior of MNCs in the context of host country regulatory dimates 
(Gladwin and Walter 1976; Gladwin and WeDs 1976); and studies of imple· 
mentation of international safery and health guidelines at foreign affiliates 
of MNCs (International Labour Office [lLO] 1984). 
The second category of studies focuses on the role of the host country in 
shaping the technology transfer decisions and effects of MNCs. This re· 
search often gives particular attention to the evolution of regulations and 
policies relative to environmental and industrial safety, both in general and 
in relation to MNC facilities. The work of Leonard and Mortell (1981), 
MoreU and Poznanski (1985), Pimenta (1987), Ural (1987) and White (1991) 
exemplify this cluster. 
The third category of research explores the dynamics and interdependen-
cies of the MNC behavior vis-a-vis the developing country's laws, regula-
tions, and political climate. Five lines of inquiry may be distinguished here: 
1. the: quc:stion of "pollution havens" -the flight of hazardous industtiaJ enterprise! 
from developed to developing countries to avoid domestic regulations and stan· 
dards (Casdeman 1987; Duerksen 1983; Gladwin and Well. 1916; Knogden 
1979; Leonard 1987; Leonard 1988; Pearson and Pryor 1978; Richardson and 
Mutri 1976; Walter 1982); 
2. analyse. of large-scale tethnological failures and pollution episodes at the MNC,' 
Third World facilities (Bawonder, Kasperson, and Kasperson 1985; Bawonder 
and Linstone 1987; Casdeman and Purkavastha 1985; Gladwin 1985; Gladwin 
1987; Lagadec 1987; Morren and Poznanski 1985; Shrivastava 1981; Weir 1981); 
3. comparative analysis of environment, health, and safety performance of MNC 
affiliates in industrial versus developing countries (Hassan 1981; Ives 1985; 
Knodgen 1979; ILO 1984; Royston 1979); 
4. comparative analysis of environment, health, and safety performance of domes· 
tically owned versus MNC-owned facilities in developing countries (Casdeman 
1987, ILO 1984; Pimenta 1987; and Royston 1985). Notably, recent work of 
8 CORPORATE ENVlJlONMENTAUSM 
the United Nations (United Nations Economic and Social Commission foe Asia 
and the Pacific 1988 and 1990) addresses the latter four lines of inquiry; aod 
5 . negotiations betwun host counaies and multinational corporations ovec the en· 
vironmentalaspects of industria1enterprises (Leonard 1985; Pinz 1987; Leonard 
1988). 
Collectively, these studies mirTor the evolution of MNC-host country 
relations during the last three decades. The initially dominant interests were 
in the goods and bads of corporate behavior and in the balance of power 
between host countries and multinational corporations. These have been 
gradually enriched by inquiries into the complexities of achieving environ-
mentally sound and safe facilities, into the most appropriate roles for the 
key actors in pursuing that objective, and into the actual negotiation process 
over the foreign subsidiaries. At the same time, the reality emerging from 
this body of research is one that defies simple characterization and generali-
zation. Time has tended to blur, rather than resolve, the debate about poUu-
tion havens and double standards, in part because aggregate trends do not 
automatically translate into measurable outcomes and in part because of the 
paucity of on-the-ground performance data to assess how facilities actually 
perform in home versus host countries. The occasionaUy inevitable major 
accidents at MNCs' overseas facilities only polarize the debate further. 
In the area most akin to our study, the case studies of Pinz (1987) and 
Leonard (1988) explore the environmental negotiations between host country 
and multinational corporation. However, their focus on select countries 
(Papua, New Guinea, and Mexico, Ireland, and Spain, respectively) and on 
visibly polluting industries (mosdy mining, energy generation, and large 
chemical complexes), as well as their limited interest in the process of nego-
tiation and in the actual performance of the new enterprises, leaves many 
unanswered questions at the nexus of MNC-host country interactions. At 
this juncture, we have few explanations as to the underlying values that 
motivate the principal actors in their mutual interactions and how such, in-
teractions translate into different levels of facility performance. Between the 
initial steps in MNC strategic planning for OVerseas expansion and the final 
5tage of facility operation lies a largely unexplored domain in which negoti-
ation, trade-offs, and reconciliation of competing objectives shape the terms, 
conditions, and performance of foreign affiliates. 
Despite the intense interest in MNCs in developing countrie., EH&S as-
pectS of MNC facilities continue to be treated generally as a black box within 
which these interactions occur. Our study provides a glimpse inside this box 
in an attempt to unravel some of its content. 
SCOPE AND RESEARCH DEOSION 
This stUdy explores the influence of two crucial sets of values - develop-
ment, equity, and independence, and environment, health, and sakty-upon 
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the decisions, negotiations, and policies that ultimately detennine the EH&S 
perfonnance of MNC facilities in developing countries. We stress at the 
outset that the study is not ditected at comparing the domestic and foreign 
facilities of MNCs. Neither does it atrempt to document or refute the case 
for corporate miscooduct. Instead, we direct our anention to the dynamics 
of MNC-host country interactions in the course of facility development as 
the two parties put into practice their respective pursuits of DE &1 and 
EH&S values. 
The vehicle for achieving this is a chronicle of decisions and events that, 
in turn, are interpreted by referring to the underlying values, trade-offs, and 
compromises. This chronicle includes negotiations, licensing, construaion, 
and start-up of ~ach facility. The analysis of sustained ~rformance of ~ach 
facility is conducted only to the extent necessary to understand the effects 
on perfonnance of the decisions made during siring. Similarly, the analysis 
of the DE&I and EH&S-related policies of the host countries and the cor-
porations is conducted primarily for the purpose of interpreting the events 
and decisions that occurred in each case. 
Case study, rather than survey, research was the chosen methodology since 
it afforded a close-up view of the actors and nuances of each case. It also en-
abled us to undenake the study with a relatively ·soft" working hypothesis-
that value conflicts occur in multiple, diverse, and unanticipated fonns in 
the course of facility siring (Yin 1988). At the same time, the small sample 
size severely limits the capacity to generalize our findings, in the end leaving 
as many issues discovered as resolved. We examine these limitations again 
in the final chapter. 
The data for analysis were collected by way of interviews, discussions, 
site visits, and review of key documents_ Each of the three stories was recon-
structed by tapping the key participants: the host country authorities, the 
U.S.-based corporate officers and management, and the management and 
workers of each facility. Unfonunately, in two cases that were joindy owned, 
we did not sucoeed in reaching the joint venture partners. Many hours of un-
structured interviews were conducted at Clark University, at the corporate 
headquarters of the corporations, and on the premises of the three facilities. 
The documents studied include official corporate and national policy state-
ments, facility permit and license records, and such internal corporate docu-
ments as joint venture agreements, facility blueprints, internal memoranda, 
and leners. Some of the corporate documents were confidential; they were 
used as sourus of information but not quoted verbatim. In addition, per-
formance data for the three facilities under study, as well as other facilities 
of the three corporations, were analyzed. 
Three teams of investigators participated in the study: the U.S. team pro-
vided the overall ditection to the project, while the teams from Mahidol 
University in Thailand and from Administrative Staff College in India con-
centrated on providing the host country perspectives and on providing the 
U.S. team with acoess to high officials in each country. 
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Sewring the participation of the corporations was difficult. The reluctance 
of any large organization, including corporations, to submit to external 
inquiry was not unexpected, particularly in the sensitive area of EH&S. Ex-
tensive and critical publicity surrounding corporate mismanagement is weU 
known to any exewtive who deals with hazardous materials, processes, and 
productS. Furthermore, to conduct the study as we designed it required a 
major commitment of staff time and resources at both headquarters and 
foreign affiliates. This was essential to understanding the processes and in-
teractions that lie at the hean of the research questions and the reconstruction 
of the stories behind each facility's development. Not surprisingly, the three 
corporations that agreed to participate, of the approximately fifty approached, 
are large, rich in resources, and eager to share their strong policies and com-
mitment to EH&S. This self-selection, which we fully recognize, further 
resmctS the ability to generalize rIDdings. 
VOLUME PREVIEW 
The volume is organized into eight chapters. FoUowing this introduction, 
Chapter 2 defines the terminology and conceptual framework used through-
out the study. Chapter 3 setS the stage for the three case studies by profiling 
the host counmes and the corporations, emphasizing EH&S policies and 
procedures governing the siting of foreign MNC facilities. Chapter 4 details 
the stories of the three facilities, the paths, diversions, obstacles, and ultimate 
success in siting in India aod Thailand. From these stories emerge three 
themes that help explain the processes and outcomes attendant to each facil-
ity: the host country's DE&I values, corporate wlNre, and the nature of 
business arrangements between parent and parmer. Each of these themes is 
explored in detail in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, respectively. 
Chapter 8 synthesizes the team's findings. It presents a revised model of 
facility development; offers our conclusions regarding the value of trade..,ffs, 
corporate environmentalism, the key determinants of facility performance, 
and the roles played by the key participants; and offers recOmmendations 
for improving the negotiating process. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Values and Culture 
in Technology Transfer 
This study deals with the influence and interaction of two clusters of values 
upon decisions concerning the transfer to and siting of hazardous techno-
logical facilities in less developed countries. The study's design was influenced 
by a range of initial assumptions (both normative and empirical) and models 
(both substantive and heuristic), which helped to derme the project, to direct 
the field work, and to guide the interpretation of empirical results. This 
chapter endeavors to identify and clarify these assumptions and models in 
sufficient detail to render them vulnerable to rational criticism, evaluation, 
and refinement. 
The first section of this chapter characterizes the EH&S (environment, 
health, and safety) and DE&I (development, equity, and independence) 
value clusters, which are treated as independent variables in our study of 
hazardous technology transfer decisions. The second pan explicates a num-
ber of concepts that are central to research reported here. These include the 
concepts of valu., value conflict, value trade-off, technology, culture, actor, 
policy, and others. Most of these have widely varied meanings in different 
scholarly disciplines, and their interdisciplinary use requires special care. 
The third part considers some of the peculiar methodological problems posed 
by research aimed at the discovery and reconstruction of value-laden decision-
making processes. The fourth section articulates the structural and develop-
mental models of technology transfer that guided our research. 
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THE EH&:S AND DE&:I VALUE CLUSTERS 
Environment, Health, and Safety Values 
This cluster includes values relating to occupational health and safety and 
the protection of the public against disease, environmental hazards, and 
technological disasters. These values treat human health and safety as fun-
damental goods and consider environmental effects to the extent that these 
will in rum affect human health, safety, and weU-being. Concern about the 
impact of industrial activities on sacred land or on highly valued landscapes, 
both of which are of special importance to many developing nations, are ex-
amples of such values. 
But the EH&:S cluster also includes values relating to environmental pro-
tection that are not derived simply from concern for human health and safety, 
that is, values that treat the environment as an intrinsic (and not merely an 
instrUmental) good. The preservation of biotopes, for example, may be re-
garded as an important goal independent of its consequences for human 
beings. (For representative arguments in support of the view that the envi-
ronment is an intrinsic good, sec Hargrove 1989.) 
These EH&:S values arc commonly held by nearly aU parties involved and 
are broadly reflected in policy, legislation, and regulatory practice of host 
countries and corporations alike. Many nations have developed legislative 
and regulatory policies that reflect their EH&:S values. In the highly devel-
oped nations that serve as MNC parent countries, these rules and policies 
may be so detailed that ODe can calculate the implicit value of saving a human 
life as a function of the individual's occupational starus, the narure of the 
hazard, and the victim's involvement in the creation of the hazard. There is 
a rich literarure discussing such calculations (sec Bennan 1978; Thaler and 
Rosen 1976; Shakow 1983). Using methods of contingent evaluation or re-
placement costs, one can calculate the implicit value (in terms of subjective 
utiliry losses or jobs or production lost) of saving a particular species (such 
as the snail darter) or biosphere (such as the Arctic wilderness reserve). 
There is broad support for three sets of values we include in the EH&:S 
value cluster. These are: 
1. Health and sal.ty-understood IS referring to the protection of human life from 
avoidable risk or harm, and manihsted as, foe example, effom to reduce or avoid 
occupational injury or illness; concern for the protection of specially vulnerable 
people and groups; and prevention or remediation of adverse public health effects 
from environmental or industtiallOlltCa. 
2. Co_nt.nd comp.ru.tion -understood IS referring to the belief that human be-
ings deserve information about the occupational and environmental hazards to 
which they may be exposed, have the capacity and right to make choices about 
Iccepting auch risb, and deserve compensation for barms. These beliefs are man-
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ifested in, for example, labeling and right·ta-.know regulations; workers' com· 
pensation systems; ton liability for consumer producu; and legally mandated 
reporting of environmental releases and occupational accidents. 
3. Enviromnenttz/ protection-understood as referring to a concern for the protection 
and pttservation of nonhuman species and biotopes and diverse ecological da-. 
mains, whether for their own sake or because of their consequences for human 
health, safety, and weUare. These values are manifested in, for example, legal 
protection of endangered species and habitats; creation of national wildlife and 
wilderness reserves; and regulation of destructive environmental discharges. 
General acceptance of these EH&S values obviously docs not entail any 
homogeneity of policy or practice between different nations: Different cul-
tural and environmental ClrOJrnstances can lead to very different national 
strategies for accomplishing similarly cherished EH&S goals. A nation con-
vinced that "wealth is health" may prefer less stringent EH&S regulation in 
the short-term in order to accelerate development and maximize EH&S 
protection in the long-term (see Wildavslcy 1990); a nation traumatized by a 
Bhopal-like catastrophe might be more concerned with implementing strin-
gent EH&S standards from the outset, regardless of their effect on the pace 
of development. 
Development, Equity, and IndepeDdeDce Values 
The DE&I value cluster includes economic goods such as national wealth, 
staDdard of living, productive capacity, and balanced trade, equity values 
related to the socially acceptable distribution of these economic goods, and 
political values such as national political stability, preferences for particular 
forms of government, independence from other nations, and international 
reputation and influence. 
Like the EH&S values, these values are commonly held by nearly all parties 
involved and are broadly reflected in the policy, legislation, and regulatory 
practice of host countries and corporations alike. We distinguish three sets 
of values within the DE&I cluster: 
1. Growth- uodentood as expansion of national productive cap.city and manifested 
as an inaease in, for example, national production, worker productivity, sav-
ings, fraaion of labor force engaged in wage economy, and basic infrastructure 
development. 
2. Equity-uoderstood as referring to the more equal distribution of the benefits of 
growth among difkrmt national regions, lUb-populatioos, and genet.tiODS, and 
manifested as, for example, teduction of skewed land and resource ownership 
and iD<ome difkrmtials; broadened access to basic social, educational, and health 
services; and equality of economic opportunity. 
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gories, and concepts, which (in combination with relevant empirical infor-
mation) he or she uses as justifying grounds for his or her beliefs that cenain 
objeas and states-of-affairs are good. For most individuals, evaluative norms 
include moral and ethical commitments (typically of religious or philosoph-
ical origin), social and cultural mores, preferences of individual taste, and 
so foM. Strictly speaking, one can distinguish first-order beliefs (that is, 
beliefs to the effect that objeas or states-of-affairs are good) from second-
order beliefs (that is, the evaluative nonns used to justify flrst-order beliefs). 
The fonner might then be called values (in • narrower sense) and the latter 
evaluative norms. Although this distinction is imponant in other contexts, 
it is unnecessary for the purposes of the research reponed here. Accordingly, 
we use the term values to include both flrst- and second-order beliefs of the 
kinds mentioned previously. 
Given these assumptions, we can propose the following pattern of usage 
for the term lIalue and its cognates: 
1. The phrase UP's values" can be used to denote, inclusively, both P's beliefs to the 
effect that certain objects and states.of-affairs as they aTe conceived (whether cor-
rectly or not) by P are good, and P's evaluative nonns (that is, the system of value-
related rules, categories, and concepts that function as justifying grounds for the 
beliefs that these objects and state .. of-affain are good). 
2. The cognate phrase "P values X" Cln be used to mean that P has a belief to the ef-
fect that X (as she or he conceives it) is good. 
These usages make it clear that to nEer to X as a value is to refer to X as it is 
conceived as a good by some person. That P values X does not enuil that X is 
rcalizeable for P, or eveD that X exists: Thus, some envirorunen[~st5 may value 
zero-risk conditions despite the faa that DO human activity can be without risk. 
Similarly, on these usages, the fact that P values X does not guarantee that X is 
"good for P" in the everyday sense of the phrase, or even that X is simply "good": 
A drug addia may value narcotic: intoxication despite the fact that, in common 
usage, it is neither "good for him" nor simply "good." 
J. The term "goods" can be used to denote the extra-mental objects and states-of-
affain to which P'. beliefs (more or less accurately) refer. 
As conceived by a narcotics addict, whether aCOlI'ately or not, a gram of heroin 
(and it3 anticipated intoxicating effect) is a value. But the "good" to which this 
value refen is not the adelia'. concept, but the actual bag of heroin (and its effects) 
in his band. Tbe good shares many properties with the value (e.g., color and tex-
ture); the good may have properties that are not a pan of the value (e.g., diluent 
CODtamjn.ationh and the good may lack properties that are pan of the value (e.g., 
the ability to prnent frostbite). 
This example display> the typical relationship between a ... !Me and it3 associated 
good: When IOUght-af= objeaJ and state&-Of-affain (values) an: actually obtained 
(goods), they are usually more complex, and ohm IOmewhat different, than their 
COnceptiON. This distinaion betwem good. and values enables us to .peak of 
IIlhaced values- in two tenses. 
VALUES AND CULTUR.!. IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSf!.R. 21 
4. We can say that two people share a cenain value in the strong sense if they have 
identical beliefs to the effect that some object or state of affairs is good. (This re-
quires that they have identical conceptions of the object or state.-of-affairs.) 
S. We can say that two people share a cenain value in the wealt sense if each has a 
.imilar belief to the effect tlat some object or .tate-of-affairs is good. (This requires 
ooly tlat they have similar coDC<ption. of the object or .tat<-of-affairs.) 
Obviously, values that are shared in the strong sense are a fortiori shared 
in the weak sense. But shared values in the Strong sense, which require identical 
conceptualizations of their object, are very rare. Here and later in this 
chapter, we use the phrase "shared values" in the weak sense, which requires 
only that all those who share a given value have sufficiently similar con-
ceptions of that value to pick out the same good. It is in this weak sense, for 
example, that health and development can be called widely shared values, 
despite the fact that no nations or corporations that share these values may 
have precisely the same concept of the states-of-affairs to which they refer. 
Diverse uDd~rstandings of imponant values arc common even in Darrow 
academic specialties: Few topics in bioethics are as hotly disputed as the 
meaning of the concept of health. Scholars almost unanimously reject the 
World Health Organization's definition of health (W.H.O. 1946): Health is 
a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely 
the absence of disease of infirmity. But there is no consensus for any alterna-
tive definition, and outside academia, the dispute is even sharper. Consider 
the Status of three conditions (political dissent, 'excess' fertility [defined as 
more than one child), and homosexuality) in four nations (the United States, 
Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and China): Whether one is "diseased," "criminal," 
"a cultural hero," or none of the above would seem to be a cultural artifact. 
Despite all this disagreement, all cultures and peoples agree that "Health is a 
basic human value and a fundamental good!" 
It is worth noting that much social and interpersonal conflict is related to 
the fact that so many shared values are only weakly shared. Friends or allies 
who have worked long and hard to attain a (weakly) shared value can be 
rudely surprised when the state-of-affairs realized by their success fails to 
match exactly most (or even any) of their individual expectations. Thus it 
can happen that political movements are divided by electoral success, or 
marriages strained by the accomplishment of long-sought goals. 
Weakly sbared values underlie many important conflicts in the area of 
environmental protection and Third World development. In the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, for example, human weUare is 
defined as "wide access to life amenities, aesthetically and culturally pleas-
ing surroundings, important historical, cultural and natural aspects of ... 
national heritage, high standard of living, and individual choice." Although 
human welfare is a value shared by both developed and developing nations, 
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the NEPA definition takes for granted the prior attainment of other shared 
values (e.g., absence of squalor, adequate food and shelter, education, and 
political empowerment), which may be missing in developing nations, and 
the pursuit of which may conflict with the pursuit of NEPA.<fefined human 
welfare. 
Values, as we have seen, can be shared. They can also conflict. As used in 
the literature, the phrase "value conflict" seems to have no commonly adopted 
core usage. This secrion will indicate how the term will be used in the chap-
ters to follow. 
Negatively, to assert that two values "conflict" (in a given context) is not 
to assert that they are in some way intrinsically opposed. Benevolence and 
malevolence may be intrinsically opposed in this way. Values would be in-
trinsit:aUy opposed if there were (and could be) no circumstances in which 
both could be realized; Mill's "Utility" and Aristotle's "Eudemonia" values, 
rooted in irreconcilable metaphysical systems, might be opposed in this way. 
But these are rare examples-and it is notable that even the values at stake 
in most "zero sum" problems, which typically result from extrinsic con-
straints, are rarely opposed in any intrinsic way. Clearly, the values and 
goods upon which this project is focused (health, safety, development, and 
national independence, for example) are not intrinsically opposed in any 
way. Accordingly, to speak of a 'conflict" between environmental and devel-
opment values is not to assert any intrinsic opposition between them; rather, 
it is merely to indicate that, in a given place and process and time, the values 
are so related that the policy and practice options that would advance one 
value tend to exclude the policy and practice options that would advance the 
other value. 
In many situatioDS, a value conflict consists simply of the fact that the 
policy and pracrice options that would best advance each value must compete 
for scarce attention and resources. This might be called weak value conflict. 
A government agency endeavoring to balance fast-track approval for a 
socially beneficial construcrion project, detailed analysis of the project's en-
vironmental effects, and lengthy public participation hearings, finds itself 
confronted with such weak (but real) conflict. In other siruations, the policy 
and pracrice options that would advance one value may significantly retard 
the other. This might be called strong value. conflict. A marginally profitable 
corporation that must choose between bearing the costs of more stringent 
occupational or environmental regulation or moving its operations to coun-
tries with less stringent EH&S standards would seem to face a strong conflict 
involving health and safety, on the one hand, and growth and employment 
on the other. (This particular conflict is explored in Shue 1981.) Unless noted 
otherwise. we will use the phrase "value conflict" to include both weak and 
strong conflicts. 
Many individuals believe that EH&S and DE&I strongly conflict with 
each other. According to the "Crisis Environmentalist" school of thought 
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articulated by Paul Ehrlich's Population Bomb (1968) and defended by 
Limits to Growth (Meadows 1972) and the widely cited Global 2000 (Coun-
cil on Envirorunental Quality 1980) repon to President Jimmy Caner, our 
economic system encourages greed, excessive profits, and competition, and 
therefore inevitably leads to resource depletion and envirorunental degrada-
tion_ (These and the opposing argumenrs are analyzed in Shrader-Frechette 
1988, pp_ 196-219; and in Dyck 1977, pp. 32-51.) According to the op-
posing "developmentalist" view advocated by Drucker (1988) and the authors 
of The Resourceful Earth (Simon and Kahn 1984) however, th .. e is no con-
flict between EH&S and DE&I values; instead, they argue, the financial 
and human assets necessary to repair and preserve the envirorunent can only 
be produced by economic growth (see Kahn et al. 1976; and Rich 1973). 
The question of conflict between EH&S and DE&I values is particularly 
difficult in the context of less developed nations, where desperate human 
poveny can give national economic growth enormous imponance. The 
uncritical assumption of a strong conflict between EH&S and DE&I values 
pow .. fully influenced past discussions of the international development 
agenda. That assumption was evident in the remark of Brazil's then-ambas-
sador to the United States, Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro, "It is our turn to 
pollute." (1972) Although the more recent concept of sustainable develop-
ment views the EH&S and DE&I values as compatible or even mutually 
supportive, its practical applications are srill in the embryonic stage (see 
Our Common Future). 
Oth .. scholars have focused attention on weak conflicts within, rather 
than between, the EH&S and DE&I clusters, For example, Branscomb 
(1987) points out that host country initiatives that increase foreign economic 
invesanent and thus promote development are often perceived as diminish-
ing national independence. (Recent reactions by U.S. society to Asian and 
European invesanent suggest that this problem affects developed as well as 
less developed natioos.) Kirkpatrick and colleagues (1984) diswss numerous 
other conflicts among DE&I values, for example, the adoption of measures 
that promote more equitable distribution of economic benefirs but interfere 
with the most efficient use of human and natural resources. 
It should be clear that value conflicts are not the result of biased reasoning 
or incoherent value beliefs. Value conflicts are objective features of particular 
situatioos. They may be well or poorly understood by some or all of the ac-
tors in the situation. In the worst case, real value conflicts may go unnoticed 
while spurious conflicts are regarded as real (see Coser 1956). The work 
reponed in this volume suggests that some of the value conflicts raised by 
hazardous technology transfers may not be well understood by all the prin-
cipal actors and that other conflicts, which are taken for granted by some 
policy commentators, may be less serious than is presumed. 
If the phrase "value conflict" has had no common meaning in thelileralUre, 
neither has the phrase "value trade-off.' In general, the phrase "value trade-
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off" wiD be used to denote the resolution of a value conflict by the selection 
of particular policy or practice options that thereby determine the extent to 
which each involved value will be satisfied. 
Within this general usage, we can distinguish within any value trade-off 
both a "subjective" and an "objective" component. Subjectively considered, 
a value trade-off consists essentiaDy of a decision-making or negotiating 
process as understood by one or more of the participating actors. Objectively 
considered, a value trade-off consists essentiaDy of the objectively determin-
able set of (value-laden) consequences that result from the decision-making 
or negotiating process. An objective account of a particular trade-off can be 
inferred from the foDowing information: the initial values of the participants; 
the actual outcome (value-laden consequences) of the negotiation process; 
the effea of the outcome on the participants' initial values; and the range of 
decision options available to the participants. To the extent that a policy or 
practice option has consequences that do not reflect the balance of values 
aimed at by an actor, we may say that the subjective and objective trade-offs 
ate more or less divergent, an eventuality that is virtuaDy guaranteed by the 
fact that the actors have imperfect knowledge. 
Strictly speaking, there are two different distinctions to be made here. 
First, process versus outcome: There is a distinction to be drawn between 
the deliberative processes by which a trade-off is adopted and the negotiated 
trade-off that is in fact fmaDy adopted. Second, actor versus consequence: 
Given a particular policy or practice, there is a distinction to be drawn be-
tween the outcomes anticipated by a particuLar actor and the outcomes acruaUy 
produced by the adopted policy. 
In much of the work that foDows, it will not be necessary to consider these 
distinctions separately. In these contexts, the phrase "subjective component" 
will be used to caD attention to the process and actor dimensions of a trade-
off, and the phrase "objective component" will be used to caD attention to 
the outcome and consequence dimensions of a uadca()ff. 
Value trade-offs are an inevitable feature of any decision in which multiple 
values are at stake, not aU of which will be best served by anyone policy or 
practice option. This is explicitly recognized by most U.S. legislation regard-
ing EH&S values, which rypicaDy includes specific guidelines for balancing 
the pursuit of EH&S objectives against the cost of their achievement. For 
example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (F1FRA) of 
1972 directs the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to "prevent any unreasonable risk to man or the environment . . . 
taking into account economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits 
of pesticide use.' According to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthori-
zation Act (SARA) of 1986, the EPA is to take action that "protects human 
health and the environment, and is cost-effective and practical." 
Most other U.S. environmental statutes dealing with EH&S issues contain 
similar provisions regarding trade-of& between EH&S values and economic 
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values. Compromises are usually mandated by statutory language indicating 
that neither cluster of values is to be given overriding priority: qualifiers such 
asfeasible, available, practical, and cost·effective, for example, are usually 
attached to statements of EH&S goals. Among notable exceptions is the 
Endangered Species Act, which gives an almost absolute prioriry to environ-
mental values if the extinction of a species is demonstrably at stake. 
U.S. statutes dealing with EH&S issues also take explicit note of potential 
conflicts between EH&S values and national security or independence values. 
In this case, however, the statutory language generally gives national inde-
pendence values a clear and overriding priority by, for example, granting 
the government exemptions from EH&S standards when national securiry 
is at stake. (Recent disclosures regarding needless environmental destruction 
at many military facilities suggests that these well-intentioned legislative ex-
emptions may be widely abused.) 
A decision-making process involving more than one actor usually will be 
characterized by multiple trade-off processes at multiple levels: at a mini-
mum, there will be (1) a set of internal trade-offs by which each actor en-
deavors to reconcile his or her own internal value conflicts; and (2) a set of 
external trade-offs by which the actors, as a negotiating group, endeavor to 
reconcile the conflicts between their several value systems. 
Because value trade-offs are inevitable in decisions made under value con-
flict, giving them explicit attention would seem to offer some advantages to 
the negotiating parties. For example, mutually acceptable compromises 
might be more easily devised if each parry understood the other's values (see 
Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). Nevertheless, actors involved in such deci-
sion processes often seek to improve their negotiating positions by concealing 
(or even misrepresenting) their internal value systems or their real trade-off 
preferences. These behaviors raise important methodological problems, 
which are discussed later in this chapter. 
Culture and Cultural Value. 
All the value trade-off decisions accompanying a particular technology 
transfer rake place within a complex multicultural environment. Each actor's 
behavior is influenced by the culture(s) of his or her home nation and his or 
her home institution (corporate, regulatory agency, and so on). The internal 
and external value conflicts discussed previously result, in large pan, from 
conflicts between the value elements of these multiple cultural environments. 
Some discussion of the relationship berween culture and values may therefore 
be helpful. 
The term cultur. is sometimes used so broadly that any set of consistent 
behaviors can be called a culture. In the chapters that follow, the term is 
construed more narrowly. Within the context of confined social systems 
(such as corporations, national, or ethnic groups), we will use the tenn cul-
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ture to denote the rich matrix of values, roles, and interpretations that un-
derlie the consistency and distinctiveness of group members' behaviot and 
expectations. To a greater or lesser extent, these values, roles and interpre-
tations (including role models and internalized codes of conduct) define the 
personal and public identities of members of the culrure. 
Many cultures have at least a petipheral influence upon the value trade-off 
decisions accompanying a particular technology transfer process, and a thor-
ough consideration of such culrures would need to consider, inter alia, the 
national culture of the home (technology-exponing) nation, the international 
or multinational culrure of supra-government agencies, the media, and SO 
on. But the three culrures that most profoundly affect such trade-off decisions 
are the corporate culrure of the MNC and the national and instirutional cul-
rures of the host nation. 
Many corporations consciously endeavor to develop a corporate culrure 
that will motivate employees to internalize corporate rules and perform in 
predictable ways. Such culrure building wiD succeed only to the extent that 
the corporation's effons nurrure linkages between corporate values and 
employee identity and self-esteem. Developing such a corporate culrure is J 
long and sometimes expensive process, but the rewards can be very substan-
tial. A company with a strong corporate culture can expect its employees to 
promote corporate goals even in absence of immediate supervision or direct 
external rewards. 
Corporate culrure is an imponant variable in technology transfer, partic-
ularly for facility transfer. A company with strong corporate culture can 
reasonably expect that the employees responsible for siting a facility abroad 
wiD not compromise fundamental corporate principles nor jeopardize the 
suocess or reputation of the company while interacting with the host country. 
Moreover, employees who have internalized a strong corporate culture wiD 
be powerfuUy motivated to replicate that same culture in the new foreign 
subsidiary. Thus, to the extent that EH&S and other performance variables 
are related to basic corporate-culrural values, strong corporate culrure wiD 
tend to reduce performance differences between home and foreign facilities. 
Strong corporate cultures can also ameliorate many shon-term value con-
flicts by providing long-term values under which the shon-term conflicts 
can be subsumed. For example, short-teno conflicts between safety and 
profit may be ameliorated by a corporate-culrural belief that "safety pays off 
in the long run. ~ Sometimes, this son of conflict amelioration wiD require 
that the culrure be sufficiendy StrOng to redefine certain leey values, for ex-
ample, that it be able to redefine profit in a long-term perspective. 
In addition, this kind of conflict amelioration requires that the individuals 
within the culrure perceive the resolution as consistent with other elements 
of the overaU culrure. For example, attempts to aeate a safety culture must 
not be undermined by management behavior that is perceived to contradict 
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the cultural safety goals: Suclt intracultural value inconsistencies effectively 
taint all proposed conflict resolutions. In the sociological literature, cultural 
value inconsistencies of this kind are caUed ;nITa-<:ultJ<ral paradoxa (Luhmann 
1986, p. 234ff). Cultures that contain many paradoxa will fail to provide ef-
fective contexts for the resolution of short·term value conflicts. As noted later 
in this cltapter, this is a problem for host nations as well as for corporations. 
With respect to host country culture, it seems obvious that culturally con· 
ditioned lifestyle factors can have significant consequences for the pursuit of 
EH&S and DE&I values. For example, the health and safety of both work. 
ers and the public can be affected by local customs regarding dress, diet, and 
sanitation, or by cultural attitudes toward death, suffering, and risk·taking. 
Progress toward national development and independence can be influenced 
by cultural attitudes toward national identity, authority, and trade. It seems 
clear that culturally conditioned administrative and regulatoty factors can 
have equally important consequences. 
These cultural factors are difficult for non-native scholars to assess, and 
in the case studies presented here, they are considered only to the extent that 
they were important influences upon the facility siting and negotiating proc-
ess. Even in this context, only those factors are considered that derive from 
the institutional and national cultures of the host country; no effort has been 
made to reconstruct the influences of, for example, regional or ethnic sub-
cultures. 
The host country institutions involved with the siting, licensing, and reg· 
ulating of tecltnology transfer have their own cultures and values. In many 
developing countries, these institutions have had neither the time nor the 
resources to develop a strong institutional culture; as a result, linkages of in· 
stitutional values and employee identity and self-esteem may be weak. 
Symptoms of such weak linkages include corruption, nepotism, arbitrary 
decision-making, and subordination of institutional goals to personal 
ambitions. 
Moreover, the values of the institutional culture may embody serious par-
adoxa that insiders or outsiders perceive as excuses or invitations to bypass 
the ·official" rules. Finally, the values of the institutional culture may conflict 
with the values of the broader national or regional culture. 
All these considerations suggest that officially stated institutional policies 
are not the sole determinants of the institutional effect on tecltnology trans-
fer decisions. It is also necessary, so far as possible, to consider the many 
(and perhaps conflicting) individual and social values that may be involved, 
including, for example, values rooted in the national and local political sys-
tems, the business and trade communities, and the key individual actors 
representing institutions with weak institutional cultures. Some of these cul-
tural considerations have been referred to as regulatory styk (Reno 1989; 
O'Riotdan and Wynne 1987). But despite efforts to classify rcguIatory styles, 
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case studies (including those presented in this volume) have repeatedly shown 
that even within the same host country, regulatory sryles vary considerably 
from one rype of hazard to another and from one time to another. 
The most complex component of this multicultural milieu is the cultural 
environment of the host country. National cultural values may be important 
components of the value conflicts surrounding technology transfers, and 
other national cultural values may powerfully constrain the lcinds of trade-
offs that can be adopted to resolve the conflicts. Thomas Donaldson has 
described several examples of such values and trade-off constraints (1987), 
for example: 
. .. A citizen of Pakistan may be more eager to preserve her countty's Moslem heri-
tage, a heritage with stria sexual differentiation in the division of labor, than to in-
aea.se me country's economic welfare through integrating women into the workplace. 
(p. 34) 
From a western point of view, the integration of women into the national 
economy and the general increase of national productiviry are both regarded 
as goods. Moreover, they are seen as complementary and mutually reinforc-
ing values. In a developing nation (e.g., Palcistan), it may be quite the oppo-
site. Thus it is crucial to identify the values of the host culture (and, in some 
instances, the values of important subcultures) with care. 
A comprehensive consideration of the influence of cultural values upon 
value trade-off decisions would also need to consider the national and insti-
tutional cultures of the MNC parent country, the institutional and interna-
tional culture of various supra-governmental organizations, and perhaps 
even (as an influence upon the behavior of multinational corporations con-
cerned about their reputation) the institutional culture of the international 
media. Nevertheless, these additional setS of cultural values are beyond the 
scope of this book. 
Technology and Technology Transfer 
This book deals with issues raised by the transfer of potentially hazardous 
t«hnologies to less developed nations. Unfortunately, the concepts of hazard, 
technology and technology transfer are each subject to widely diverse inter-
pretations in the literature. 
In the literalUre, technology is often narrowly construed as knowledge 
necessary to provide means to accomplish certain goals (Brooks 1968, p. 
254; von Weizsaclcer 1990). Other scholars adopt a broader view and then 
distinguish such components of rechnology as hardware (machinery and 
facilities), software (blueprints or computer programs), and services (tech-
nical or professional work) (United Nations Centre for Transnational Cor-
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porations [UNCTC] 1988, p. 176). We also construe technology broadly as 
including not only knowledge but also (and centrally) knowledge-based facil-
ities, products, and processes. 
As Cavusgil has noted, technology transfer is a multifaceted, diversified, 
and constantly changing process subject to variation in industries, product 
lines, companies, and types of host countries (CavusgilI986, p. 219). Given 
the broad definition of technology adopted here, technology transfer can be 
understood as the acquisition of technological knowledge or its related facil-
ities and processes from foreign sources (United Nations Centre for Trans-
national Corporations [UNCTC] 1987. p. 2). And. as Doctors has noted. 
the acquisition of technological knowledge by less developed nations often 
involves a creative adaptation of the knowledge in order to facilitate its ap-
plication within the host country (1969. p. 3). 
For the purposes of national development. technology transfer need not 
always involve ownership of a technology; it may, for example, involve a 
limited right to use a technology for a certain period. subject to the control 
of the firm that developed or owns the technology. Host countries may seek 
or accept technology transfer even subject to such limitations or external 
controls, in part because they hope thereby to increase their capacity for 
technology development (for the indigenous generation of technology by the 
host country). 
Technology transfer can be accomplished in many different ways: by the 
export and import of manufactured products; by the transfer of industrial 
processes; by the provision of technological services or research and devel-
opment (R&D) assistance; by the training of host country personnel; or by 
the construction of industrial facilities (see Ashford and Ayers 1985, p. 875; 
National Academy of Sciences 1980, pp. 6-7). Technology transfers between 
advanced nations are commonly accomplished by licensing. Technology 
transfers from advanced nations to developing nations usually involve a 
combination of capital. facilities, technical knowledge. and services (Cavasgil 
1986. pp. 219-220). Technology transfers from newly developed nations 
to less developed nations often involve special management methods or in-
dustrialization concepts (a so-called role model approach). Technology 
transfers between developing nations usually involve indigenous technologies 
such as agricultural practices or seed stocks. 
From the perspective of national development, the most common and 
perhaps most important form of technology transf« has been the direct in-
vestment of multinational corporations in developing countries (Tavis 1988, 
p. 10ff). Our three case studies examine just one variety of this modality of 
technology transf«: the design, siting, and construction of an industrial 
manufacturing facility in a developing country by a U.S. mulrinational cor-
poration. As the studies will show, this kind of facility transfer involves a 
wide range of supporting technology transfer activities. such as capital. serv-
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ices, management tools, know-how, and R&D effons. Thus, although the 
cases described in this volume reflect only one of the many primary varieties 
of technology transfer processes, they do involve an interesting range of 
transfer activities. 
Acton and Policies 
The fO<lls of our study is on the decision-making process of the principal 
actors involved in the technology transfer projectS represented by our cases: 
(1) the developing host country that receives the technology, (2) the MNC 
that transfen it, and (3) the local joint venture parmer. We have included 
the joint venture parmers because they are often influential parties in the 
decision-making processes and have goals and interests that may differ from 
those of the other principal actors (Robinson 1988, p. 193). 
The principal aaors in each case are just those institutions and individuals 
who take an integral part in the decision-making process that eventuates in 
the technology transfer activity. Each case also involves numerous peripheral 
aaon, institutions, and individuals outside the aaual decision-making proc-
ess who influence or detennine the set of external constraints within which 
the principalaaors' negotiation process takes place. These peripheral aaors 
include the national government of the MNC's home country, various non-
governmental institutions and international organizations, other affeaed 
industries, or consumen, worktts, and cultural opinion leaders, both inter-
nationally and in the host country (see Tavis 1988, p. IH£). The values of 
the home country institutions may have a particularly strong influence on 
the behavior of MNCs at home and abroad. Our research was not fO<llsed 
on these peripheral actors, but has suggested some interesting hypotheses 
regarding their activities and influence. 
The last three concepts needing preliminary clarification are process, pol-
icy, and outcome. These concepts are central to the models and case studies 
reported here, and are subject to a wide range of usages. 
As used hert:, po/;cy will be understood to denote a course of action adopted 
by an organization (e.g., a corporation or regulatory institution) for the pur-
pose of advancing a particular objective or set of objectives. More particu-
larly, a policy specifies some set" of procedures (policy tools), together with 
the circumstances in which the procedures are to be employed. The proce-
dures are intended to advance the policy objective{s). Policy implementation 
thus consists of applying the specified procedures in circumstances consistent 
with policy's specifications. For example, a host country development agency 
might use licensing procedures as tools to implement a hiring quota policy 
for MNC. with the objective of increased indigenous employment. For its 
part, an MNC might use training programs and design standards as tools to 
implement an EH&S policy with the objectives of protecting both employee 
health and corporate reputation. 
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It is through the process of implementation that the worlcing of policy can 
be best understood (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). In the context of this 
book, this implementation process may begin when an MNC notifies a host 
nation of its intention to acquire or build a facility and may continue for 
months or years through facility design, construction, and start-up. The im-
plementation process will typically involve all the principal actors: institu-
tional, national, corporate, and (when present) local venture partners. 
Finally, follOwing Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky (1974), we understand 
outcomes, in this context, to include the consequences of the corporate and 
the host countty policies and of the facility siting negotiation processes during 
which the two sets of policies come in contact with each other. For the pur-
poses of this project, the most important of such mnsequences are the negoti-
ated agreements and the physical and social mnsequences of these agr=nents. 
Accordingly, the field studies and models presented here are principally con-
cerned with three lcinds of outcomes: (1) the actual agreement{s) arrived at 
by the principal actors; (2) the accomplishment of host countty and MNC 
policy objectives; and (3) the extent to which EH&S and DE&I values are 
served by the MNC facility. Management of EH&S at the local facility level 
is thus a critical outcome and was an important focus of our field work. 
METHODOLOGY FOR RECONSTRUCIlNG VALUE ROLES 
Central to all the research reported here are the difficult problems of recon-
structing each of the actual decision-making processes, explicating the value 
conflicts and trade-offs inherent in each, and, finally, teasing out the role 
and interaction of EH&S and DE&I values in the process and in the deci-
sions of all the principal actors. The analysis of value trade-offs within the 
context of technology transfer projects has been suggested by a number of 
authors (Ashford and Ayers 1985, p . 882; Tavis 1988, p. 18; Robinson 
1988, p. 192f£; Gladwin and Walter 1980, p. 428). Thelcind of reconstruc-
tions required by such analyses and reported in the chapters that follow, 
involve several serious methodological problems. 
PrioritiringvenusBalancing 
Following Ackennan and StrOng, we can distinguish in the philosophical 
and scientific I medical literatures two quite different conceptual approaches 
to the analysis and resolution of value conflicts. 
The first approach, which Ackennan and Strong call the prioritizing ap-
proach, seeks to rank all the competing values at stake in a partiodar prob-
lem. The highest-ranked value then is given priority in the strong sense that 
"its requirements must be met before acting on other competing values or 
obligations." (Ackennan and Strong, 1989) In other words, decision options 
that fail to meet the claims of the highest-ranking value (no maner how ex-
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cellent their consequences for other values) are eliminated. If the highest-
ranking value suffices to determine a unique decision option, the claims of 
other values will not even be considered. If the highest-ranking value does 
not suffice to determine a unique decision option. the next-highest ranking 
value is used to son out the remaining decision options, and the claims of 
this second-ranking value then are given strong priority (in the sense ex-
plained) over the claims of all the lower-ranking values. This prioritizing 
approach is called the lexicographic method in the decision sciences (Edwards 
1954) and is very prominent in contemporary philosophical literature on 
applied ethics. It appears to be refleaed in the adoption by some developing 
nations, including Thailand, of policies and practices that give an almost 
absolute priority to development or independence over environmental or 
safety values. 
In contemporary decision theory, several different variations of this general 
prioritizing approach can be distinguished. The Parieto Optimality Rule 
provides the most elegant solutions to prioritizing problems, since it selects 
just the solution that serves every relevant value better than any alternative 
solution. Unfortunately, few problems have any Parieto-optimal solution. 
The elimination-by-aspeets method sorts options according to a hierarchy 
of values and selects the one that meetS the most values, proceeding from the 
top tn the bottom of the hierarchy (T versky 1972). The "Satisfying Strategy" 
method adopts minimal satisfaction criteria for all relevant values and then 
selects a solution from among only those options that meet all the specified 
minima (Simon 1976). 
The second general conceptual approach, which Ackerman and Strong 
call the balancing view, attempts in each case of value conflia to formulate 
a resolution that gives at least partial satisfaction to all the competing values. 
Precisely how each value may be partially satisfied, and which values may 
be most fully satisfied, can vary from case to case. This balancing approach, 
which is predominant in contemporary medical and scientific literature on 
applied ethics, appears to be reflected in the adoption by some developing 
nations, including India, of policies and practices that endeavor to give at 
least partial satisfaction to all or most of the competing EH&S and DE&I 
values. 
To the extent that this volume offers policy suggestions dependent upon a 
choice between these frameworks, it adopts the balancing approach. That 
is, it does not presume that an absolute priority can be given to any of the 
competing values that this research considers or that such an absolute pri-
ority was assigned to anyone value by any of the aaors involved in our case 
studies. Neither do we presume that a stria prioritizing of such values, even 
if it could be defended for one culture or technology or situation, would nec-
essarily be correa for all cultures, technologies, or situations. Certainly, the 
cultures involved in our case studies do not exhibit any such monolithic value 
pr.)ritizing. 
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Interdisciplinary Issues 
Value trade-offs are sometimes conceived as involving~ at least implicitly ~ 
the assignment of relative weights to the different goods at stake, as though, 
for example, the weights could be used as coefficients in a simple hedonic 
equation, the maximization of which could be determined by application of 
Bentham's hedonic calculus. It remains to be seen whether modem decision 
theory, armed with mathematical tools that Bentham could not envision, will 
produce a calculus adequate to the analysis of the complex value trade-off 
processes involved in international technology transfer. (On the use of sophis-
ticated weighting analyses in contemporary decision theory, see Winterfeldt 
and Edwards 1986, or Keeney and Raiffa 1976.) We are skeptical of the 
claim that anyone theory or discipline already possesses all the tools neces-
sary for such an analysis. The multidisciplinary analysis presented here draws 
on the resources of decision theory, geography, environmental chemistry, 
hazards management, philosophy, sociology, and risk assessment. Neverthe-
less, it could have been significantly extended by application of the resources 
of economics, anthropology, management theory, and other disciplines. 
The value trade-offs studied in this volume involved the complex interac-
tion of many values and many actors at many levels. An analysis that hopes 
to illuminate rather than obliterate such a complex, value-laden, deliberative 
process must reconcile itself to such complexity. As Aristotle noted in the 
Nichomachean Ethics, "The same kind of precision is not to be sought alike 
in aU discussions ." 
Reconstruction Problems and Strategies 
An imponant component of the research reported here was the discovery 
and articulation (or "reconstruction") of the value systems of the several 
principal actors. Without a reasonably accurate reconstruction of these value 
systems, no analysis of the value-laden trade-off decisions would be possible. 
Although the research team was given access to extensive (and even confi-
dential) documentary evidence and was able to interview many of the key 
national and corporate officials, the reconstruction of the principal actors' 
value systems still involved Significant methodological difficulties. 
For a number of reasons, including negotiators' use of deception and con-
cealment, it is not possible to reconstruct with confidence any principal actor's 
value system simply by observing her or his public negotiating behavior. In 
the cases reported here, fortunately, reconstruction &om negotiating behavior 
alone was not necessary. The research team had access to multiple indepen-
dent sources of information regarding the value systems of the corporate 
and national actors, including interviews with multiple key actors, access to 
extensive written documentation, and field srudy of actual outcomes. Thus, 
the principal actors' EH&S and DE&1 values were inferred indirectly from 
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multiple independent and mutually cross-<:OrToborating sources. This meth-
odological approach has been used in other empirical investigations of these 
value clusters by such scholars as Lowrance, Wenk, Strong, McAllister, and 
Kirkpatriclc, Lee, and Nixson. 
In the case of the corporations, there is an extensive body of public infor-
mation regarding corporate history and behavior in the area of environmental 
and health protection. In addition, the research team was given broad access 
to key corporate executives and to private corporate records, poliey docu-
ments, and procedural and training manuals. In some cases, corporate co-
operation extended even to generating specially requested data not already 
collected by any corporate unit. 
[n the case of the host countries and their regulatory agencies, there was 
again a substantial body of public information regarding national and insti-
tutiona[ development policies and national and institutional behavior relative 
to implementing those policies. The research team was also given access to 
high-level officials at key institutions, the activities of which include tech-
nology transfer and environmental and health protection. 
In some cases, national EH&S legislation can also serve as a key source of 
information regarding societal EH&S values. For example, the EH&S and, 
to a lesser extent, DE&I values prevalent in the United States during the 
golden year. of environtnental and health legislation of the 1970s and 1980. 
are reflected in an extensive set of statutory and regulatory aCts from that 
period. The ten most important federal acts regarding EH&S values are the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969; Clean Air Act ofl970; 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970; Clean Water Act of 
1972; Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (F1FRA) of 1972; 
Endangered Species Act of 1973; Safe Drinking Water Act of 1975; Toxic 
Substance Control Act (TSCA) of 1976; Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) of 1976; and the Comprehensive Environtnental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, including the 1986 
amendments. These ten acts mirror the evolution of societal attitudes toward 
environment and public health; they are national in scope and address 
human, animal, and plant species and all environmental media (air, water, 
land, and the workplace); they created major regulatory institutions and 
triggered the growth of an environmental protection industry. Their value 
content is not difficult to discover. 
Both human/ife attd health and economic prosperity are treated as intrin-
sically valued goods by every one of the statutes (excepting the 1973 ESA, 
which dealt with the value of nonhuman species). In addition, human wel-
fare-defined in NEPA as wide access to "life amenities," "aesthetically and 
culturally pleasing surroundings,. "important historical, cultural and natural 
aspects of • • . natural heritage," "high standards of living," and "individual 
choice"-is treated as an intrinsic good by all the statutes. 
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Each statute focuses on a slighdy different aspect of human welfare and 
creates or uses a different set of tools for the purpose of advancing human 
welfare thus understood. For example, the Clean Air Act considers such en-
tities as livestock, crops, property, and recreation to be instrumental goods 
that promote public welfare. The Clean Water Act seeks to protect the agri-
cultural, industrial, recreational, and navigational uses of surface waters, 
while the Safe Drinking Water Act emphasizes aesthetic quality of drinking 
watet. F\FRA stresses the need to increase food production at low cost (hence 
the need to use pesticides) as a path to greater prosperity, while the Endan-
gered Species ActS lists the recreational value of diverse biological species to 
human welfare. Taken together, this diverse list of goods suggests an inclu-
sive understanding of the ways in which human welfare can be advanced or 
undermined. The list includes both basic human goods that serve universal 
needs (for example, food, potable water, and transportation) and less basic 
goods instrumentaUy linked to culturaUy and sociaUy conditioned needs (for 
example, aquatic sports and recreational hunting). 
The statutes give evidence of a shared desire to protect the environment 
and of a range of different conceptions of environmental values. GeneraUy, 
the NEPA, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act 
aU treat the environment as an instrumental good to be valued for the ways 
in which it can advance such other human goods as human life, health, wel-
fare, and economic prosperity. GeneraUy, the FIFRA, TSCA, RCRA, and 
CERCLA aU treat the environment as an intrinsic good that ought to be pre-
served and promoted for its own sake, whether or not this instrumentally 
advances other human goods. The Endangered Species Act seems to invoke 
both conceptions of environmental values: It notes that the continued exis-
tence of diverse nonhuman species offers aesthetic pleasure, educational 
resources, historical continuity, and scientific interest. But it also asserts that 
such species have value apart from their use as recreational, nutritional, or 
medicinal materials. 
Each of the ten Statutes also treats national security as a vital good, some-
thing we find particularly noteworthy in view of the fact that the purposes 
of these statuteS seem far removed from issues of national independence. Tbe 
NEPA requires that aU actions taken to protect the environment must be 
consistent with essential considerations of national policy. The Clean Air 
Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, 
TSCA, and CERCLA contain specific language that permits exemptions "in 
the interest of national security.· Even RCRA and OSHA exempt federal 
occupational and disposal practices from tbeir regulation. 
F\FRA, TSCA, and RCRA embody clear national self-determination 
values. These statuteS permit U.S. corporations to export to foreign countries 
hazardous chemicals that have been banned (as threats to health, welfare, 
or the environment) in the U.S. market. The actS do not appeal to different 
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ethical standards for U.S. and foreign societies; indeed, they articulate a strict 
obligation to infonn the purchaser and the foreign government of the hazard-
ous properties of the agents and to obtain an explicit consent from the trade 
parmer. Rather, the acts sum to rest on the view that each nation is entitled 
to make its own decisions about risk. 
Eight of the ten statutes also acknowledge an obligation to infonn those 
who arc at risk of injury, thus invoking a right to know. OSHA, F1FRA, 
TSCA, and RCRA require appropriate labeling to assure that workers (in-
cluding pesticide applicators and hazardous waste transporters) are, in the 
words of OSHA, " ... appraised of all hazards to which they are exposed." 
In these statutes, the right to know is articulated with reference to occupa-
tional hazards. The Clean Air Act and Safe Drinking Water Act extend the 
right to include the general public'S knowledge of hazardous substances in 
the environment; when exposure standards for air and water pollutants are 
exceeded (thus creating an unreasonable risk), both laws require notification 
of the affected publics. SARA, the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, requires 
that information about hazardous substances used by businesses and insti· 
tutions (including potential hazards) be made available, on request, to 
members of neighboring communities. 
The OSHA, Clean Air Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act all invoke an 
ethical obligation to protect vulnerable members of the population. OSHA 
requires that "no worker" suffer adverse effects of technological hazards. In 
the other two statutes this value is expressed through the criteria by which 
safety-of-exposure standards for air and water must be judged. The Clean 
Air Act and Safe Drinking Water Act both require that such standards must 
provide an "ample" or "adequate" margin of safety to protect (in our inter-
pretation) vulnerable individuals or subpopuJations. 
Clearly, the U.S. environmental and health laws are a rich source of data 
on the prevailing national values. Unfortunately, because much of the EH&S 
legislation in developing nations has been modeled on analogous statutes in 
developed nations, it cannot be assumed to provide evidence of an established 
social consensus in those countries. Our analysis therefore attaches less im-
portance to host nation EH&S legislation than to the analysis of institutional 
behavior, etnpiricalfield worll, and interviews with key decision makers. In 
the two case studies in Thailand, the research team was able to interview the 
key government actors and to consult with native scholars. In the India case 
study, our efforts to reach leey regulatory officials were less uniformly suc-
cessful; however, this deficiency was substantially ameliorated through col-
laboration with native academics. 
By using multiple sources of data, it was possible for the research team to 
overcome the shortcomings of anyone source as a mirror of any particular 
principal actor's values. In each of the three cases, the team had access to 
multiple and varied sources of information regarding the principal actors' 
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value systems and the influence of those values upon their decisions through-
out the facility siting process. 
Reconstructing the principal actor's value trade-off decisions depends also 
upon knowledge of the range of options the actor considered, rejected, and 
adopted. In each of the case studies reponed here, sufficient infonnation 
was available regarding these options and with regard to the negotiated out-
comes. 
Given the knowledge of the aaors' value systems, it was relatively easy to 
reconstruct the principal actors' EH&S/DE&I trade-off decisions with 
some confidence. Accordingly, while the case studies and analyses reponed 
here are subject (as noted) to many limitations of scope, the core analysis is 
offered with some confidence. 
The Tecbnology Transfer & Facility Siting Model 
Based on the factors enumerated and upon our understanding of how they 
may influence the decision-making process for siring a facility in a developing 
country, we have developed a conceptual model of the sequential stages that 
characterize technology transfer decisions. The focus of the model is on the 
three-step sequence: (I) negotiations, (2) construction, and (3) start-up. A 
fouM stage, sustained operations, follows start-up, but is not a focus of our 
research (see Figure 2.1). 
At each of these stages, one can investigate the naNre and resolution of 
value conflicts. Our investigation focused on the questions of how EH&S 
and DE&I issues were addressed and how potential conflicts between EH&S 
and DE&I were resolved in the facility siting process. As the model is used 
in our research, EH&S and DE&I values are treated as independent vari· 
ables, and the outcomes already enumerated (negotiated agreements, the 
objectively detennined value trade-offs, and actual EH&S- and DE&I-related 
consequences) are treated as the dependent variables. 
Sequenrial Model of Facility Siting Process 
The dynamics of facility siting can be conceptualized as a sequence of 
events that starts with contract negotiations between the corporation and 
the government of the host country and ends with an on-line productive fa-
cility. The three major stages of this process are negotiations, construction, 
and start-up. The fouM stage, which follows after the process, is sustained 
operations. 
Interactions between the principal actors may have a significant history 
before onset of negotiations regarding any particular facility. Du Pont's pres-
ence in Thailand, for example, was established by two decade. of carefully 
and deliberately phased growth. This kind of planned, gradual market entry 
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seems to be the rule, rather than the exception, for MNCs in many industrial 
sectors (Granger 1979). These preliminary activities, however, are not in-
corporated in the model that follows. 
The negotiation stage refers to the process of initial interaction berween 
corporate representatives, host country officials and, where applicable, the 
various joint venture partners. These negotiations may involve protracted 
and direct bargaining by the principal actors or may consist of routine ad-
ministrative proct:Sses. In cases that involve a joint venture partner, two 
parallel sets of interactions may proceed: one set berween the host country 
and the joint venture; another set between the members of the joint venture. 
In the India case, the joint venture was incorporated and the second set of 
negotiations far advanced, before any application for host country approval 
was filed. [n the Occidental Chemical case, the order was somewhat different; 
in the Du Pont case, no joint venture parmer was involved. 
[n this stage, the principal actors must settle issues about location, build-
ing requirements, properry rights, safcry standards, employment, and a range 
of other matters. 
The product of the negotiation phase will be a working agreement between 
the principal actors regarding the major features of the proposed faciliry. 
This agreement will specify basic decisions regarding the location, nature, 
and scale of the facility, equity participation arrangements, management 
structure, profit remittance, taxation schedules, export and import permis-
sions, and agreements regarding control of proprietary technology. The 
agreement may be implemented in different forms in different circumstances, 
such as industrial licensing, letters of intent, preliminary agreements, binding 
conuaas, permits to export, and so on. 
The" construction stage refers to the design and construction (or, in the 
Occidental Chemical case, redesign and major modificarion) of the facility 
and the associated infrastructure. This stage requires important decisions 
regarding waste management systems, choices of engineered EH&S control 
systems, adaptation of standard facility designs to local conditions, and so 
forth. [n this stage, the facility design is completed or modified in compliance 
with the conditions of the agreement with the host country and in view of 
the objectives of the parent company. As our field work revealed, the agree-
ment itself is not a perfect predictor for the facility design. Issues that were 
not discussed during the negotiations may emerge and must be concretely 
resolved, during this design process. 
This stage also includes a range of management and regulatory activities 
that precede facility srart-up-for example, final issuance of any environ-
mental, occupational, import, and export licenses not completed during the 
negotiations srage; procurement decisions relating to facility construction or 
modification; preliminary hiring and employee training activities; and devel-
opment of relevant infrastructure (which may include options as diverse as 
emp[oyee housing, water supply, and local fire-fighting capability). 
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The start-up stage refers to the period in which the facility is tested, put 
on-line, and brought to full planned operating capacity. In this stage, all the 
prior facility design, organization, and operation plans arc concretely imple-
mented and tested. Typically, new issues arise in the start-up stage that may 
require modification of the prior agreement or redesign of elements of the 
plant or process. This seems particularly true with respect to EH&S equip-
ment and regulations, which depend crucially upon [he availability of par-
ticular materials, local building codes, the quality of workmanship, the cul-
tural background and technical skills of the work force, and so forth. 
In this stage, vital management decisions must be made regarding the im-
plementation and cultivation of corporate EH&S culture among the local 
workers and managers and regarding the joint venture partner's support for 
EH&S values. Standard safety training programs may need to be modified 
in order to effectively influence worker behavior. 
The sustained operations stage refers to the on-going operation of the 
facility following start-up. It is in this stage that many consequences of the 
decisions made in the prior stages will become evident. Long-term EH&S 
performance, although crucially influenced by prior design and management 
decisions, will depend upon the management policies and practices that 
evolve throughout the sustained operations phase. As the Bhopal and Cher-
nobyl disasters suggest, poor management in this stage will eventually 
undermine any EH&S gains made in the design and construction decisions. 
The types of decisions generally characteristic of each stage in this sequence 
arc summarized in Figure 2.1. In each of the four stages, the value trade-off 
process and the final EH&S- and DE&I-related outcomes are largely deter-
mined by the principal actors, but peripheral actors may exert important in-
fluences. Two sets of factors govern the principal actors' prenegotiation 
positions: their respective cultural values and their empirical expectations 
about the potential benefits and risks of undertaking or permitting the desired 
activity. These factors are interrelated, but not identical. The cultural values 
provide the rules and standards used to assess and evaluate the benefits and 
risks; but the quality and magnitude of both the benefits and the risks depend 
on the concrete situation. For example, corporate EH&S values will influ-
ence a company's profit projections, but so, to a larger extent, will empirical 
assessments of market potential, production costs, and so on. 
Peripheral actors may influence the decision process in .a wide variety of 
ways. The international community and the national cultures of the two in-
volved countries influence the process in part by virtue of the fact that many 
of their values arc internalized by the major actors: The MNC may incorpo-
rate the values of its home country, the joint venture partner may incorporate 
the values of the local culture, and so on. Media and interest groups may 
also exen a conttol function by commenting on [he outcome of the decision-
making process or even trying to intervene. They may demand that their 
specific interest (e.g., protection of endangered species or ecosystems) be 
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taken into account. The extent to which peripheral actors can influence one 
or more principal actors is widely variable. For example, international repu· 
tation may be important 10 the MNC and the host country, but irrelevant 10 
the local joint venture parmer. This differential stnsitivity toward inttma-
tional reputation can cause conflict between the MNC and its local parmtr 
(Robinson 1988, p. 192ff). 
The model described earlier was an exploratory guide for our field work. 
For txamplt, givtn tht belief that national and institutional culturt and ex-
pectations would be major factors influencing ttchnology transfer agretmtnt 
decisions, a major field task was to interview the major actors and learn as 
much as possible about thoir values, inttmal values conflicts, tradt-offs, tx· 
pectations, and areas of compromise. By reconstructing the actual decision 
process, we expected to discover how these initial factors evolved and how 
external conflicts between the actors were resolved. 
Our analysis juxta POStS tht cultural valUtS of tht MNC with the institu-
tional valuts of the host country's lictnsing and regulating agtncies. We also 
considtr tht values of tht host country's culturt, insofar as thtSt diff .. from 
the values of its institutions. Our empirical research showed that within the 
host country, there were significant differences between the values of the 
different institutions and between the values of institutions and the parent 
culturt. These conflicts betwetn host country institutional values and host 
country rultural values wtre somttimes apparent and imponant in the actual 
nogotiation and ptrmitting prOctss. 
Our modtl is similar to some othtr models described in tht literaturt. 
Among these is the model of multiple stake holdtrS and thtir influenct on tech-
nology transf .. (Tavis 1988, p. 13). Anothtr is tht multicultural influtnct 
modt! by Sirgi (1986, p. 186). A third is tht model developtd by Robinson 
(1988, p. 54). Likt Tavis, we consider multiplt actors with differtnnal influ-
ence on the dtcision prOctss; like Sirgi, we tmphasizt tht importanct of 
cultural factors; and likt Robinson, wt include the situational exptctations 
regarding risks, costs, and benefits. 
The model was a useful research tool, but it is not a final thtoretical tX-
planation. In chapt .. 8, we discuss somt of tht ways in which tht model 
was conflrnled or modifitd by tht rtsults of our empirical case studits. 
A FINAL NOTE 
It is worth emphasizing that the research reported in this volumt is not 
philosophical or ethical but empirical. The chapttrs that follow constitute 
an empirical study of how, in ctrtain instances, sptcifitd sets of values (or 
valutd outcomes or goods) affecttd, and resulted from, the complex decision-
making process involved in hazardous technology transfer. The point of this 
work is not to dettrmine what is good or evil (although, of course, our selec-
tion of socially responsible corporations presumes, at a preliminary level, 
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some ability to distinguish good and evil activity). Rather, the point of this 
work is to add to our understanding of the preass by which this ~t of goods 
(rather than that ~t of goods) becomes the outcome of a technology transfer 
process. In sum, the work reported here does not aspire to be empirically in-
formed normative ethics. It aspires to be ethically informed empirical science. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Corporate and Host Country Profiles 
As stated in Chapter 1, this study attempts to explicate the facility develop-
ment process in light of the principal actors' pursuit of their respective EH&S 
and DE&I values. This chapter sets the background for the case studies by 
outlining the policy and implementation systems adopted by the participating 
host counuies and corporations in order to pursue these two clusters of 
values. 
OUf discussion of the corporations focuses on international operations 
and on EH&S related matters: corporate EH&S policy and philosophy; 
EH&S organization for domestic and foreign operations; and the interna-
tional EH&S management artitudes of the executives and managers inter-
viewed during this study. These qualitative data are supplemented by a 
number of quantitative performance indicators for domestic and international 
facilities, for example, standardized occupational injury and illness rates, 
occupational standards compliance records (for Xerox), environmental 
assessment score records (for Oxychem), and other data provided by the 
corporations at the research team's request. 
These data are not used to compare the EH&S performance of the three 
corporations with each other: Except for the standardized occupational injury 
rates, the data is so company specific that inter-company comparisons would 
be meaningless. Rather, we use the quantitative data to provide an empirical 
check on our interpretation and analysis of the MNCs' domestic and inter-
national EH&S policies. 
Following the individual corporate promes, we offer a brief comparative 
analysis that highlights those shared characteristics of the three that make 
them unlikely candidates to represent their industries as a whole, for exam-
ple, their large size and significant resources; their commitment to EH&S 
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rates, the data is so company specific that inter-company comparisons would 
be meaningless. Rather, we use the quantitative data to provide an empirical 
check on our interpretation and analysis of the MNCs' domestic and inter-
national EH&S policies. 
Following the individual corporate profiles, we offer a brief comparative 
analysis thnt highlights those shared characteristics of the three that make 
them unlilcely candidates to represent their industries as a whole, for exam-
ple, their large size and significant resources; their commicment to EH&S 
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values and record of EH&S improvements over rime; and their experience 
with hazardous processes. That section also underscores important differ-
ences among the three corporations, especially concerning the origins of their 
respective corporate cultures. 
Notably, most of the intra-company analyses of quantitative performance 
indicators included in this chapter were performed for the first rime in the 
course of this study. Each of the corporations studied maintains good quan-
titative EH&S performance records and uses those records to set internal 
goals for each facility, to motivate local personnel to improve facility per-
formance, and to spot significant departures from company averages. But 
the MNCs display surprisingly little interest in performing their own retro-
spective and interregional comparisons of their many facilities' performances, 
despite the fact that such analyses might be useful tools for investigating the 
relative imponance of different management and technological factors. 
The survey of host countries presented in this chapter focuses on the ad-
ministrative srruaures, policies and procedures they use to regulate the siting 
and operation of multinational manufacturing facilities. For each country, 
these policies reflect two sets of considerations, one set related to national 
DE&I goals, the other related to EH&S goals. Our discussion considers 
these clusters separately. 
THE CORPORATIONS 
Xerox: An Overview 
Founded in 1906 as the Haloid Company to manufacture and sell photo-
graphic paper, this company acquired license to basic xerographic patents 
from Banelle Development Corporation in 1947. In 1959 it produced the 
world's first automatic plain.paper copier (the Xerox 914) and subsequendy 
changed its name to Xerox Corporation. In 1961, it became listed on the 
New York Stock exchange. Since then, Xerox has blossomed into a giant 
enterprise with over 110,000 employees worldwide and gross revenues ex-
ceeding $19 billion for 1990. Figure 3.1 shows the importance of photocopier 
technology in the company's business equipment operations. 
The Americas Operations of Xerox oversee the facilities in Nonh, South, 
and Central America as well as in the Caribbean, Middle East, and Nonh 
Africa. Four U.S. manufacturing facilities (including engineering/develop-
ment operations) are located in California, one in Illioois, two in New York, 
and one in Oklahoma. Other facilities in the Western hemisphere include 
two manufaCturing facilities in Canada, three in Brazil, and one in Mexico. 
In 1959 Xerox extended its international operations by forming a joint 
venture with the Rank Organization PLC, a British company, under the name 
of Rank Xerox. Rank Xerox is a majority-owned subsidiary of Xerox Cor-
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Figure 3.1 
Xerox Orpniutional SUUctun: 
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poration. Five Rank Xerox manufacturing facilities for photocopier tech-
nology arc located in Europe, one in Egypt, one in China, and two in India. 
The India operations include the Modi Xerox joint venture in Rampur and 
Indian Xerographic SystemS in Bombay. Rank Xerox also holds a SO percent 
equity in Fuji Xerox following a 1962 joint venture with Fuji Film Company. 
The gross revenues of Rank Xerox totalled $4.6 billion in 1989, with almost 
98 percent resulting from European operations. Rank Xerox's consolidated 
operations in Africa, Asia, Australia, the South Pacific, and the Middle East 
totalled only about 2 percent of the company's 1989 revenues. 
The domestic and international Xerox manufacturing facilities associated 
with photocopier technology are listed in Table 3.1, along with their product 
lines. The corporation tends to focus each facility on just one or two tech-
nologies. The Rampur facility is the most integrated, due to host country in· 
sistence rather than corporate preference. (The Chinese facility is almost as 
integrated, again at the insistence of the host country governments.) The 
integration of multiple technologies in the Rampur facility is particularly 
striking because it is one of the smallest facilities operated by Xerox in the 
world. Also notable in Table 3.1 are the joint venture operations. Nearly 
one third of Xerox's international facilities are jointly owned. 
Rank Xerox pursues three major goals in the conduct of its international 
market strategy: 
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Table 3.1 
Domestic aDd International Facilities ae Xerox 
TYPE OF JOINT 
XEROX LOCATION TECHNOLOGY VENTURE (YIN) 
U.S. 
OPERATIONS 
CaUl .... M'E N 
COw ..... E N 
Caw .... M N 
ClWonla N 
IIl1al_ M N 
N ..... York M: T- P:: D N 
N_Yon T N 
OklU_a To';D N 
AMERICAS c:.u.... OPERATIONS M N 
c:.u.... T:D N 
8ndl TiD:' N 
8raall M N 
andl M N 
Mtsko M N 
RANK XEROX 
OPERATIONS U.K. It;p N 
U.K. M N 
...... n M Y 
N.UMriuIk MoT:D N 
.... M ' T N 
t • .n. (80 .... ) M Y 
1 .. 11. ca- .,) M: E:T, ' : D y 
(Em' M Y (willi tv") 
a'-(."r~1I} M i T:r:D Y ("til I"rt) 
M, Machines; E, Elecuoruc boards; T, Toneri P, Photoreceptor; D, Developer 
1. to make profits, at least in the medium and long ~enn; . _ .. 
2. to diversify markets as a buffer against regional.sales variations, an especially im. 
portant consideration for a company with a monolithic product line and little 
product diversity; and 
3. to be represented in every major market. 
In pursuit of these goal., the company will enter joint venture arrangements 
in developing countries, provided that the arrangements meet these four 
corporate requirements: 
Assurance of qua"1y control. The lOp priority is that the produa manufactured abroad 
is absolutely identical in quality to the same product in the home facilities. 
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Assurance 0/ health and safety, SystemS equivalent in performance to those in Ameri-
can and European facilities must be achieved. 
Assurance 0/ financial control. Key decisions concerning the ratio of reinvestment 
and distribution to shareholders are to be made by the corporation. 
Assurances 0/ managermnt control. All first-line managers have to be appointed or 
at least approved by Rank Xerox before they are hired. 
Other requirements, such as share of stock or production guarantees, are 
handled in a more flexible manner. Rank Xerox is willing to enter a joint 
venture with less than 50 percent equity ownership if and only if all four of 
thelioted requirements are met. The second and fourth requirements, equiv-
alency of health and safety systems and management control, give Rank 
Xerox the major tools needed to implement its EH&S philosophy. 
With regard to foreign investment strategies, joint venture requirements, 
and EH&S management and philosophy, our interviews with top and middle 
managers at RanJc Xerox and Xerox Corporation detected no difference he-
tween the two companies' philosophies or operating practices. Accordingly, 
for the purposes of this srudy, the Rank Xerox facility at Rampur has been 
treated as a subsidiary of Xerox and Rank Xerox alike. 
Xerox: EH&S Policies, Implementation, and Performance 
Historically, EH&S issues became part of Xerox corporate consciousness 
in the mid-1960s, and significant resources were committed to the area in 
the late 19700. The change was prompted by the discovery that one of the 
toners used by Xerox photocopiers tested positively in a bacterial mutageni-
city test. An extensive multidisciplinary investigation conducted by Xerox 
in collaboration with vendors, consultants, and other parries established 
that the mutagen was an impurity present in trace amounts in a single type 
of carbon black (a toner colorant). New procedures and standards prompdy 
reduced the impurity (and other potential mutagens or carcinogens) to an 
undetectable level in toner extractS, but the events left an enduring corporate 
legacy: Corporate attention was focused on the importance of effective EH&S 
management to the company, consumers and workers. Extensive health and 
safety evaluation procedures, reflecting a greater sensitivity to health and 
safety issues, were adopted. The corporate EH&S structure currendy in 
place at Xerox was adopted in 1980 as a direct result of these considerations. 
Xerox EH&S organization is shown in Figure 3.2. The Xerox Corporation 
Safety Nerwork maintains a centralized health and safety function, ensures 
that aU manufacturing plants and operations report to the corporate director 
of environment, health and safety, and facilitates implementation of com-
panywide EH&S policies. Corporate EH&S staff set and enforce world-
wide standards and have the authority to shut down a plant if necessary. 
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Fqpm: 3.2 
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Individual departments have ongoing responsibility for compliance activi-
ties, but major issues may also be brougbt to the attention of corporate 
authorities. The company's corporate safety/environment office reports 
directly to the corporate director of EHI!cS, as do significant safety/envi-
ronment units located within devdopment and manufaauring, marketing, and 
customer rdations. An official Environmental Health and Safety Policy Com-
mittee within the devdoping and manufacturing unit reviews specific safety/ 
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environment issues, develops action plans to resolve the issues, and oversees 
implementation of the action plans throughout all industrial operations. 
Four principles guide occupational hazard management within the inter-
national Xerox organization: 
1. the primacy of engineered safety I environment controls; 
2. compliance with aU laws and ngulations of the host country; 
3. plefeacnce for application of unifonn occupational corporate standards worldwide; 
4. equivalency in safety and health performance among international facilities. 
The first two principles are explicitly articulated in written policy state-
ments. The last two reflect the working practices and shared beliefs of the 
management. For example, Xerox's Environmental Health and Safety Man-
ual states: "Facilities design, including eogineering controls, are the primary 
methods of controlling employee exposure to chemical and physical agents. 
Personal protective equipment, work practices, and/or administrative con· 
trols are utilized only when engineering controls are not feasible or as a sup-
plement to engineering controls (Xerox 1982)." 
Based on the research team's discussions and interviews with top and 
middle managers, it appears that the equivalency criteria is understood at 
Xerox to require both equivalent compliance with corporate occupational 
standards and equivalent performance relative to the company's average 
recordable incidence rates for occupational injuries. Individual facilities may 
achieve these through different combinations of engineered controls, personal 
proreaion, work practices, and administrative controls. 
EXternal safety and environmental audits at Xerox facilities are conducted 
by various insurance cartiers, with Marsh & Mclennan Protection Consul-
taots serving as broker. The auditing program focused on safery issues when 
begun in 1970, but has gradually expanded to include environmental concerns. 
Xerox maintains significant cootrOl over the audits by explicitly determining 
their scope, format, and schedule. The external audits are supplemented by 
internal audits at both the corporate program level and the local plant level. 
Plant audits are conducted approximately once a month and reviewed by 
the plant manager. Auditing procedures at international facilities are the 
same as at the domestic facilities. Corporate audits take place every ooe or 
two years, depending upon the degree of hazard involved and the insured 
value of the equipment and property. 
The occupational exposure standards implemented in the Xerox facilities 
are listed in Table 3.2, aloog with the comparable governmental standards 
(Urtited States, Europe, and India). Dust standards at Xerox are significantly 
lower than those required by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministratioo (OSHA). The first corporate standard for total dust, adopted 
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Table 3.2 
ComparisOD of Xerox ami Goveroment Occupational Standards 
Standards 
Goverument Standards 
Xerox 
Substance! US Europe Indl. 
Tecbnology 
5.0 
Total Dust- 15 10 10 (1977) (to~r prodactllM, 
alc!ml) (UK) 2.5 (1988) 
Respirable Dust·· 
(toMr ,rodllClM • 5 5 None 0.4 
• "IIll) (UK) (1989) 
Respirable Arsenic 10 50 200 10 (fboto .....,ur (5 ..... ) prodllr&.. .&fal) 
. 
Respirable Selenium 
(pboto nettto.' 100 100 200 100 
ptodotdo ... cfal) 
• Standard for Total Dust in Thailand is 15 mg/ml . 
•• Standard for Respirable Dust in Thailand is 5 mg/m3. 
in the mid-1970s, was lowered in 1988 foUowing completion of a long-tenn 
inhalation bioessay with animals. In 1989, the company also set a standard 
for respirable dust. Srudies conducted by Xerox (not shown here) indicate 
that as the concentration of total dust in toner facilities decreases, the pro-
portion of respirable dust to total dust increases. Thus, at a total dust level 
of 10 mg/m', the fraction of respirable dust is approximately 3 percent, but 
at a total dust level of 1 mg/m' the fraction is approximately 10 percent. 
These data suggested that as total dust levels approach the 2.5 mg/m' stan-
dard, the respirable dust level might not meet the respirable standard. Hence, 
total and respirable dust requires separate monitoring. 
The results of total airborne dust monitoring at aU Xerox toner facilities 
are shown in Figure 3.3. Each point represents an arithmetic mean of 12-100 
samples (depending on the facility) coUected at random over a 12-month 
period. The facilities clearly have different perfonnance records, with the 
Dutch facility lagging behind the rest, but over time there is both an unmis-
takeable downward trend and a convergence. In 1988, for example, all but 
one facility were in the 0.5-0.75 mg/m' range. The results of airborne 
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Figtm 3.3 
Trends in MeaJI Annual Concentration. of Total Dust at Individual Xerox Toner 
Facilities 
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arsenic and selenium monitoring in the photoreceptor plants, shown in Fig· 
ures 3.4 and 3.5, respectively, indicate that all facilities represented by the 
dara were in compliance with the relevant srandards. 
In addition to monitoring compliance with airborne standards, the corpo-
ration uses routine urinalysis to monitor the biological arsenic and selenium 
burdens among photoreceptor workers. It is difficult to translate urinalysis 
data (not shown here) into occupational exposure data because individual 
biological burdens can be affected by nonoccupational sources, such as 
ambient air, local diet and drinking water, exposure to local pesticides or 
rodenticides, and so on. The urinalysis data therefore are used primarily as 
a warning sign of sudden changes in the work environment and as a general 
indicator of employccs' health. 
Comparative analysis of reportable incidence rate data for selected Rank 
Xerox facilities (Figures 3.6 and 3.7) shows that rates vary subsrantially by 
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Figure 3.4 
Mean Annual Ancaic (As) Concmtrations at Individual Xerox PbotDr<eq>tor Facilities 
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year, facility, and even production area. For example the incidence rate for 
the Spanish facility is notably higher than all other facilities' (Figure 3.6). 
The incidence rate for the Dutch facility is 1.18 but the rate for the toner 
area alone is 5.52; in Spain the analogous rales are 1.58 and 9.07 (Figure 
3.7). In the Spanish toner plant the incidence rate varied by an order of 
magnitude between 1987 and 1988. 
As a group, the European facilities had a lower average incidence rate 
(0.79 in 1988) than the corporation as a whole (3.49 in 1988), and the India 
facility was consistendy much lower than either (average of 0.9 between 
1985 and 1988) (Figure 3.6). 
The low incidence rate at Modi Xerox may reflect fewer accidents, but 
the facility managers interviewed by the research team suggested a different 
explanatory hypothesis, based on their personaJ experience. Because of local 
cultural attitudes and concern about lost income, minor accidents that 
would be reported by almost all U.S. workers and by many European work· 
COIlPORATE AND Hosr COUNTRY PROPU.I!S 55 
Figure 3.5 
Mean Aunual Sdcniwn (Sc) ConcaltratioDS at Individual Xerox Photoreceptor 
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en are almost never reponed by Indian workers. It is therefore important to 
consider the possibility of under- and over-reponing when comparing RlR 
statistics across countries and cultures. 
Taken together, Figures 3.3 through 3.7 reflect an extensive monitoring 
and reponing network for occupational health and safety hazards. Although 
individual facilities do not show equal EH&S performance, aU are in fuU 
compliance with governmental occupational standards, and most are in 
compliance with Xerox Standards. Health and safety improvements over 
time are obvious, but there are recent deviations in compliance with the sel~ 
nium standard and in average occupational injuty rates. The data do not 
demonstrate performance differences between U.S., European, and dcvd-
oping country facilities, but this finding should be interpreted with caution 
because of the limited time period involved and because of monitotingl 
reponing differences among individual facilities, countries, and cultures. 
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Figure 3.6 
Reportable Incidena: Rates for Individual Xerox Facilities 
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Du Poin Agrichemical Products Division: Overvi~w 
The Du Pont de Nemours Corporation began in 1802 as a manufacturer of 
black powder. Through its first century, it remained essentially an explosives 
manufacturer and grew by geographic expansion. In 1903 Du Pont became 
one of the first corporations to launch a formal R&D program, opening of 
its first research laboratory in New Jersey. Although initially focused on 
ways to expand the company's explosives business. the research soon ex-
tended into chemical proocsscs unrelated to explosives. 
Corporate growth and diversification have been principally driven and 
accomplished by internal Du Pont R&D, with such landmark developments as 
cellophane (1923), synthetic ammonia (1924). Freon (1931), white pigmcots 
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Figure 3.7 
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(1935), and Teflon, Nylon, Orion, and Dacron (1938-50). But diversifica-
tion has also been advanced by notable acquisitions, including the Fairfield 
Rubber Company (1916), Endo Pharmaceutical Labs (1969), Berg Electron-
ics (1972), New England Nuclear (1981), Conoco (1981), and Shen Agri-
cultural Products (1986). Today, the science-based company is one of the 
largest and most diversified industrial corporations in the world. 
The key components of Du Pont's organizational structUre are shown in 
Figure 3.8. This study focuses on Du Pont's agrichemical products group, 
which is one of its ten major manufactUring groups. (The others are imaging 
systems, medical, fabricated products, petrochemicals, textile fibers, auto-
motive parts, chemicals and pigments, electronics, and polymer products). 
The agrichemical products business has 5 domestic and 13 international 
facilities. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Italy, Puerto 
Rico, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines each have one facility; Mexico 
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has two. Approximately 70 percent of these agriadtural facilities were built 
by Du Pont. The other 30 percent were acquired as existing plants, and of 
these, the recendy acquired Shell U.S. Agrichemical ProduCts facilities are the 
largest block. Because the facilities built by Du Pont tend to be larger than 
the acquired facilities, approximatdy 85 percent of the total agrichemical 
produCts manufacturing capacity is based in company-built plants. Eleven 
of the 13 international facilities (85 percent) are wholly owned. Du Pont 
owns 45 percent of the Argentine facility and 80 percent of the facility cur-
rendy under construction in China. In both cases, local business interests 
are the joint owners. Because acquired facilities and joint ventures account 
for such a small part of its overseas agrichemical facilities, Du Pont has been 
deeply and directly involved in the design, licensing, and operation of its 
overseas facilities. 
Du Pont's primary goal in making foreign investments is the acquisition 
of new markets. When evaluating potential new investments, the company 
applies two general criteria: the global business value of the product, as 
measured by the potential global sales and profit margin, and the strategic 
value of the host country. The United States, Japan, Europe, China, Aus-
tralia, and India are strategically valuable countries for agrichemical produCts 
because of their large populations, their significant agricultural production, 
and their commitment to modem agricultural technology. 
Du Pont'S decision to site a new agrichemical manufacturing facility over-
seas is made in the context of a planned market entry strategy that spans at 
least several years. The general chronological model for such market entry 
is shown in Figure 3.9. Several stages are typical. 
Stage 1-Fully formulated and packaged product is imponed from the United States. 
Duting this stage, the company getS to know the local market, culture, and business 
conditions as well as the natural conditions and practices that may require changes in 
the product formulation and lor packaging. 
Stage 2-Fully formulated bulk product is imponed from the United Stites and pad· 
aged locally. 
Stage 3-Aetive ingredients and formulation ingredients are imponed from the United 
States and formulated and packaged locally. Formulation and packaging may be per. 
formed by local contractors, or Du Pont may build its own facility to conduct these 
operations. The construction of a formulating facility is not a necessary step for the 
transition to Stage Four to take place. 
Stage 'I-Synthesis of aetive ingredient is transferred to the foreign country. At this 
stage only the last step or steps of the synthesis are conducted abroad. The interme-
diates are either imponed from the United States or purchased locally, depending on 
the process and economic coosidc:rat~ons. 
Stage S -The entire production process, and some of the R&D, is canied out in the for-
eign country. At this stage, the foreign subsidiary facility earries out complete synthe-
sis, including manufacture of intcnnediatcs, using Jocal and imponcd raw materials 
and starring substrates. Stage S represents full "backward integration" of technology. 
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Fisure 3.9 
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The development of the Thai case study conforms to this general chrono-
logical model. Stage 1 entry was accomplished in the 1960s. Local repackaging 
(Stage 2) was initiated in the early 1970s. The transition to Stage 3 was made 
in the mid·1970s and relied upon local contractors until the early 1980s, 
when Du Pont constructed its own formulating and packaging facility. 
The model shown in Figure 3.9, which focuses on total sales as a variable 
in transitions between stages, oversimplifies business reality. It iguores the 
political, rultural, economic, and regulatory climate of the host country 
(current and projected), and it ignores a range of other circumstances (dis-
russed later) that affect corporate business decisions. The model also over· 
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simplifies corporate policy. In appropriate circumstances, Du Pont is willing 
to forgo gradual market entry aod enter a host country at an advanced stage, 
evco including the construction of a technologically integrated facility, as 
evidenced by its current facility construction project in China. In this case, 
the push toward full backward integration came from the Chinese govern-
ment, but corporate policy was sufficiendy flexible to allow adaptation of 
the usual development strategy. 
Nevertheless, despite these oversimplifications, the model highlights two 
characteristics of Du Pont agrichemicals overseas activities. First, Du Pont 
ordinarily does not decide to build a facility in a foreign country until after 
the company has beco in the country for several years, has become familiar 
with its cultural and business climate, and has established a network of rela-
tionships with suppliers, distributors, and host country authorities. Second, 
Du Pont's planned and staged cotry into a foreign market ordinarily involves 
several decision points at which the interaction of corporate and host country 
objectives can be observed. 
Do Pont: EH&S Policies, Implementation, and Performance 
Du Pont's corporate EH&S structure is shown in Figure 3.10. Three key 
executive committees guide policy-making: the Safety, Health, and Envi-
ronmcot Steering Committee; the Environmental Management Committee; 
and the Environmental Resources Committee. These committees include 
corporate personnel representing operational departments (petrochemicals, 
consolidated coal, polymer products, agricultural department, chemicals 
and pigments department, Conoco), an employee relations department, a 
central research departmcot, and departments for development, cogineering, 
external affairs, legal issues, and marketing. 
In addition to this corporate EH&S structure, the several manufacturing 
departments (and some subunits within the manufacturing departments) 
each have their own EH&S specialists. In the Agricultural Products Depart-
ment, EH&S experts are important resources, continually providing a kcy 
liaison with the foreign facilities plant managers and other units within the 
company, including engineering and research. The number of employees 
who specialize in EH&S matters at international facilities varies with the 
size of the facility, the hazards associated with the product, and the local 
conditions. 
The safety culture of Du Pont employees is deeply entrenched and can be 
traced to the origins of the corporation. Du Pont's first major product was 
gun powder. The hazards associated with Du Pont's traditional chemical 
products have helped to promote a singularly intcose occupational safety 
culture, a culture which (although emulated by many other firms) still seems 
to be the most extcosive and deeply rooted in the chemical industry. Over 
time, Du Pont's occupational safety culture expanded to include product 
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Figure 3.10 
EnvironlDCnt, Health, and Safety Organizational Structure at Du Pont Corporation 
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safety and environmental management areas in which Ou Pont has again 
been among the corporate leaders. 
The values just mentioned-occupational safety, product safety, and re· 
sponsible environmental management-are key elements of the corporate 
image that Ou Pont aspires to project to both the industrial community and 
the general public. But safety culture is not just a public relations issue at Ou 
Pont; it is manifestly a cherished historical tradition, a prerequisite for pro-
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fessional success in the company, and a major source of pride and professional 
identity among its employees. These excerpts from the introductory paragraph 
of Du Pont's Policy Manual for the Bangpoo Plant and from the introduction 
to the general information section of Du Pont's Operating and Procedures 
Manual for the Bangpoo Plant, illustrate the culture: 
The bedrock principle that governs relationships at Du Pont is that each person will 
be treated with fairness and respect. Du Pont maintains confidence in its men and 
women and their honesty in all company related activities, and relies on them to fol-
low specified safety and operating procedures, depamnent and division rules, and 
supervisory instructions (Poliey Manual, Du Pont 1981, p.1). 
Control of discharses of liquid and solid wast .. '0 the environment such that .here 
is no potential of injury to personnel or the environment is a requirement of the job 
and a condition for employment. It is imperative that we control the disposal of aU 
materials that leave the si.e for safe disposal (Operating and Procedures Manual, Du 
PODt 1982, p. 6200). 
The foundations and implementation of Du Pont safety culture are explored 
in greater depth in Chapter 6. 
Du Pont conducts formal corporate EH&S audits every I.S to 3 years 
(depending upon facility size, industrial pro=ses, etc. ) for both domestic 
and international facilities. The audits use a participative survey methodol-
ogy. Central topics include safety and health management (staff, rules and 
procedures, communication channels, committees, contractor safety, and 
health); work practices (compliance with rules and procedures, personal 
protective equipment, training); and work environment (area and equipment 
guarding, transportation equipment inspections, material handling and 
waste disposal, working conditions, preventive maintenance). Some surveys 
also have a "health emphasis" and add chemical, biological, and physical 
health hazards to the central topics. Others have a "safety emphasis" and 
add pro=s safery management and emergency control to the core survey 
objectives. 
Site survey teams consist of site personnel but are led by a survey consultant 
from the Corporate Safety, Health, and Environmental Affairs Division. In 
order to avoid "policeman-suspect" relationships between auditors and plant 
managers, the reports are not sent through the regular agricultural products 
manufacturing group's reporting channels. Instead, the survey team's report 
is given to the plant manager for review and, after mutual discussion, is sent 
directly to the corporate health and safety group. 
In addition to these formal surveys, each overseas facility is visited by the 
U.S. director of manufacturing every two years, by the regional manager 
(Du Pont Far East in the case of Thailand) every six months, and by the 
managing director of the local rorporation (Du Pont Thailand) every month. 
Safety performance indicators used by Du Pont include standardized num-
bers reported to the U.S. Department of Labor, such as lost workday incidence 
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Figure 3.11 
Lost Workday lojury Cases at U.S. Du Poot Facilities 
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cases and total repomble injury cases. The company also keeps records of 
non-work related injuries. Figure 3.11 shows the average lost workday inci-
dence cases experienced at U.S. facilities between 1912 and 1989. The dra-
matic decrease from 1912 to 1930 was followed by modest but consistent 
decreases in subsequent years, with apparent leveling off at approximately 
0.02. Du Pont's reportable injury rates arc approximately two orders of 
magnitude higher than the lost workday rates. 
Figure 3.12 shows the injury rates for Du Pont's worldwide chemicals and 
specialties productS (including agrichemicals). Figure 3.12 also shows the 
off-the-job injury rate for Du Pont's worldwide chemicals and specialties 
productS; the off-the-job injury rate closely paraUels the on-the-job rate, 
suggesting that the same behavioral and attitudinal changes that promote 
safe working conditions also promote off-the-job safety among the Du Pont 
employees. 
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Figure 3.12 
Lost Workday and T oral Recordable Injury Cases at Du Pont Chemicals and Spe. 
cialties Facilities 
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Figures 3.13 and 3.14 compare the injury rate performance of Du Pont 
agricultural product facilities in the United States to Du Pont facilities in 
other industrialized countries and in developing countries. The facilities in 
developing countries rank lowest in both on·the-job and off-the-job injury 
rates. These comparisons chaUenge the common belief that facilities in in· 
dustrialized countries have berter safety records than equivalent facilities 
elsewhere. However, as noted earlier, these data may reflect cultural differ-
ences that incline workers in developing nations to underreport occupational 
incidents. 
When compared to Du Pont-owned facilities, the facilities of Du Pont 
contractors have significandy poorer safety perfonnances. For example, the 
average standard on-the-job lost workday incident rate among 20 Du Pont 
agrichemical contractors in the United States was 12.21 per 200,000 person-
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Figur< 3.13 
Average Total Occupational Injury Rates for Du POOl Agricbtmical Facilities 
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hours in 1988 and 13.6 in 1989, roughly an order of magnitude worse than 
the record at Du Pont-owned plants. 
In summary, Du Pont's occupational injury statistics are consistent with 
its traditional commitment to safery. The issues related to developing and 
maintaining the Du Pont safery culture are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
Oecidental Chemical Corporation: Overview 
Occidental Chemical Corporation (Oxychem) is a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of Occidental Petroleum Corporation. Initially focused in the fertilizer 
industry, Oxychem launched a program of substantial growth with its 1968 
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Figure 3.14 
Average Total Off Job Injwy Rate for Du POOl Aptthemical Facilities 
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acquisition of Hooker Chemical. Oxychem now has three core business 
areas: agricultural produClS, plastics, and industtial and specialty chemicals. 
Figure 3.15 shows its organizational structure. The general corporate growth 
strategy caUs for acquisitions of the biggest, best quality, and lowest cost 
manufacturers of commodity chemicals. Since acquiring Hooker, Oxychem 
also has purchased Tenneco Chemicals (polyvinyl chloride facilities), W. R. 
Grace's Brazilian facilities, and, most recendy, Diamond Shamrock Chem-
icals and Caine Chemicals in the mid 1980s. These acquisitions doubled 
Oxychern's size over the last decade. 
AU of Oxychem's acquisitions over the last twO decades were based on 
mutual consent and were precc:dcd by careful study of the target company's 
culture. Moreover, foreign or domestic subsidiaries of newly acquired cor-
porations are sold if they do not fit weU with Oxychem's corporate strategy. 
FigIm 3.tS 
Occidental Chemical Oqpnizatioaal Structure 
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$S, as a company with a distinct and unified identity, Oxychem 
short corporate history. 
n is predominandy a U.S. company and aspires to become the 
,estic manufaaurer of commodity chemicals. In recent years, it has 
ased attention to foreign development. Oxychem's 16 international 
'e located in Belgium (1), Brazil (7), Chile (1), Mexico (4), Singa-
nd Thailand (2). Only three of these facilities were built by Oxy-
;ium, Singapore, and Mexico); the other thirteen were acquired. 
n uses several criteria to evaluate potential invesnnents abroad: 
I profits; market share (the company is determined to be the num-
number rwo producer in each national market, and, if number 
ve a major market share); past experience with the product, the 
nd the local marker; adequacy of the local market to support 
.f scale; market growth potential; local economic and political cli-
the ability to maintain significant influence on the operation of 
. including management of environmental health and occupational 
1e of these variables are largely bey.ond corporate control, for ex-
t! marker size, local economic clin1ate (such as inflation, indebted-
lbility of money, regulations of foreign invesnnent, availability of 
·k force), local political climate, or market share and growth po-
hers are subject to negotiation and trade-off, either within the 
il' with the company, joint venture parmer, and host country, for 
axation, protection of technology patents and trademarks, epa-
profits, host countty incentives, and maintaining major influence 
,era tion of a facility. 
,. thirteen (77 percent) Oxychem international facilities are joint 
'he Oxychem manager of the Thai facility viewed the partnership 
business advantage, provided that the local partner accepts the 
philosophy and key business objectives. A joint venrure partner 
major strengths, including close knowledge of local marker con-
lrural practices, and rules for dealing with local authorities. 
Oxychem's international facilities were purchased from other com-
.e from W. R. Grace and three from Diamond Shamrock. Only 
built by Oxychem. Oxychem's decision to grow by acquisition has 
:onsequences for EH&S management at its international subsidi-
• newly acquired facilities usually require major EH&S-related 
which can cost as much as 15 percent of the facility's purchase 
nd, Oxychem has repeatedly factd the chaUenge of imposing its 
S philosophy and policies on new groups of workers and mana-
, because many of the facilities purchased in developing countries 
'enrures, the company has also been confronted with the challenge 
Nith venrure partners whose EH &S views may be very different 
,.m's. These issues are further discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 3.16 . . 
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Oxycbem: EHSeS Policie., Implementation, and Performance 
Both Occidental Chemical and Occidental Petroleum have relatively re· 
cendy embraced the concept of corporate involvement in environment, health, 
and safety. As with Xerox Corporation, the occasion for this change was a 
serious environmental problem for which Oxychem assumed responsibility. 
The corporate EHSeS network, shown in Figure 3.16, was created in 
1981. The vice president of corporate environmental affairs is responsible 
for environmental remediation, environmental control, environmental 
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information, and legal/regulatory affairs. The corporate medical director is 
responsible for physical and mental health of employees (medical examina-
tions), while the vice president of safety and hygiene is charged with broader 
health-related responsibilities (safety assessments, toxicologic studies per-
taining to employee health, and indusoial hygiene). Because most health 
hazards associated with Oxychem's processes are well known, long-term 
epidemiological studies of employees have not been undertaken. Toxico-
logical testing, if needed, is contracted out, and the company rarely sets its 
own standards. 
Oxychem's dccision to acquire existing facilities means that the company 
must be prepared to respond to environmental problems resulting from pre-
vious operations. Oxychem calls these remedial activities "special environ-
mental projects." The special fund for remediating past practices is funded 
by the corporate budget and receives annual conoibutions from Oxychem's 
ovcrall gross revenues before corporate profits are calru1atcd. In 1989, special 
remediation projects judged appropriate by current standards of environ-
mental management and supponed by the fund totalled 525 to 530 million. 
(Oxychem's total environmental expenses, including the fund, were over 
590 million in 1989). 
Explicit corporate policy calls for the application of uniform occupational 
standards worldwide and the achievement of "functional equivalency" be-
tween domestic and international facilities. Functional equivalency is defined 
by Occidental Petroleum's vice president for health, environment, and safety 
as "a level of protection of human health and the environment that is compat-
ible with the intended objectives of the U.S. laws and regulations" (Friedman 
1988). 
Functional equivalency at individual facilities usually calls for the usc of 
site-specific methods to achieve similar levels of EH&S protection. For ex-
ample, different technologies may be employed at different facilities to achieve 
compliance with a uniform worldwide occupational standard. Where U.S. 
law mandates the use of a particular pollution control technology (a so-called 
best-available technology rule) at domestic facilities, a company may substi-
tute an environmental standard or a pollutant discharge limit in order to 
achieve equivalent environmental protection at its foreign facilities. In other 
situations, a company may choose to disregard certain procedural require-
ments mandated in the United States, such as reporting or community out-
reach. The last chapter of this book discusses a body of empirical evidence 
that bears on the question of how Oxychem, Xerox, and Du Pont interpret 
the concept of functional equivalency. 
Oxychem corporate safety assessments at domestic facilities are conducted 
by a team of safety or environmental spccialists from corporate headquaners 
staff, one or more safety or environmental officers from other Oxychem 
facilities in the same industry group, and the safety and/or environment ad-
ministrator from the facility being assessed. Sometimes the team includes 
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Fi~ 3.17 
Safety Process and Safety Program Implemenl2tion al Occidenw Chemkal Fa<:iIities 
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the production manager of the facility. These unannoun~d assessments are 
conducted annually at large plants and biannually for small planls. 
Corporale safety assessmenls at international facilities are conducted with 
Ihe same frequency as at domestic facilities. The assessment teams for inter-
national facilities arc usually composed of a safety and environmental expert 
from Ihe divisional headquarters staff, the local facility's program director, 
and the facility representative responsible for safety and environmental con· 
trol. The manager of Environment and Safety International participates in 
most safety assessments of international operations. A representative of the 
parent company, Occidental Petroleum, participales in approximately half 
of the assessments. 
The results of safety assessments are expressed quantilatively on two 
scales: a lOO·point Index of Safety Program Implementation (derived from 
quantitative ratings con~rning 36 calegories), and a IOO·point Index of 
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Figure 3.18 
Total Injury Rate. for Occidental Chemical Facilities 
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Safety Process Management (derived from the rarings concerning 8 of the 36 
categones). Results from 1987 to 1990 for domestic and international facil-
ities and for the Thai facility are summarized in Figure 3.17. S~ady improve-
ment over time is obvious in all categories. It appears that domestic V.S. 
facilities may be perfonning slightly better than international facilities (all 
but one of which are in developing countries), and that the Thai facility lags 
behind both groups. However, these comparative data should be interpreted 
with caution, because many of the ratings upon which they depend involve 
an inherently subjective judgment. 
Standardized total reportable injury rates for Oxychem and its individual 
divisions for 1987-1990 and corporate goals for 1991 are shown in Figure 
3.18. Statistics for product-based divisions include only domestic V.S . facil-
ities; the international group includes aU nondomestic facilities, regardless 
of product line. Steady improvement over time is evident for each manufac-
ruring group, including the in~rnational group. As a group, the international 
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Figure 3.19 
Total IDjury and Illness Rata for Occidental Chemical Facilities 
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facilities performed slighdy better than the company average. This comparison 
seems to conflict with the international facilities' lower safety / environmental 
assessment scores, but the apparent discrepancy may result from underre· 
porting of occupational incidents at foreign facilities , although no direct 
evidence of such underreporting has so far emerged. 
Combined injury and occupational illness rates are reported in Figure 3.19. 
They show essentiaUy the same trends as the injury rates alone. 
In summary, Oxychem's numerical facility performance indicators show 
steady improvement over time in aU categories studied here. Interesting and 
significant differences can be observed among some categories: for example, 
OCQlpational injury and illness rates vary widely between product line cate-
gories. But the gap between these categories has been narrowing over time. 
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COMPARISON OF 1HE CORPORATIONS 
Table 3.3 presents the overall vital statistics for the three companies stud-
ied. Although Occidental is significandy smaller than Xerox or Du Pont, all 
three companies are large corporations with multiple overseas facilities. 
The corporations have quite different histories: Du Pont is one of the old-
est chemical companies in the United States, with a long and cherished tra-
dition of stability. Its growth has been steady but slow, primarily due to 
expansion rather than acquisition. Practically aU hazardous chemicals pro-
duced by the agrirultural division are consumer products and thus present 
uniquely complex safety perfonnance challenges. 
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Occidental Chemical and Xerox are much younger companies. and each 
has grown rapidly. Xerox photocopier technology is a highly proprietary 
process, and Xerox corporate growth has been due primarily to expansion. 
Occidental Chemical has grown primarily by acquisitions. 
All three companies manufaaure chemicals with hazardous properries. 
but the companies' main product lines differ. Oxychem produces only indus-
trial chemicals, so consumer exposure is not a major issue. Both Du Pont 
and Xerox produce chemicals to which consumers are exposed, so hazards 
to both workers and consumers are important concerns. 
Table 3.4 summarizes the ownership arrangements and the manner of ac-
quisition for each of the foreign facilities srudied. OCCidental Chemical has 
the highest proportion of joindy owned foreign facilities. This is probably 
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Figure 3.20 
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related to the fact that its technologies, unlike those of Du Pont and Xerox, 
are not proprietary. The manner of acquiring facilities also differs among 
the three corporations: While Xerox and Du Pont tend to build their facilities, 
Occidental tends to acquire existing facilities from other companies. 
All three corporations have well-developed management systems for 
EH&S, with clearly artiallated philosophies and corporate involvement. 
The philosophies and management systems, however, have very different 
histories. Du Pont's concern with safety has its origins in the nineteenth cen-
tury, when gun powder was its first and only product. Since then, the cor-
poration has developed a highly sophisticated safety culture and is widely 
recognized as one of the world leaders in that area. Occidental Chemical 
(1981) and Xerox (1980) are more recent convens to the concept of high·level 
corporate involvement in EH&S management; both were awakened to the 
question by incidents that resulted in undesirable publicity. 
The only numerical data providing direct cross-corporate comparisons 
for the three companies are the standard reported total occupational injury 
rates. As shown in Figure 3.20, all three companies show a general down· 
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wacd trend with time, although Xerox shows certain depanures from the 
trend after 1987. Although Occidental Chemical and Xerox are among the 
leading corporations with regard to EH6cS management, their occupational 
injury rates ace still approximately an order of magnitude higher than Du 
Pont's. (This suggests that there is considerable room for improvement by 
even the best.) Notably, there is a definite convergence in the overall rate 
pattern, with a hypothetical baseline being asymptotically approached by 
Du Pont. By comparison to other industries, all three corporations have 
substantially lower average rates of occupational injury than the chemicals 
and specialties industria1 sector or even the aggregated private sector. In sum, 
the available statistical data suggest that the three corporations under study 
ace among the industry leaders in keeping occupational injury rates to a 
minimum. 
The statistical data also suggest some counter-intuitive company-specific 
conclusions regarding facility performance differences between domestic 
and foreign facilities. In aggregate, the internal data provided by the corpo-
rations suggest that their foreign facilities have tended to ourperform their 
domestic U.S. facilities and that this is particularly true of facilities in devel-
oping countries. (As has been noted, these differences must be interpreted 
with caution because cultural differences may influence the reporting of 
occupational injuries.) On the other hand, the data provided by the three 
corporations regarding compliance with occupational exposure star.dards 
show no systematic differences between domestic and foreign facilities. 
THE HOST COUNfRIES 
Development and Factoty Licensing in India and Thailand 
The current development policies of India and Thailand have evolved in 
very different ways and from very different historical roots. In India, the 
policies ace the result of decades of intense national public debate, critical 
self-examination, and a continuing self-conscious search for pragmatic solu-
tions to openly articulated social problems. Each of India's live-year devel-
opment plans ace drafted initially by the Plantring Commission and then 
presented to Parliament, where each plan's "objectives, priorities and targets 
could be reviewed in detail with the widest public discussion" (Plantring 
Co~ssion 1961, p. 23). In contrast, Thailand's development debate has, 
until recendy, been confined 10 a small circle of governmental officials whose 
views have been shielded from public debate (Christensen 1989, p. 181). 
Following independence, India's first two decades of planned development 
were inward-oriented in the Soviet style and aimed at large-scale rapid indus-
trialization and an increasingly self-reliant economy (Plantring Commission 
1961, p. 3). A severe balance of payments crisis in 1957 resulted in increased 
emphasis on the drive for self-reliance, and infused the plantring process 
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with a perceived need to conserve foreign exchange expenditures (Srinivasan 
1990). In its quest for self-reliance, India's industrialization was to be guided 
by wee prominent social aspirations: 
1. the assurance of equal opportunities for all, regardless of class, caSte, or regionj 
2. rcduaion of the extreme gap between socia1 groups at opposite ends of the eco-
nomic speantm and prevention of new inequalities; and 
3. prevention of monopolistic growth and concentration of economic power in the 
hands of a few (Planning Commission 1961, p. 31). 
Current Indian policies related to industrial location, size, indigenization, 
and ownership, as well as the active involvement of government authorities 
in regularing investment activities, are all rooted in these post-independence 
goals and experiences. In the case of multinational facilities, these policies 
restrict location and ownership options, impose production quotas, enforce 
local procurement of parts and materials (up to 80 percent of value of the 
manufactured produCt), and require integration of the manufacturing proc-
ess through the so-called Phased Manufacturing Program (PMP). 
Thai development policies are not rooted in a rich history of highly visible 
public debate and overt development choices. While India's five-year devel-
opment plans represent blueprints for coordinated national efforts toward 
both economic and social objectives, Thailand development plans serve pri-
marily as a general guideline for government agencies. The Thai five-year 
development plans are not intended to mold national identity or produce 
social transformation. Indeed, a high-level official at Thailand's National 
Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), who is a co-author of 
the recent plans, remarked, "The process of drafting a plan is more important 
than the final produCt, as it brings the best minds together and creates a lively 
and productive debate." 
Thailand's strong commitment to a free market economy has resulted, 
without significant public debate, in the acceptance of economic growth 
(and limited governmental intervention) as the central development objec-
tive. The administrative structures and procedures currendy employed to 
regulate MNCs still reflect the fundamental development philosophy adopted 
by post-war Thailand: openness to foreign investors, facilitation of economic 
growth, and minimal interference by the government. Not surprisingly, 
multinational corporations generally judge Thailand's business climate to 
be very good. As one high level official at the Board of Investment of Thai-
land stated, " ... a foreign company can come freely to Thailand and when 
its technology is within the government's priority areas it can do whatever it 
lik • es. 
A closer examination of the licensing process for forcign-owned manufac-
turing facilities reveals additional differences between the development phi-
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Figure 3.21 
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losophies of Thailand and India. Figure 3.21 oudines India's approval system 
for siting MNC facilities. The Secretariat for IndusDiai Approvals, located 
within the Ministry of IndusDial Development, plays a key role in the proc-
ess. Essential responsibilities of the secretariat include the receipt of aU fonns 
for indusDial licenses and forcign collaboration agreements, appropriate 
channeling of these through the concerned approval comminees, monitoring 
of delays, and the ultimate issuance of indusDiallicenses and leners of intent. 
The Project Approval Board is a coordinating and supervisory body for 
the secretariat; it oversees the operation of the Licensing Committee:, the 
Forcign Invesunent Board, the Capital Goods Comminee, and the Monopolies 
and ResDictive Trade Practices Comminee. The board and each of the com-
mine .. are direcdy assisted by a Secretariat for IndusDiai Approvals (SIAl, 
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which operates within the Ministry of Industrial Development. The applica. 
tion process begins when a corporation submits to the minister of industrial 
development a letter of intent to apply for a factory license. The first 
response to the letter is the formation of a technical committee within the 
ministry, consisting of appropriate technical and development expens from 
the Ministry of Industrial Development and other branches of the govern· 
ment. The primary role of the committee is to determine whether the proposed 
technology is consistent with India's development objectives and hence desir-
able. Key factors considered in this initial review include domestic need for 
the product, prospects for indigenization of the manufacturing process, pro-
jected c:xpon value of the product, sophistication of the technology, projected 
magnitude of the employment, and (for highly polluring or resource·intensive 
industries such as paper manufacturing or mining) the potential environmental 
impact of the technology. 
If the technology is approved by the Technical Committee, the applicant 
receives a letter of intent to consider an application for industrial license 
from the Seaetariat of Industrial Approvals. This letter is equivalent to an 
invitation to enter the Industrial Approval System shown in Figure 3.21. 
That process is characterized by intense negotiations becween the applicant 
and the host country's government and may take cwo to three years. Depend-
ing on the facility's size, proposed foreign equity percentage, and degree to 
which the proposed activity conforms to India's industrial sector priorities, 
the applicant will need to pass through powerful committees (Licensing, 
Foreign Investment, Capital Goods, and Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices), which are overseen hy the Project Approval Board. For example, 
the Foreign Investment Board is chaired by an official from the Finance 
Ministry and includes the seaetaty of the Planning Commission, the director 
general of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, the director 
general of Technical Development, and various secretaries from other eco-
nomic ministries as well. 
The negotiations, which culminate with issuance of an operating license 
and a foreign collaboration license, typically settle the issues of location, 
ownership (including the value to be assigned for non-cash equity contribu· 
tions), technical integration of the manufacturing process, production quotas, 
contribution to foreign trade, and contribution to indigenization of tech-
nology. Sites within large urban or industrial centers are effectively excluded 
from consideration. Potential industrial sites are categorized in four groups: 
"A" sites, which have weU..<fevcloped infrastructure and an established industrial 
presence but need more industry; 
"8" sites, which have good infrastructure and some industrics; 
toIC" sites, which have no infrastructure but some industry; and 
"'D" sites, which have neither infrastructure nor industry. 
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Industries that locate in "0" areas are classified as "pioneer industries" and 
receive a seven-year exemption from business taxes. Industries that locate in 
a C areaS receive a six-year exemption from business taxes. 
By comparison, the Thai licensing system is quite simple. Except for a 
number of very routine procedural approvals (such as mmmcrcial registration, 
business tax registration, and residence and work permits for non-Thai em-
ployees), a proposed investment that complies with the equity restrictions 
established by the Alien Business Law of 1972 will require no specific gov-
ernment approval other than an industrial license. (International Legal 
Couns<llors 1980, p. 49; Business International Corporation 1989, p. 5). And 
in most cases, an application for an industriallicensc is pro<%SSCd within a few 
months through routine administrative channels. Ordinarily, there are no 
direct negotiations between the MNC and the government. The applicant has 
substantial Ocxibility in deciding the size and sophistication of the technology. 
Thai authorities do exercise some inOuence OVer location of facilities, but 
the philosophy underlying their siting strategies is fundamentally different 
from that of India's authorities. India's policies are intended to promote long-
term tegional development, but the government assumes only the most min-
imal responsibility for providing infrastrUcture to support remote industrial 
locations. Thai policies are 'intended to relieve congestion in Bangkok while 
encouraging foreign investment; to serve these ends, the government assumes 
responsibility for providing superior infrastrUcture in government-managed 
industrial estates. 
Given its efficient processing of industriallicensc applications and its gen-
erally unrestrictive business atmosphere, Thailand's principal means of inOu-
encing MNC conduct is a strategic incentives system. For example, Thailand 
uses a system of import duties to encourage local content in its production 
(Business International Corporation 1989, p. 7). The incentive system is 
managed by the Board of Investment (BOI), which has as its prlmaty objective 
facilitating the mnduct of business. This board is the central Thai government 
agency responsible for investment promotion. It provides a range of services 
designed to help investors at aU stages of their projects, from identifying 
investment opportunities to solving specific operational problems. The BOI 
Investment Service Centtt provides a coordinating link with other government 
agencies, enables investors to obtain necessary approvals and permits, proc-
esses visas for foreigners investigating potential business opportunities, and 
actively seeks potcotiallocal business partners. BOI also manages a publicity 
campaign praising the investment climate of Thailand. 
Established in 1960 as a relatively obscure entity, the BOI is perhaps best 
known now for its power to grant a wide range of attractive incentives (known 
as "privileges") to multinational corporations judged to deserve "promoted 
Status." The Board of Investment is empowered by the 1977 Investment 
Promotion Act to "formulate an invesunent promotion programme" that 
furthers Thailand's development and to participate in preparation of the 
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National Economic and Social Development Plans. The incentives available 
to the board indude: 
1. guarantees against expon restrictions. competition by new state enterprises, state 
monopolization of similar products. nationalization, price controls, and impons 
by tax..exempt state agencies or enterprises; 
2. protective measures such as import surcharges or bans on competing foreign 
productS; 
3. exemption from the Alien Business Law restrictions on foreign-equity shares; 
4. pennission to employ foreign technicians and apen:s, to own land, and to take 
or remit foreign aurency abroad; and 
5. a wide range of taX incentives, such as exemptions from import duties and bud· 
ness taxes on raw materia1s components and re--cxponcd items. exemptions from 
duties and business taxes on exportS, and annual deduaions hom taxable incomes 
based on expon perfonnaoce (Business International Corporation 1989, p. IS) . 
In awarding privileges, BOI gives priority to projects that demonstrate 
dear importance for national development. The specific criteria by which 
the desirability of projects are judged reflects a broad range of social and 
economic objectives, induding sophistication of technology, desirability of 
technology (vis-a-vis the government-promoted industrial and agricultural 
sectors), foreign exchange earnings, degree of domestic co-ownership, will-
ingness to locate in government-designated industrial estates or in the prov-
inces, magnitude of prospective employment, conservation of energy, and 
ability to develop a base for further industrial development (Board of Invest-
ment 1989, pp. 14-15). The relative weights assigned these several criteria 
are not equal. For example, the BOI application forms do not indude ques-
tions regarding the environmental effects of the proposed projects. Similarly, 
a high-level BOI official interviewed by this research team assigned much 
less imponance to implementing policies of regional development or natural 
resource management than to advancing economic growth and business de-
velopment policies. 
Despite its lack of direct authority to issue industrial licenses or to attach 
conditions to such licenses, the magnitude of the BOl's incentives and priv-
ileges make it a key regulatory body with respect to MNC activities. A ma-
jority of MNCs investing in Thailand do apply for promoted status and do 
choose to locate their facil ities in a government industrial estate. These in-
teractions with BOI, concerning the negotiation of incentives and privileges 
within the context of siting decisions, are the only times that most MNCs will 
directly confront the host country's development objectives. The agency's 
prominent role in the siting process is strengthened by the fact that its prin-
cipal objective-to help investors in aU business matters-is perfectly consis-
tent with Thai policy regarding multinational corporations: to promote 
economic growth and expom by attracting foreign investors. 
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Regulatory Suucturc. in India and Thailand 
In Thailand, responsibiliry for developing national environmental policy 
is assigned to the National Environment Board (NEB) and to its executive 
arm, the Office of the National Environment Board (ONEB). The revised 
Conservation of National Quality Act of 1978 gives NEB and ONEB the 
responsibility to develop national environmental policies; recommend stan-
dards on environmental quality to other agencies having statutory power to 
implement and enforce them; coordinate effons by government agencies to 
implement the environmental statutes; and repon to the cabinet on the state 
of the nation's environment. 
NEB and ONEB are primarily advisory, coordinating, and planning bod-
ies, not enforcers or implementers. This limitation on NEB/ONEB authority 
is reinforced by its location in the central administrative suucture of the 
country. In 1979 the NEB was transferred from the office of the prime mini-
ster to the newly aeated Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy 
(MSTE). Since the primary mission of MSTE is to promote conain industries, 
the regulatory objectives of NEB would appear to be suucturaUy subordi-
nate to the promotional objectives of its parent agency. 
Friction occasionally arises between ONEB and BOI, usually over specific 
decision timetables. While ONEB may want one to two years to evaluate 
the environmental impact of a particularly complex project, the tight sched-
ules of BOI may require much more rapid decision making. Although the 
prime minister has authority to resolve such matters, solutions to conflicts 
between economic and environmental objectives are usually negotiated 
among all the affected parties rather than imposed by one authority. 
Authority to implement NEB environmental standards and to regulate the 
environmental activities of industrial facilities rests with the Ministry of In-
dustry. The Ministry of Industry has promulgated standards for industrial 
effluents and air emissions since the early 1970s, as it was empowered to do 
by the Factories Act of 1969. By 1978 the regulatory authority of the Minis-
try of Industry was extended to include armospheric chemical and mineral 
dust standards in the workplace and groundwater quality standards for 
drinking purposes. 
In practice, enforcement of environmental standards is very weak in Thai-
land. In pan, this is due to the limited authority and resources granted 
ONEB. In pan, it can be attributed to the virtual absence of local enforce-
ment authorities: All enforcement activities must be carried out by the min-
istries and deparrments of Thailand's highly centralized national regulatory 
suucture. At government-managed industrial estates (which, thanks to 
superior infrasuucture and BOI incentives, are inaeasingly selected by MNC 
afftliates), enforcement is largely delegated to the estate management, the 
Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (lEA T). lEA T sets and enforces 
effluent standards, monitors discharges, and panicipates in the licensing 
process by specifying the conditions for environmental and occupational 
CORPORATE AND HOST COUNTRY PROFILES 85 
safety practices within the operating license. The advantages and disadvan-
tages of delegating regulatory and enforcement authority to lEA T, an agency 
with multiple missions, are evident in the case studies presented in Chapter 4. 
In contrast to Thailand's highly centralized system, India's legislative and 
administrative system for environmental regulation of industrial enterprises 
is characterized by the division of power berween the central government 
and state governments. The m3m responsibility for environmental peotee· 
rion lies with the Ministry of Environment and Forests. The Central Board 
for Pollution Control acts as the central government's implementing and 
coordinating authority, while eighteen state pollurion control boards have 
been established for more local supervision of statute implementation. The 
state boards are empowered to control pollution primarily through issuing 
discharge permits. 
Functioning of India's administrative machinety is supponed by the enact-
ment of various environmental regulations. Prior to 1984, the primary envi-
ronmental regulations were the Water Prevention and Control of Pollution 
Acts of 1974 and 1977, and the Air Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 
of 1981. Following the Bhopal accident in 1984, and in view of the shon-
comings of earlier environmental regulations, the government of India enacted 
a comprehensive Environmental Protection Act in 1986 (Bowonder and Arvind 
1989). As general legislation on environmental protection, the act coordi-
nates the activities of various regu]atory agencies; creates and empowers 
authorities for environmental protection, such as the plant closure authority 
given to the Ministry of Environment and Forests; regulates the discharge of 
environmental pollutants and handling of hazardous substances; enables 
speedy responses to accidents; and punishes those who endanger human en-
vironment, health and safety. Section 6 of the act explicidy empowers the 
central government by giving it rule-making authority for: 
1. standards of quality of air, water, or soil for various areas and purposes; 
2. maximum allowable limits of concentration of various environmental pollutants 
(including noise) for different areas; 
3. procedures and safeguards for the handling of hazardous substance; 
4. prohibition and restrictions on the handling of hazardous substance in different 
areas; 
S. the prohibition and ccstriction of the location of indusuies and the carrying on of 
processes and operations in different areas; and 
6. procedures and safeguards for the prevention of accidents that may cause envi-
ronmental pollution and for providing for remedial measures for such accidents. 
The 1986 rules contain industry-specific emissionl discharge standards for a 
broad range of industrial activities. The 1986 rules also empower the central 
government with authority to prohibit or restrict the location of industries 
and the continued operation of existing operations. 
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Using the British Factories Act of 1937 as a model, India's Factories Act 
of 1948 codified for the first time the international priocipIe that workers 
employed in a h.""rdous manufactUring process should have their health 
proteaed, safety ensured, and welfare attended to. In accordance with the 
provisions of this aa, facilities must pass state inspections and receive a license 
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for safe operation from the state boards. The Factories (Amendment) Act of 
1987 provides better safeguards in the use and handling of hazardous sub-
stances in factories, mandates the creation of emergency response procedures, 
and allows for more stringent punishment for noncompliance with the pro-
visions of the Act. For hazardous industries, the 1987 act specifies provisions 
controlling the faciliry siting for the protection of neighboring communities, 
creates compulsory disclosure of infonnation by corporations, and ensures 
that the person ("occupier") who has ultimate control over the affairs of the 
factory is responsible for implementing safery and hazard management. Con-
cerning hazardous faciliry siting, a mandatory siting procedure involving 
the creation of a site appraisal committee has been instituted. This committee 
is to consist of the chief inspector of factories of the state (as chair), an expert 
in the field of occupational health, and representatives from the State Pollu-
tion Control Board's meteorological department. This committee has the 
power to call for any infonnation from the industry prior to siting a factory 
(Bowonder and Arvind 1989). 
Despite the existence of an c:xtensive regulatory structure for environmental 
protection, enforcement in India is weak. Administrative and technological 
constraints, coupled with the reluctance of governments to take firm actions 
when the interests of strong and influential private groups are put into jeop-
ardy, provide common hindrances to the enforcement capabilities of India 
as well as other developing countries (Eskeland and Jimenez 1991). 
SUMMARY 
Against this background of two fundamentally different national develop-
ment philosophies, rooted in different economic and political systems and 
conditioned by different institutional and national histories, in the early and 
mid 1980s Du Pont and Occidental Chemical initiated business ventures in 
Thailand, and Xerox initiated a venture in India. Table 3.5 summarizes the 
philosophical differences between the two countries, which are reflected in a 
wide spectrum of contrasting policies and administrative systems, including, 
for example, the extent of government intervention; the instruments of that 
intervention (e.g., incentives versus strict and short-lived licenses and per-
mits); the degree of control imposed on the foreign corporations; and the 
support provided by the host country to the corporations. 
Not unexpectedly, the contrasts in business environment betWeen Thailand 
and India create different expectations of how the siting process for foreign 
facilities would proceed in each country. From tbe company perspective, the 
expectation in Thailand would be for a relatively efficient siting process, 
with minimal negotiations between the host country and the company and 
with a large degree of autonomy maintained by the company in making kcy 
design choices: design and complexiry of technology, location, and environ-
mental and occupational control systems. In India, the company might expect 
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a slower siting process, one that would involve multiple government agencies 
at both the state and central levels. It would likely require extensive negotia-
tions and might leave the company little flexibility in making key design 
choices. India's process would be more likely than the Thai process to aeate 
a perception (independent of the actual outcome) by both participants that 
the solution was less than optimal. 
But one might also expect cenain similarities between the two national 
situations. Since both countries have fairly weak enforcement systems, the 
companies all might expect to have relative autonomy in achieving compli. 
ance with EH&S regulations and in choosing their own combinations of 
engineered and management controls for implementing their EH&S policies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Tales of Three Facilities 
This chapter assembles the main body of raw data coUeered through the case 
studies; it consists of a detailed description of the events that took place in 
the course of establishing the three facilities. Although occasionally peppered 
with interpretive commentaries, these are fundamentaUy narrative descrip-
tions of the three chronologies. The chapter concludes by identifying the 
variables that may explain the nature of the interacrions among the principal 
participants observed in the three facility transfer processes. 
The vital statistics of the three facilities studied are summarized in Table 
4.1. AU were construered and brought on line during the 1980s. The two 
Thai facilities generate produas for domestic consumption and employ a 
relatively small work force, while the Indian facility is significantly larger 
and significantly committed to exports. AU three handle materials with 
potential occupational and environmental hazards. The stories of the facili-
ties have been reconstruered from different types of elements: interviews 
with company managers and executives in the United States and in the host 
countries who had personally participated in the events; analysis of docu-
ments such as industrial licenses, technical agreements, joint venture agree-
ments, internal letters, and memorandaj site visits at the foreign facilities; 
and associated interviews with employees at the foreign facilities. Additional 
insights were gained from the collaborating research teams in India and 
Thailand, who independently met with the executives and managers of the 
facilities and conducted site visits. 
In comparison, interactions with host country officials possessing either 
first-hand or indireer knowledge of the three cases were much more modest. 
Only the Modi Xerox case included an interview with a high level official 
who had participated in considering the company's application for a license. 
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•• 96 of these arc former land owners who aft employed primarily as grounds.keepers. 
This can be attributed to the scvetal-year interval since the events under 
study. Furthermore, in Thailand both facility transfers were accomplished 
through routine administrative procedures, without extensive involvement 
by anyone individual government employee. 
It was not possible to interview the Modi Xerox or Oxychem joint venture 
partnets. 
MODI XEROX FACILITY IN RAMPUR 
Negotiations 
The joint venture between Rank Xerox and Modi Rubber was primarily 
initiated by Modi Rubber in the late 1970s. The prospects for photo-repro-
duction teclmology in India, which at that time had no domestic manufacruretS 
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of photocopiers, were bright. After considerable activity prior to 1982, the 
two companies formed rhe India Export Company and inaugurated a 100 
percent export assembly facility located in Bombay. FoUowing governmental 
relaxation in 1982 of severe restrictions on rhat technology, Modi Rubber 
established Indian Xerographic Systems Limited, and rhe venture partners 
(Rank Xerox and Indian Xerographic Systems) submitted a letter of intent 
to rhe Ministry of Industrial Development (MID) to form a coUaboration 
and to set up a factory. The letter provided a general description of rhe pro-
posed technology. In accordance wirh rhe standard administrative procedures 
for licensing foreign enterprises in India, rhefirst response to the letter of in· 
tent was rhe formulation of a technical cornmittee representing rhe Ministry 
of Industry and orher governmental agencies. The following issues were 
considered during that initial review: domestic need for rhe product; prospectS 
for indigenization of rhe manufacturing process; projected expOrt value of 
rhe product; and sophistication of rhe technology. Also considered, but to a 
lesser degree, were rhe projected magnitude of rhe employment and rhe po-
tential environmental impact of rhe technology. Consideration of environ-
mental factors, rhough included, was limited at rhis stage to ascertaining 
whether rhe proposed project was resource intensive or highly poUuting 
(neirher of which was rhe case wirh rhe proposed facility). 
Upon the initial approval, issued in mid-1982 by the technical committee, 
rhe venture partners were encouraged to apply for rhe industrial license and 
foreign collaboration license. The submission of rhe applications for rhese 
licenses was followed by a period of negotiations between rhe government 
and rhe newly formed company regarding rhe location, size, equity arrange-
ment, technological sophistication, and export requirements for rhe proposed 
facility. The participants in rhe negotiations included rhe minister of industry 
for rhe central government of India, rhe managing director of Rank Xerox, 
the president of Indian Xerographic Systems Limited, and, later on, a repre-
sentative of rhe government for rhe state of Uttar Pradesh. 
From rhe company's perspective, an ideal site for the proposed facility 
would have rhe foUowing attributes: access to rhe means of transportations 
(good roads, railroad, airport); access to skilled labor; other essential infra-
structure (electricity, telephones, sewage, drinking water, etc.); dust-free air 
(important in rhe manufacturing of electronics); cultural and educational 
amenities rhat would make it sufficiently attractive to Indian and expatriate 
employees. These criteria (wirh rhe exception of dust-free air) led rhem to 
propose potential sites in highly industrialized areas of rhe country. 
In contrast, rhe government's criteria for selecting a suitable site were pri· 
marily concerned with promoting regional development. Its first proposal 
focused on Kashipur, a town in rhe state of Uttar Pradesh (the home state of 
rhe minister), classified as a "D" area. The site had no industry, and its lack 
of infrastructure included the absence of paved roads and railroads. 
Borh sides flatly rejected each orher's proposals, and the negotiated com-
promise solution emerged as the town of Rampur, approximately 120 miles 
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east of Delhi and also in Uttar Pradesh. The area was at that time classified 
as "C". The principal disadvantages to the company of locaring in Rampur 
were the lack of reliable power supply, lack of skilled labor, unattractiveness 
to the potential employees because of unavailability of good primaty educa-
tion and cultural and social life, and high level of airborne dust. As shown 
later, the company has since made significant progress in compensaring for 
these deficiencies or in reducing them. The advantage of the site was its lo-
cation on Oelhi-Lucknow-Calcutta National Highway 24 and the proximity 
to Amritsar-Lucknow-Calcutta Railroad line. The nearest airport was ap-
proximately 40 miles away in Panmagar. 
It appears that the compromise made by the venture partners, from an 
"A" to a "C" area, was greater than that made by the host country authori-
ties from a "0" to a "C" area. This sleewed outcome was, according to the 
company, a reflection of the government's smaller concern that the deal 
might fall through; in this case the locational benefits of the facility were 
perceived as outweighing its other potential economic and social benefits. 
The conditions specified in the letters of intent to grant the industrial and 
foreign collaboration licenses, issued in July 1983 by the Ministry of Indus-
try, indicate that approximately a year aftcr initiation of the formal approval 
process, the leey decisions had been made. These included equity participa-
tion by Rank Xerox of 40 percent; export obligation of 30 percent for five 
years; annual production ceiling of 9,500 machines destined for domestic 
sales (no ceiling on exports); compliance with phased manufacturing pro-
gram, and indigenization plan; location in a backward district categoty "C". 
This was also the year that Rank Xerox and Indian Xerographic Systems 
Limited established Modi Xerox Limited. 
The limit on the level of production was dictated by the country's attempt 
to prevent monopolistic marleet domination by Modi Xerox, which in the 
early 1980s was the only manufacturer of photocopiers in India (this is no 
longer an issue). Indigenization policy, as applied to the proposed Rank 
Xerox facility, required that within five years approximately 80 percent of 
the value of the product manufactured at the facility be contributed by the 
local industry-either made at the facility or purchased from the local ven-
dors. The company is ftce to choose which parts of the final product it will 
import and which it will obtain locally, as long as the overall financial value 
of the imports is reduced annually at a predetermined rate. Since the policy 
is enforced through semiannual renewal of iniport licenses, the intense nego-
tiations between the corporation and the government are practically continual. 
In accordance with the provisions of the national phased manufacturing 
policy, Rank Xerox was required to transfer to Rampur increasingly com-
plete stages of the complete artay of the xerographic technology: machine 
and electronic boards manufacturing, as well as the chemistry of the photo-
copying process (toner, photoreceptor, and developer). That such integration 
required a major departure from the company's usual investment practices 
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is apparent from Table 3.1; the Rampur facility is the only one among Xerox 
and RanIc Xerox manufaauring facilities worldwide that has all photocopier 
technologies concentrated under one roof. The depanure is even more strik-
ing if one considers that the Rampur facility is among the smallest in capacity. 
From the business perspective, manufacturing of toner in India would not 
be cost effective until the toner facility could operate on three shifts, a goal 
not expected to be achieved for several years after start-up. Nonetheless, the 
operating license specifies the construction of toner, developer, and photo-
receptor plants a year after completion of the hardware facility. 
Notably, environmental issues were not part of the negotiations between 
the company and the central government. Similarly, at no point did the gov-
ernment express any expectations of RanIc Xerox regarding the size of the 
proposed work force. 
The operating license and the license for foreign collaboration for the Modi 
Xerox facility were issued in June 1984. The industrial license reiterated the 
conditions articulated a year earlier in the letters of intent and specified 
Rampur as the site of the facility. In addition, several general conditions of 
compliance with the state environmental regulations were included. 
The rigid restrictions imposed on the Rampur facility are in contrast to 
the flexibility afforded by the authorities to the first Xerox facility (jointly 
owned by Rank Xerox and Modi Rubber as part of the Indian Export Com-
pany) established approximately two years earlier in Bombay and producing 
exclusively for export. Starting with a location significantly more attractive 
than Rampur's, the facility is exempt from the indigenization and PMP re-
quirement, import duty and customs duty, and has no production ceiling. 
The only requirement is that the final product has value added through local 
labor and materials. Accordingly, the production entails only assembly of 
machines and parts that are, by and large, imported. The difference between 
the twO facilities vividly illustrates the trade-offs made between different 
dimensions of achieving technological self-reliance in India. In this case, the 
trade-off is made between two murually desirable goals, promoting technol-
ogy transfer and balancing foreign trade. 
The negotiations between the joint venrure partners, respectively repre-
senting Rank Xerox and Indian Reprographic Systems (IRS), proceeded in 
parallel with the negotiations with the government. As early as 1981 the 
partners agreed, in a memorandum of understanding, on the fortD of man-
agement for the new enterprise. According to the agreement, during the first 
five years IRS would nominate the president and vice president, with an op-
tion of RanIc Xerox also nominating a co-president. In the case of such joint 
presidency, the Rank Xerox president would be responsible for technical 
matters. After five years the company would have only one president, nomi-
nated by IRS, and one vice president, nominated by Rank Xerox. In addition, 
the agreement assigned to Rank Xerox the sole authority for product quality 
control over the life of the facility, which included stopping production if 
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necessary. Tbe financial management was assigned to Rank Xerox for the 
first five years and to Indian Reprographic SystemS thereafter. Tbe emphasis 
on product quality was consistent with the general corporate objectives in 
considering foreign investments, as described in Chaprer 3. The agreement 
did not address management of environment, health, and safety. 
The forma! joint venture agreement and the accompanying teehnical agree-
ments were signed by the partners in 1983. It specified ownership to be 40 
percent by Rank Xerox, 40 percent by Indian Reprographic Systems, and 
20 percent by public share holders. The 40 percent ownership by Rank Xerox 
was the ceiling on foreign ownership of Indian companies as defined by law 
(the original breakdown has since been changed to 35 percent Rank Xerox, 
33 percent Modi, 20 percent public, and 10 percent institutional). 
With regard to the management of the facility, the documents were con-
cerned primarily with the transfer of know-how - such as design and en-
gineering of the plant, and specifications of equipment and its maintenance, 
manufacturing process, and quality control-by the multinational to the 
domestic partner. The joint venture agreement is brief on other aspectS of 
joinr venture management as wen. Furthermore, what functions were speci-
fied in the joint venture agreement were altered in response to the needs. For 
example, the initial assignment of technical management to Rank Xerox 
(engineering, design, coostruction, instaUation, product quality) and busi-
ness management to Modi changed when it was clear that certain elements 
of the Rank Xerox business management were more appropriate than those 
of Modi. In the course of the case study, the executives of the company re-
peatedly stressed that there was one culture and one management system, 
that of Modi Xerox. "There is no Modi partner and Rank Xerox partner, 
there is simply Modi Xerox' were the words used by one. 
However, each partner clearly brought its own strengths to the enterprise, 
and these strengths were displayed at different times. During the negotiations, 
Modi was belpful in arranging the purchase of 96 acres, a difficult task con-
sidering India's limitations on land ownership (a ceiling of 12.5 acres). The 
parmer's knowledge of the country's prevailing business practices also would 
prove helpful in dealing with local suppliers, officials, and customers. As in 
the 1981 document, the issues of EHlIcS are not included. 
The design and management of environment, health, and safety were not 
explicitly assigned to either partner in the joint venture agreement, but it has 
been implicitly understood by both parties to be the purview of Xerox through 
its subsidiary Rank Xerox. The elements of that system in the Modi Xerox 
facility are described later. 
Construction 
The construction of the facility staned in November 1983, a few months 
before the official issuance of the operating license. The production ceiling 
imposed on the facility created a chaDenge for the company. It could build a 
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large facility, similar to its other worldwide plants, and simply run it well 
below the capacity for an unknown period of time. Alternately, it could build 
a smaller plant. The main advantage of choosing the first option was that 
the company would approach the task with extensive and well-tested expe-
rience in desigrting the plant and procuring the necessary equipment; the 
main disadvantage was that it was not a cost-effective solution. The choice 
made by Xerox, to build a scaled-down plant, presented a different challenge. 
The Rampur facility would be but one-third the size of the smaUest similar 
facility in the world of Xerox. Such a drastic reduction in size implied that 
there could be sigrtificant changes in the basic design and in the choice of 
equipment. The adjustment that these changes might require in order to 
achieve product quality and facility safety equivalent to other worldwide 
Xerox operations were not completely known at the OulSet of consrruction. 
The plant was designed by an Indian architectUral finn whereas the tech-
nology specifications for the manufacturing process, equipment, and engi-
neered poUution and safety controls were designed by Rank Xerox engineers 
at the Dutch facility (toner), the UK facility (photoreceptor), and the Dutch 
and the French facilities (assembly of machines and electrOnic boards). Corpo-
rate EH8cS personnel were included in the process. The Indian venture part-
ner had little involvement in the designs for the facility or in the oversight of 
its consrruction. This was clearly the domain of the owner of the technology. 
The technology design required modifications in the standard blueprints 
to meet the smaU scale of the plant and the integration of the diverse tech-
nologies (for example, in the design of a water treatment plant, waste dis-
posal, and emergency response system). The consrruction was performed by 
local contractors. Errors were made and corrected. In one instance the local 
contractors, anxious to meet deadlines, finished the toner building without 
providing a sufficient explosion-relief system. Upon the insistence of Rank 
Xerox management, the buildings had to be partially demolished. 
The design of the toner plant reflects the adjustments the company made 
in scaling down the facility while retaining aU features associated with main-
taining product quality. The process generates fine dust in the respirable 
range and beyond. The workers most exposed to the inhalable dust are 
cleaning staff, control operators, and materials handlers. The primary haz-
ards of airborne toner dust consist of adverse health effects from inhalation, 
explosions, and fires. Since air concentrations sufficient to protect workers 
from adverse effects provide a wide safety margin for explosions, for both 
types of hazards, dust control is the most effective preventive measure. The 
major sources of dust emissions are at transfer points between the steps. 
Automation and infrequent changes in the product lines (generaUy requiring 
reassembling of equipment) are therefore the most effective methods for 
reducing dust generation. In addition, maintaining cleanliness in the plant 
prevents the already settled particles from becoming airborne again, thus 
reducing the risk of secondary explosions. 
In the large Xerox toner facilities, most transfer steps are automated. 
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However, the relatively small size of the Rampur facility and the modest in-
itial scale of production did not justify extensive automation. The manual 
operations at the facility included hoisting of the bags of starting materials 
to the Banbury mixer located on the upper level (since automated by an ele-
vator), most transfers between steps, and bottling. At the OUISet, management 
was concerned that the manual operations would generate more airborne 
dust than the automated operation, but the lack of prior experience with a 
small operation such as this did not allow them to make accurate predictions 
on the magnitude of such increase. An alternative solution, chosen by the 
company as an interim measure, was to use individual personal respiratory 
protection (disposable dust masks) once the facility went into operation. 
The measure was accompanied by the installation of an extensive personal 
monitoring system. This and other health and safety systems installed at the 
facility are discussed later. 
The employment of personal protective devices instead of engineered con-
trols was clearly a temporary solution that would be effective only for a 
modest production scale at the plant. The system would not, according to 
the initial predictions, meet the demands of a two- or three-shift production 
schedule. (These predictions were later confirmed during a brief acceleration 
of production). ,As the system was being put in place, the plans for funher 
modifications of the key sources of emissions also were being developed by 
the EH&S personnel for future implementation. 
During the construction, the partners occasionally differed on capital 
spending for engineered safety. In one instance, at issue was installation of a 
fire protection system: Whereas the Indian partner aimed for a system that 
would assure the lowest possible fire insurance and no more, the Western 
partner aimed for a system capable of meeting conoin performance standards. 
The disagreement was resolved in Xerox's favor when it became clear that 
protecting the factoty from destruction in fire was more cost effective than 
other alternatives. 
Startup and Operations 
The construction of the ftrst pan of the machine assembly plant was com-
pleted early in 1985 and the toner, developer, and photoreceptor plant ap-
proximately a year later. The 42 acres on which the facility is located can be 
accessed directly from National Highway 24. It is a single-lane, two-way 
paved road that Serves the needs of long-distance travelers and delivery 
trucks, as well as the local population. The trucks, automobiles, buffalo-
drawn cartS, and pedestrians, including children, all coexist on that road. 
The average car speed is probably below 30 mph, and the 120-mile trip from 
the company's headquaners in New Delhi takes four to five hours. The 
shoulders of the road are lined with vehicles damaged in collisions, not sur-
prising considering the crowds, the total absence of lighting at night, and 
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the failure on the part of many drivers to use headlights after dark. Sometimes 
the road is closed altogether because of religious festivals or political rallies. 
The facility manufactures half a dozen different models of photocopiers 
and electronic boards, as well as photoreceptor, toner, and developer. Its 
products are identical to those manufactured at other worldwide plants. At 
the time ofthis study, the facility opetated 9 hours pet day,S days per week. 
As the demand for machines grows, the facility may expand to two and three 
shifts. There are 272 employees, 96 of whom are the former occupants of 
the land (primarily employed as groundskeepers). In 1988-89 the factory 
produced at a rate of 1,000 machines per month. Five thousand machines 
were exported that year to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom, Holland, Spain, and Zimbabwe. 
In 1988-89 Modi Xerox commanded 40 percent of the domestic market 
share in India, up from 36 percent in 1986-87. The number two competitor 
had 15 percent of the market that year. 
In addition to the manufacturing areas, the facility has laboratories for 
routine chemical analyses and a modest R&D unit. The R&D efforts are 
primarily directed at improving the exisring processes and materials and 
responding to the unique needs of the customers. One of its recent accom-
plishments was a modification of the photoreceptor manufacturing process 
to meet the needs of Japanese customers. 
Despite the remote locarion of Rampur and a shortage of cultural ameni-
ties, Modi Xerox had no difficulty in attracting and keeping a highly skilled 
work force. Company executives attribute the success to the management 
style at Modi Xerox and the attraction of high technology represented by a 
well-known mulrinational corporation. Another reason for the company's 
success in attracting a professional work force is its significant efforts to 
improve the quality of life of the workers. More than half of the 96 acres 
owned by Modi Xerox in Rampur has been used for housing, recreation, 
and educational purposes. The Modi Academy, established in 1987, offers 
fine elementary schooling for approximately three hundred children of the 
employees and other Rampur residents. There are company housing, recre-
ational areas for employees, and medical services. Following the well-estab-
lished tradition of Indian companies, Modi Xerox "adopted" two very poor 
local villages. The company's improvements in the villagers' lives have included 
building a modest schoolhouse, erecting solar panels, dust and mosquito 
control, hygiene education, job training, and medical services. 
Changes in the business climate of the area have been disappoinring, 
however. Although the workers contribute to the local economy, spin-off 
industries associated with the Modi Xerox technology have not been estab-
lished in the area, most likely because of the small size of the production. 
Since the establishment of the Modi Xerox facility, the area has been re-class-
med from "C" to "8. " Clearly, the location policies of the Indian government 
that pressured Ranlc Xerox into siting its facility in the poorly developed 
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area of Rampur only panially accomplished their objectives: The enterprise 
brought jobs and infrastructure to the area and, for some people, improved 
living conditions, but it did not attract satellite industries. 
The manufacturing activities at the Rampur facility are associated with 
multiple occupational hazards. Chronic health impairment may occur from 
prolonged inhalation of paniculates in the toner plant, from inhalation of 
selenium and arsenic in the photoreceptor plant, and from exposure to vapors 
in the paint shop. Several materials generate toxic fumes when ignited. As 
stated earlier, there is a substantial risk of fire and explosion in the toner 
plant because toner is a combustible dust. In addition, there are the usual 
hazards associated with operating a variety of mechanical equipment in the 
toner plant, the photoreoeptor plant, and the machine assembly plant: acci-
dental damage to the limbs, eyes, the body. 
The company selectively practices all forms of occupational protections 
at the facility: engineered controls, if feasible, personal protective devioes, 
training workers in safe occupational practices, monitoring potential and 
actual exposure levels of workers, and an emergency response system. The 
engineered controls in the toner factory, where the risk of fires is the greatest, 
includes a dust exhaust system, fire doors, and pressure relief panels built 
into one of the walls of the building. The paint shop is extensively automated. 
Other engineering controls include safety switches on equipment, local ex-
haust ventilation, remote control operations, and machine guarding. 
The workers in the toner and photoreceptor plants wear respiratory equip-
ment known to permit occupational exposures that are lower than Indian 
national or Xerox standards. Respiratory protection in the toner plant con-
sists of selected approved disposable masks. The personal monitoring of air-
borne dust, conducted sinoe 1987, has shown complianoe with company 
standards in most areas, and the mandatory wearing of masks has been con-
fined to the operators of the Banbury mixer where emissions are the highest. 
The masks are light but become quite uncomfortable with prolonged wear, 
especially in hot and humid weather. Gloves, glasses, and other protccivc 
clothing are required where necessary. 
Complianoe with Xerox occupational dust standards in the Rampur toner 
facility, as in aU other Xerox facilities, is asoertained by way of personal 
monitoring in the breathing zone. Dust panicles down to 0.3 urn in diameter 
are collected by personal dosimeters attached to the collars of workers. As 
shown earlier (Figure 3.3), the Rampur facility has been in complianoe with 
the standard sinoe opening and on par with other Xerox toner facilities. 
Similarly, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that the photoreceptor plant is in com· 
plianoe with Xerox's arsenic and selenium standards, although the safety 
margins are wider than for dust. Relative to other Xerox facilities, the Rampur 
plant has also performed well in oocupational injuries, as shown in Figure 3.6, 
although the small sample size (based on two incidents annuaUy) and unoer-
tainty with regard to roportiog practices, suggest caution in data intupretation. 
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Official corporate audits arc conducted at the Rampur facility biannually. 
In addition, Rank Xerox's EH&S manufacturing manager travels to the 
plant on an average of two to three times per year. Local audits are con-
ducted at the facility each month, and the results arc reponed to the corporate 
headquarters of Rank Xerox and Xerox. 
When the facility first opened, safety training was conducted by a consul-
tant engaged for that purpose. In addition, the safety manager, who had a 
post-graduate diploma and five years of relevant safety experience in india, 
went for one month of training in England. Twenty-five percent of the two-
day training of new employees in manufacturing jobs is dedicated to safety. 
T·he annual evaluation of perfonnance includes a section on safety practices 
of each worker. 
Discussions with the management of the Rampur facility revealed a group 
of professionals deeply commined to the Xerox safety philosophy. Achieving 
and maintaining safety behavior among workers that is consistent with the 
company's standards requires, however, continual monitoring and feedback. 
The obviously dangerous violations, such as smoking or using spark-prone 
instruments in the toner plant, are rare. Other, less obviously hazardous ac-
tivities, take time to eliminate. The workers' acceptance of the uncomfonable 
face masks took time. During our brief tour of the facility we saw some 
workers without protective glasses, and we observed pneumatically operated 
fire doors that were left open. As explained during the site visit by one of the 
managers, the fire doors had been installed only recendy, and the workers 
are only slowly becoming accustomed to the new practice. 
Like all systems that rely on modification of human behavior, that one is 
vulnerable to unusual circumstances. The Rampur facility may be uniquely 
vulnerable on this count because: 
1. The average worker in India is entitled to approximately 30 percent of workdays 
off each year because of numerous holidays, which requires frequent shifts of 
workers between jobs. 
2. The toner facility is more dependent on worker compliance than other 7 similar 
Xerox facilities because of less automation. 
3. A rapid increase in demand might increase the production level several-fold (the 
plant currendy operates at approximately 60-70 percent of single-shih capacity) 
with the result that the manual step would become the bottleneck. 
The Rampur facility produces liquid and solid hazardous waste: The solid 
waste consists primarily of difficult-to-handle fine carbonaceous powder. 
Liquid waste contains arsenic and selenium. From the outset, the corporation 
was given to understand by the state authorities that a license to transport 
any waste from the site was unlikely to be granted. This conStraint has 
required Rank Xerox to devise and provide suitable waste treatment tech-
nology. Programs were initiated in-house and with the U.K. Harwell Envi-
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the company's initial concern-that the unanractivelocation would interfere 
with attracting a skilled work force-proved to be unfounded. 
The adjustments made by Modi Xerox were extensive, including the design 
of the manufacturing process as well IS the management system. They led to 
a facility functionally equivalent to the U.S.-based facilities in EH&S per-
formance but relatively more vulnerable to human error, sudden inenases 
in production volumes, and planned-for future shihs in the management 
arrangements. 
DU PONT AGRICULTURAL FACILlTY IN BANGPOO 
Negotiations 
Du Pont's presence in Thailand dates back to the 1960s when several of 
its productS were marketed by individual distributors. Crop protection 
chemicals were in great demand among Thai farmers, and by the end of the 
decade these chemicals accounted for half of Du Poot's business in Thailand. 
In 1971 Du Pont made a modest official start of its branch in Thailand by 
opening an office of Du Pont Far East in Bangkok. The company started by 
marketing agricultural chemicals, plastic products, and synthetic rubber. At 
that time the formulated agrichemicals were shipped in bulk containers from 
the United States to Tbailand, where the fully formulated productS were re-
packaged and labeled by a local contractor. 
Business was good during the 1970s, especially for agrichemicals, and the 
local contractor was soon given the additional task of formulatiog the agri-
chemicals. By 1980 the sales of agrichemicals in Thailand totaled $S million, 
which accounted for some 70 percent of total sales of Du Pont in Thailand. 
Du Pont had 7 percent of the $74 million pesticide market in Thailand. All 
through the 1970s, the market in Thailand was-and remains-vety com-
petitive. All major internationalagrichemical suppliers participated. Several 
of those, including Bayer, Shell, Union Carbide, and Hoochst, had their 
own local formulation/repackaging facilities while Du Pont relied on con-
tractors for that service. The rate at which the Du Pont agrichemical prod-
ucts could be introduced into the Thailand market was determined by the rate 
at which the local contractor formulated, packagea,-and labeled the materi· 
also Especially important in the local market were small packets (as small as 
three grams) to serve the small farms typical of developing countries. 
During the 1970s the sales of the chemicals contioued to grow. By 1978 
Du Pont's business relationship with the local contractor deteriorated. First, 
the packaging step became a bottleneck in Du Pont's ability to meet the needs 
of the Thai market. Second, the company was dissatisfied with the contrac-
tor's low safety and product quality standards. (For example, the contractor's 
baby food repackaging operations shared a warehouse with their pesticide 
operations). After considering various options (contracting with other local 
lOS 
business interests, contracting with other multinationals, building a fomtu-
lating! repackaging facility) the decision to construct a facility was a logical 
next step because other options did not guarantee long-tenn improvement 
in the situation, were not considered cost effective, and evoked concerns 
about proprietaty inEonnation. The option of building a new facility thus 
emerged as the most attractive and profitable alternative. This solution would 
also most likely increase Du Pont's chances of expanding its share of the local 
market. 
The series of events that, over time, led to the decision to build a facility 
in Thailand, &om the initiation of marketing in the 1960s to the actual siting 
of a manuEaauring facility two decades later, is characteristic of the company's 
entrance into a foreign market, as discussed in Chapter 3. Gradual entry 
aUowed Du Pont to become familiar with the Thai market and with the 
country's cultural, economic, and political environment. Also during that 
time Du Pont was able to build imponant working relationships with a net-
work of local contractors, suppliers, customers, and government officials. 
In shon, the company has, over time, gained the advantages that would be 
otherwise brought by a local business partner in a joint venture partnership 
arrangement. 
In considering the location of the proposed facility, the corporation sought 
an area with sufficient infrastructure to suppon manufacturing (roads, water. 
sewage, telephone, electricity), proximate to a major pon, and accessible to 
prospective workers. Other factors, such as good schools and cultural and 
reaeational resources. were minor considerations in this case because the 
management of the facility was to be aU Thai, but would have been important 
if expatriate U.S. employees were to be assigned to these positions. The po-
tential sites were aU in the Bangkok area. One was an industrial estate located 
in Bangpoo, 20 miles southeast of Bangkok. Established in 1977, Bangpoo 
was one of the first such estates in the country. It currently hosts approxi-
mately 100 plants, with a capacity for 300, and is one of the few estates that 
accept chemical industry (approximately 74 percent of aU facilities in the 
estate prooess or manufacture chemcials). 
In return for agreeing to locate in Bangpoo, Ou Pont received exemption 
from impon duties as weU as guarantees against nationalization, direct gov-
ernment competition, and product price controls. Du Pont was also permitted 
to own the land_ The company benefited from choosing this site in other 
ways. First, the estate provided an important infrastructure, such as perim-
eter and interconnecting roads, electrical power, drinking quality water, 
and a central waste treatment facility. Secondly, the management of the estate 
facilitated the permitting process by contacting, on behalf of the company, 
aU the necessary government agencies. 
From the company's pcrspcctive, there were also disadvantages to that 
location. Heavy concentration of chemical industry in that area increased 
the potential for accidental releases, events outside the company's control. 
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TabIe 4.2 
Permiu Rcquirtd to CooJllUct Du Poot Thailand facility in Baogpoo 
A& fDC 1 Time PermIt (moDth) 
Approval for aeniDl up factory MiDisIer of IndlUtry 2 
approval fot ccutructlon Minislei' of Industry 2 
approval for opentio& industry Minister of lodustry 1 
approval fot briDaiDa in Board of IDvestmeDt forcip lCchDicilDl 2 
Ipptoval \0 owa land Boud of Investment 2 
approvll for procluctioDllr.onae 
oIlOx1e lubl1lDCel Ministry of Agriculnuo 2 
That possibility was particularly disturbing because the estate also did not 
control the growth of residential bousing around it, a likely consequence given 
the rapid growth of the Bangpoo Industrial estate. To the contrary, the orig-
inal development plan designated 20 percent of the land within the estate 
for residential bousing. (This was abandoned on economic grounds; the 
land is too expensive for blue-coUar workers and not sufficiendy attractive 
for those who can afford it.) 
The six permits required for the Du Pont faciliry, the permitting agencies, 
and the time it took to receive them are listed in Table 4.2. 
Du Pont's application for a factory operating permit, signed by the Thai 
Industria1 Estate Department, was issued in 1981. It stipulated thirteen 
EHIleS conditions, ranging from keeping the factory clean, to worker medical 
check-ups at three-month intervals, to personal safety equipment. The total 
permitting process, which did not include the Office of the National Envi-
ronmental Board, took three to five months to complete and was so unevent-
ful that the Du Pont executives and managers interviewed for the study had 
practically no ·story" to teU. 
Several factors account for the ease of siting of the Du Pont facility. first, 
it was a small operation with uncomplicated technology that was simple to 
review. Second, since the enterprise was expected to have a smaD iinpact on 
the environment and on the economy, it did nor trigger high-level involve-
ment by the authorities. Third, Du Pont did not seek major privileges such 
as tax exemption, which would have been available from the Board of 
Invesbnent had the facility produced primarily for export, installed sophisti-
cated technology, entered into joint ownership with local business interests, 
or created many new jobs. The facility simply did nor meet these aiteria. 
Tbe involvetnent of BOI, which might otherwise have led to serious negotia-
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nons, was instead only a routine matter. Fourth, the efficacy was consistent 
with the investor-friendly business climate of Thailand. 
Construction 
While the permits to set up and operate a factory were being sought by 
Du Pont in Thailand, the blueprints for the faciliry were prepared in the 
United States. They consisted of extremely detailed construction specifica-
tions for the local contractor and covered all aspectS of the construction: the 
appropriate 611 grade, the construction of struaures, tie-ins with the electric, 
water, and sewage companies, all manufacturing equipment, the screws and 
bolts, and so on. The specifications left nothing to chance or imagination. 
This was to be another Du Pont facility that happened to be in Thailand. The 
contractor performed the work with minimal profit for the experience of 
building the Du Pont facility . Construction staned late in 1981 and was 
completed a year later. 
The formulating and repackaging operations in the plant are very simple. 
The herbicide and fungicide / insecticide operations are in two separate build-
ings. The staning materials (paper bags for solids and barrels for liquids) 
are manually emptied from bulk containers into charging stations (areas 
where the ingredients are loaded into the mixing vessel). After mixing, the 
filling machine deposits premeasured quantities into containers that move 
on the belt underneath. The rest of the operation-the addition of an alumi-
num tamper-proof seal, a screw cap and a label-are manual. 
All transfer points in the process-the charging and container-6IIing areas-
are ventilated under hoods to prevent any dust from escaping into the indoor 
air so the operators do not have to wear respirators or face-masks, even when 
working with the acutely toxic Lannate. This is imponant in the Thai climate 
where face-masks would be uncomfonable and difficult to enforce. The 
central exhaust system and several other related engineered safety systems 
are consistent with Du Pont's preference for engineered controls Over personal 
protective equipment. 
Stanup and Operations 
The Bangpoo facility opened in October 1982. The simpliciry of the man-
ufacturing process requires simple skills of the operators. Currently, the plant 
employs 25 people, 7 hours per day, 6 days per week. It consists of three 
operations: herbicide repackaging (Karma and Hyvar Xl; fungicide and in-
secticide repackaging (Lannate 90, Benlate, Manzate D, Delsene MX 200, 
and CUIZate M8l; and liquid insecticide formulation and packaging (Lannate 
and Vydate L). 
The hazardous properties of the materials processed in the Bangpoo plant 
are summarized in Table 4.3. The insecticides are members of the carbamate 
family. The fungicides are dithiocarbamates and carbamidazoles. The her-
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bicides are of urea and uracil families. Methomyl and its two formulations 
Lannate 90 and Lannate L are acutely toxic, while its chemical relatives, 
benomyl (formulated as Benlate) and maneb (formulated as Manzate), are 
much less so. The herbicides have very low toxicity to humans but their en· 
vironmental release may be destructive to vegetation and some desirable 
aops. These agents can produce irritation of skin, nose, eyes, and mouth 
and can produce allergic reactions. 
Explosions and toxic fire are serious hazards associated with the processes 
at the Bangpoo plant. The airborne dust and vapors (as low as 5 percent in 
the air) are explosive if exposed to high temperature or sources of ignition. 
Fires and explosions of some products can occur under storage conditions 
that lead to decomposition in sealed containers. Decomposition produces 
heat and gases that can ignite spontaneously. The chemical decomposition 
of these products during combustion also sometimes generates highly toxic 
fumes. For example, Benlate generates a highly effective teargas, n.butyliso-
cyanate, and methomyl and Lannate formulations emit the deadly poisons 
cyanide and methylisocyanate. 
The facility bears the unnUstakeable marks of a safety-conscious manage-
ment: Safety glasses and hard hats are mandatory, the doors have outlines 
on the floor to indicate in which direction they open, there is emergency 
equipment for chlorine in case of an accidental release in the chlorine facility 
adjacent to the Du Pont plant, and there is a large-apacity water pump to 
augment the fire fighting capabilities of the industrial estate. The building is 
constructed to withstand a major earthquake. A manager of another U.S. 
company with a subsidiary in Thailand, who had visited the plant, remarked 
to us: "If our facilities are Jeeps, the Du Pont facilities are Cadillacs." 
Hazardous wastes produced by the facility are all solids, consisting pri-
marily of empty shipping containers. Du Pont's original plan was to dispose 
of these containers at an appropriate local sanitary landfill. When none was 
identified, the company in 1982 installed an incinerator with a capacity of 
150 pounds per hour. The Du Pont solution to waste disposal is not unique 
among the residents of the Bangpoo Estate, which does not offer waste dis-
posal services; many resident facilities own on-site incinerators. 
The responsibility for selecting and training new workers rested with the 
new facility management. The plant manager had been a long-time Thai 
employee of the company, whereas the production supervisor was new. Both 
were trained for six weeks in the United States. They were also members of 
the task force that designed and started up the plant. By the time the first 
group of workers was hired, management of the facility was clearly ready to 
indoctrinate them in the safety philosophy of the company. 
The workers were hired into the facility only after careful selection, with 
preference given to recent technical school and high school graduates, and 
were meticulously observed during the probationary first six months of em-
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ployment, including soliciting their personal views on risks and safety. The 
rurnover during the first six months was significant. 
In addition to training the plant workers, the company trained local insti-
rutions in hazard management when it was considered murually beneficial. 
These included the local fire departmenl's response to emergencies at chem-
ical plants; the local hospital in treating victims of accidents at chemical 
facilitics; and neighboring hazardous facilities at the Bangpoo Industrial Park 
in emergency response at their own plants, one of which manufactured 
chlorine and the other matches. 
How does a company control the safety of its produa beyond the boun-
dary of the facility? Underlying this question are several vexing problems 
unique to crop protection chemicals. Three scenarios of human exposure 
are of primary concern: in the field during application and immediately after, 
through misuse of empty containers, and through accidental releases such as 
floods, fires, or transportation accidents. The chemicals can also contaminate 
ground water if improperly applied. 
Du Pont has been active in controlling these downStream hazards. One 
way is in pacl<aging, which presents unique local challenges. First, there is 
the possibility of produer adul,eration through removal of material from 
unopened containers and replacement with another ingredient using hypo-
dermic syringes. Second, because of the widely practiced reuse of containers 
in Thailand, there is a possibility of mistaking the liquid pesticide for a bev-
erage and accidentally drinIcing it. To address the first problem, the containers 
are made of thick polyethylene, difficult to puncture with a needle, and alu-
minum seals that show punaurc marks are put on all botties. To address 
the second problem, the liquid produas are dyed bright blue, and hazard in-
formation is included on the label. 
Since the plant opened in 1982 a single dealer bas been the major distributor 
for Du Ponl's agricultural produas in Thailand. The dealer warehouses the 
matcrials and sells them dircaly to farmers. The warehouse is located dircaly 
on a canal, water heing the main route of transportation in the area. The 
man and his family live in the warehouse, and the canons of pacl<aged agri-
chemicals are stored in their living room. The major hazard of this unonhodox 
arrangement is that in a fire the people could be exposed to toxic fumes and 
chemicals might be carried into water. The company provided safety training 
to the distributor and offered to install a sprinlcler system in his house, but 
the man declined the latter. The problem was solved by Du Pont by building 
a warehouse on the Bangpoo propeny, which is scheduled for completion at 
the end of 1992. 
Protcaion of the rural population from acute poisoning by the chemicals 
presents perhaps the greatest challenge for Du Pont. Seventy percent of Thai-
land', population lives on farms, mosdy small, family-owned one- to two-
acre properties. Education is low among the rural population. To reach, 
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educate, and train these 40 to SO millioo people is a monumental task (in 
Q)lDparison, there are approximately 10 million farmers in the United States). 
The company has an extensive outreach program. It conducts workshops in 
villages and distributes protective clothing specially designed for the local 
climate and farming praaiccs. The clothing is sold to fanners at cost. Sig-
nificant research has been dedicated to developing new materials for protec-
tive uniforms. 
Tbe company has also expressed concern for potential ground water con-
tamination through misapplication of pesticides. While no direct sampling-
and-analysis program is in place, the primary emphasis is on prevention 
through farmers' education. 
Summary 
The story of the Du Pont facility in Thailand, outlined in Figure 4.1, is 
that of gradual and carefuUy planned entrance of a seasoned U.S. corporation 
into a new bost country market. In that process the company meticulously 
controlled all aspectS of building and starting up the plant and was able to 
essentially recreate its U.S. technology and culrure. The local adaptations in 
the design of the facility and in management style were primarily to adapt to 
the unique conditions of the country and the site, such as lack of suitable 
land disposal of chemical waste, hot climate, or proximity of other hazardous 
facilities. The Bangpoo facility is first and foremost a Du Pont facility that 
happens to be located in Thailand. 
lHAJ OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL FACIUTY IN BANGPOO 
Acquisition and Negotiations 
Thai Occidental Chemical, Ltd. is a joint venture of Occidental Chemical 
Corporation and certain Thai business interests. Occidental owns 49 percent, 
on. venture partner owns 36 percent, and another 15 percent. Th. facility 
manufacrures chrome compounds for the local leather-tanning industry. 
The operation, dating baclc to 1983, was originally built, owned, and 
operated by certain Thai and Pakistani interests. The facility never worked 
to full capacity because of the poor quality of the prnduct. After lengthy dis-
putes with the local tanneries, the owner of the facility decided in 1985 to 
sell the facility to the partnership consisting of U.S.-based Diamond Sham· 
roclc Corporation (49 percent) and a local industrialist (36 percent). The 
previous owner retained a minor partnership in' the 'enterprise (15 percent) 
that he continues to hold. 
According to the contract, the company would have two managing direc· 
tors, each nominated by one venture partner, and a board of directors rep-
resented by both companies. With respect to EH&S, the following excerpt 
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from the contract specificaUy required that the environmental standards 
observed at the facility would be those specified by Diamond Shamtoclc and 
that both partners would contribute the funds n<cessary for their achieve-
ment, according to their respective shareholdings: 
The parties agree to cause the Company to bring the Project up to environmental 
health and safety standards pr=ribed by Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corporation 
(DSCC) and thereahrr to maintain the Project in accordance with said standards and 
all applicable Thai environmental health and safety law> and regulations. If the 
Company has insufficient funds or canna< borrow the funds needed to achieve the 
standards prescribed by DSCC, then the parties win contribute such funds to the 
working capital of the Company in proportion to their respective shareholdings. 
The industrial operating license, signed by the Industrial Estates Authority, 
was approved by the Ministty of Industty in a routine administrative move, 
with no direct negotiations between the company and the ~ntral authorities. 
The Ii~se was accompanied by a set of EH&S compliance conditions, as 
foUows: 
• The quality of the waste water must comply with lEA T standards; 
• The company must provide safety equipment such as masks and gloves to 
employees; 
• Workers who work with acid must wear 40ng rubber shoes" and "rubber gloves"; 
• The company must install a ventilator system to remove gas that might cause harm 
to workers; 
• The company is to be "'very careful" so that there arc no acid leaks that cause 
danger to workers; 
• The company "'must use water or inorganic material" to clean up spilled acid; 
• The company must have voice and light alanns in case of emergency; 
• The company must have a firsteaid room and first aid equipment; and 
• The company must provide annual physical check-ups to staff. 
Clearly, these are simple criteria. The most notable among them is the 
combined role of the Industrial Estate Authority in facilitating plant Ii=ing 
and its EH&S regulation. 
Diamond ShamtOCk upgraded the facility and restaned it in January 1986. 
Shortly after that, in November 1986, Occidental Chemical Corporation 
acquired a majority of the worldwide chemical operations of Diamond Sham-
rocIc. This included the Diamond Shamrock portion of the Thai joint venture, 
along with fony-four other chemical plants throughout the world. The nego-
tiated agreement included sharing the potential costs of environmental reme-
diation at these facilities. Sixteen of the 45 facilities acquired by Oxychem 
from Diamond Shamroclc were subsequently sold. The 8angpoo facility was 
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through fulfilling the government-favored ownership arrangements and the 
ability to deal with local authorities, local legislation, and local markets. 
The technology and the systems for marketing, accounting, and management 
are, in such partnerships, left to the foreign company. 
Oxychem was therefore in a strong position to achieve one of the impor-
tant aspects of its policy regarding international subsidiaries: to maintain 
major influence over the operation of the facility. Although the provisions 
of the writtm joint venture contract were not specific beyond the ownership 
arrangements, less fonnal agreements assigned specific functions to each 
partner: Oxychem was responsible for technology, general management of 
the facility (including EH8cS), and for exporr markets; the Thai group was 
responsible for dealing with the Thai government (permits, licenses, inspec-
tions, reports) and for interactions with local customers and suppliers. 
Entering into a partnership also meant that the management styles of the 
two partners, which were very different, would require mutual adjustments. 
With regard to environment, health, and safety, for example, the Oxychem 
slogan of "pay now or pay later" would have to be accommodated by the 
partner. Because the history of the facility indicated that it would almost 
certainly require significant initial investments for pollution control, a deci-
sion that would require approval by both partners, the slogan would be put 
to the test almost immediately. 
The adjustment in the management styles of two parmers would be partic-
ularly important because the managing directorship of the joint enterprise 
would be shared by two individuals, each representing one of the venture 
partners. Thus, there would be an Oxychem managing director and a Thai 
managing director. Furthermore, because the contract also provided for 
shifting management into the Thai hands after several years , institutionali-
zation of Oxychem's safety and environmental culture at the new subsidiary 
during the initial years of the partnership was essential. 
In shorr, there were several EH8cS-re1ated uncertainties with regard to 
the blending of the joint managanent at Thai Occidental Cbernical Company, 
including the Thai parmer's philosophy, his willingness to accept immediate 
costs of upgrading the pollution control technology, and his acceptance of 
the Oxychem's strUctured style of managing environment, health, and safety. 
Shortly before the acquisition of Diamond Shamrock was completed in 
October 1986, Occidental Petroleum Corporation's vice president for bealth, 
environment, and safety visited the facility in Tbailand. to-explore these 
questions. The direct involvement of the parent company, Occidental Petro-
leum, in the EH8cS affairs of its subsidiary, Occidental Chemical, speaks to 
the importance of this matter to the parent corporation. He was accompanied 
by a consultant specializing in environmental management. The visit had 
three purposes: 
1. to evaluate the potential managerial changes that would be required in order to 
install the Occidental system of environment, bealth, and .. fety; 
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2. to identify improvement> needed immediately at the facility; and 
3. to introduce the venture partner to the Occidental environment and "Iety philos--
ophy and '0 esublisb a working relationship with him in that area. 
The outcome of that visit would weigh heavily in the companys decision of 
whether '0 en.er io.o the partnership or to sell the Thai facility. O<Xidental 
was prepared to iovest significantly io upgradiog the safety-and<ontrol ttch-
nology, by up to 15 percent of the purchase price. With respect to the venture 
partner, O<Xidental was prepared to negotiate the timetable for iotroduciog 
the changes io the technology and management ofEH&S but not the nature 
of these changes; the option to pull out of the partnership was definitely open. 
To the satisfaction of the U.S. corporate representative, the potential part-
ner was open to the Oxychem ideas on environment, health, and safety. The 
two basic principles of Oxychem environmental and safety philosophy, that 
safety and environmental awareness pays and that safety/environment re-
quires long-term iovestments, also appealed to his busioess iostincts. Aocord-
iog to company officials, the slogan ·pay now or pay later" was particularly 
persuasive. Ouriog the visit several environmental and safety measures were 
requested by the U.S. team for iotmediate implementation on the premises, 
with the venture partner's consent. These iocluded iostallation of a saubber, 
construction of dikes, and iostallation of safety gates. In the middle of the 
next year, a systematic implementation of the Oxychem safety system was 
initiated at the facility. 
Transitiod and Additional Construction 
In mid-1987 a full safety and environmental assessment was conduaed at 
the facility by the Oxychem Manager of Safety and Environment Interna-
tional. One of the major conclusions reached duriog the assessment was that 
the plant manager was too busy to effectively manage health and safety issues 
and that an iodividual was needed at the plant level with health and safety 
responsibilities as part of the formal job description. The iodividual even-
tually employed io the newly aeated position was sent to the United States 
for two weeks of training, one io safety and one io environmental manage-
ment. Currently, he spends approximately 75 percent of hi. time on health, 
safety, and environmental management. In addition he is assisted by the lab-
oratory manager for environmental matters and by the production manager 
for safety matters. He repom to the plant manager and, ioditcctly, to the 
Thai O<Xidental managiog director responsible for environment, health, 
and safety matters. The second key outcome of the assessment was develop-
ment of a specific long-term EH&S program, iocludiog specific actions and 
target dates. Agaio, the responsibility for the implementation was given to 
the Oxychem managiog director. 
The systematic education of the workers io the O<Xidental safety practices 
stoned approximately a year after the acquisition and iocluded all employ-
118 CORPORATE ENVIIlONMENTAUSM 
«:s. According to the company, the transitioo was easy. As the managing 
direaor, also a formet employee of Diamond Shamrock, recalls, Occidental 
filled a vacuum left by the previous owner: "These people (vice presid.nt for 
EHIleS at Occidental Petrol.um and the international managet of environ-
mental safetY at Occidental Chemical) cam. in and brought a strUcrur. to 
it." The most important aspea of that .ducation was not the seri.s of im-
provements in the enginee ... d safetY syst.ms or the new procedures, but the 
awareness of the issu.s. Once the philosophy of safetY was aecept.d and the 
awareness of safetY and environment was built into the managem.nt style, 
according to the managing direaor, changes simply foUowed as the most 
logical operating procedures. 
The changes that took place at the facility since the acquisition went beyond 
management systems and upgrading the safetY technology. By mid-1989 the 
manufaauring capacity of the plant had doubled through major .xpansion. 
One of the key changes in the technology was a shift from using dry chromate 
to wet chromate as feedstock. Thete are sevetal advantages to the new proc-
ess: Workm are not exposed to hexavalent chrome dust, which is porentiaUy 
carcinogeniG; using liquids aUows for making aU the transfetS in a closed 
system (a liquid chromat. is pumped directly from a trUck into a process 
storage tank and then to a ... action vessel); the process is more automat.d 
because manual opening of bags is .liminated; .fficiency is greater; thet. is 
no need to dispose of empty bags_ 
Th. design and construaion of the expanded facility was a joint projea 
of the Thai engineers and plant manag.rs and the U.S.-based experts, with 
the Thai team playing a significant part in aU d.cisions. This .ffectiv. trans-
f.r of technology was undoubtedly facilitated by two faaors: First, this was 
a simple technology, with no proprietary .lements beyond what one may 
desaibe as the "art of getting • high quality produa" by finding just the 
right combination of the ingredients, the temperature, and the duration of 
the chemical .... ction; second, th .... was no equivalent Occid.ntal facility in 
the United States that would provide the blueprints for the Thai facility. 
The constrUction also afforded the opportunity to introduce a number of 
safetY and environmental systems that would be eJ<pe.."ted at an equivalent 
U.S. facility. In particular, spill control was stressed, including paving and 
trenching of critical areas, thus enabling recycling of spilled mat.rials. Lik. 
the technology for manufaauring, the safetY and environmental technology 
was "transfetred" into the Bangpoo facility . . The engineering and manage-
ment t.am in Thailand closely interaaed with the U.S. experts in that area 
and joindy produced the most appropriate design. 
Anoth.r consequence of changing the feedstock from powdet to liquid was 
the "'quirement of obtaining a permit to import. Although such a permit 
does not routincly involve environmental considetations, Thai govetnment 
(National Environmental Board) insist.d on receiving assurances from the 
company that the transf.rs and transport of the chromate liquid would be 
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conducted in a safe manner. This was accomplished by Occidental Chemi-
cal through purchase of the transport vehicle. 
Operation 
Currently, there arc 42 employees in the plant, which operates on 3 shifts, 
24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The operation consists of a plant manager, a 
production manager, a quality control manager, and an administrative 
manager. The main functions of the administrative manager are safety, in-
dustrial hygiene, and environmental management. 
The assessment scores for safety management at the facility have been 
steadily improving since the acquisition, as shown earlier in Figure 3.17, 
and although they continue to lag bebind other international and U.S. facili-
ties, the gap appears to be narrowing. 
There are two hazardous raw materials used in the process: sulfuric acid 
and sodium bichromate. The final product is trivalent chrome, which is 
considerably less hazardous than hexavalent chrome. The toxic properties 
of the chemicals used at the plant are quite well established. Sulfuric acid is 
highly corrosive to biological tissues and will destroy skin, the respiratoty 
tract, and the digestive tract upon contact. Tri- and hexavalent chromium 
compounds are also irritating to the skin and may cause allergic reactions 
upon long- or short-term exposure. Chronic exposure to airborne hexavalent 
chromium is also destrUctive to the respiratoty tract and can lead to ulcera-
tion of nasal passages, perforation of nasal septum, and lung canar. 
The facility produces no process effluent, although there are two air emis-
sion point sources, a saubber and a reactor vent, none of which arc routinely 
monitored. The facility does not generate waste classifiable in the United 
States as hazardous. Empty raw material bags that contained potentially 
hazardous chemicals under the old "dry" manufacturing system are incin-
erated. The incinerator asb is being stored in the plant pending the constrUc-
tion of a planned secure landfill in Thailand. There are several hundred 
kilograms of that ash. Recently, the facility chemist bas initiated experimental 
procedures for extracting chromium from the ash, thus rendering it nonhaz-
ardous. All other wastes are sent to the local landfill. 
All the changes that rook place at the facility since the acquisition were 
primarily motivated by the company, with some involvement of the Thai 
licensing authorities. The management of the industrial estate was notably 
absent. At times, there bave been concerns at the Occidental plant aboot the 
air emissions from one of its neighbors, a maner that would be quite appro-
priate for the estate to handle, but the laner did not take the initiative. The 
participation of the estate management in the environmental and safely mat-
ters of individual facilities primarily focuses on setting and monitoring the 
pretreannent waste water standards. 
The tanning industry served by the Thai Occidental products hal a less 
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conscientious attitude toward materials for leather tanning, and environ-
mental and OCQIpationa1 safety. In Thailand leather tanning is a trad~ passed 
through generations within families and has been traditionaDy confined to 
certain social groups. The tanneries are smaD, family owned and operated, 
and mostly concentrated in one geographical area not far from Bangkok. In 
the past, that area was quite remote but recent spread of induStry and housing 
into a wider and wider area outside the capital bas changed that. Recently, 
the discharges from the tanneries into surface waters became a nuisance to 
local bousing developments, shrimp farms, and other local enterprises. In 
response to the increasing dissatisfaction among those adversely affected by 
the poDution, the government authorities became involved. In the course of 
a few years the tanning industry found itself under growing social and insti-
tutional pressure to change its operating practices and to clean up. The pres-
sure was sufficiently intense to open to question the very survival of that 
industry. 
The potential decline of the leather-tanning industry in Thailand became 
a serious business concern of Thai Occidental Chemical (its tnajor supplier), 
and the company became actively involved in seeking solutions. Oxychem, 
in cooperation with Thai government, facilitated implementation of a study 
of sound environmental management options among the tanneries. The 
World Environment Center, a U.S.-based nonprofit organization providing 
technical assistance to government and industry in developing countries, 
was selected to undertake the study. Occidental is also considering switching 
to maoufacturing a new leather-tanning producr, appropriately named ENV, 
which was originaDy developed in Taiwan because of the environmental 
concerns there. The agent is absorbed by leather more effectively than are 
the currently manufacrured products and thus produces less waste. 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the relationship between the business 
parmers has surfaced recently as the two corporations are getting ready to 
consolidate the shared managing directorship of the Thai enterprise in the 
hands of one individual. According to the contract, that person should rep-
resent the Thai side of the joint venture. Clearly, the U.S. corporation bas a 
Stake in the decision because of its desire to maintain a major role in the 
management of the facility and because of a need to ensure that the safety 
culture of the company does not change. This is wbere the differences in the 
management styles of the two partners playa role. The preference of Oxy-
chem would be to hire from the outside a highly professional individual wbo 
would share the management style aDd safety pbilosophy with Oxychem. In 
sbort, the individual would represent the rapidly growing class of Thai busi-
ness school graduates. In contrast, the Thai partner would prefer to choose 
a loyal associate from among the employees of the Thai group. Personal 
loyalty to the group and a long-standing association with that enterprise 
would be among the key criteria applied in tnaking the selection. From the 
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Oxychem perspective these selection aiteria would produce an uncertain 
outcome and would therefore be less desirable. 
Summary 
The chronology of Thai Occidental Chemical tells a story of a relatively 
smooth transition of co-ownership. in three years. of a joint venture manu-
facturing enterprise in Thailand. During that period the facility's safety and 
pollution control system was significantly upgraded and the manufacturing 
system was expanded to double capacity. The safety record at the plant saw 
steady improvement and is approaching the safety performance of older 
Oxychem facilities. Similarly. the management of the Thai suhsidiary appears 
to have adopted the Oxychem safety philosophy and practiooo. The stoty 
also highlights the challenge to a multinational corporation with a commit-
ment to environment. health. and safety created by acquisition of a foreign 
facility and by entering into a joint venture partnership. 
EMERGING RELATIONSHIPS 
The three case Studies of facility transfer illustrate the complex interactions 
among principal participants in facility siting who are guided by their respec-
tive policies relative to development. busin .... and health. safety. and envi-
ronment. and by the necessity for mutual adaptations. 
At the same time. each case highlights a different dimension of the transfer 
process. Modi Xerox's is a tale of a corporation making adjustments to a set 
of direcr controls imposed by a host country while simultaneously accounting 
for the objectives of a joint venture partner and pursuing its own busin ... 
and environment. health. and safety objectives. The case follows in detail 
the making of these adjustments and the complexity of implementing cor-
porate EHIlcS policies in the presence of two other active participants: host 
country and joint venture partner. It also reveals how one corporation resolved 
what it perceived as an aggregate set of mutually desirable but at times com-
peting objectives_ 
In contrast. the Du Pont case desaibes a facility transfer in an environment 
characterized by a relatively low level of direct controls by the host country 
in the absence of a joint venture partner. This case reveals how one corpora-
tion with a strong SCDSC of commitment to environmental and occupational 
safety chose to transfer that commitment to its foreign affiliate in the absence 
of significant external constraints. It also illustrates the site-specific adapta-
tions the company made in pursuing its self-defined standards of safety and 
the effects that the host country's attempts to facilitate busin ... may have on 
corporate EHIlcS. 
The Occidental Chemical case represents a middle-of-the-road set of exter-
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nal constraints on a multinational corporation. Like Du Pont, the company 
in this case had few direct controls imposed by the host country. Unlike Du 
Pont, bowever, the corporation was confronted with two other constraints: 
acquisition of an existing facility, with environmental and occupational per-
formance below its own standards of acceptability, and acquisition of a joint 
venture partner wbose presence on the scene preceded its own. Arguably the 
most illuminating aspect of the Occidental Chemical case is the Study of how 
the company managed a transition among an existing work force (including 
the management) to conform another company's safety philosophy and pol-
icies to its own and how it managed to extend its own principles of environ· 
mental and occupational safety to the venture parmer. 
Clearly, the three cases are substantially idiosynaatic in na=e, precluding 
any possibility of making meaningful comparisons among them. This is due 
to the large number of variables involved, and the researchers' inability to 
change these variables one at a time while keeping the others constant. Fur-
thermore, the research depended upon self-selected multinationals and their 
volunteering for study of their individual facilities and corresponding data 
related to environment, bealth, and safety. As a group, however, the cases 
highlight three types of factors that appear to play aucial roles in the manage-
ment and performance of overseas facilities of multinational corporations: 
corporate safety culture, host country development policies, and business 
arrangements at foreign affiliates. The cases also show that in the dynamic 
and highly interactive facility transfer process, the three types of variables 
play different roles at different stages. The management system for EH&S 
at the facility level and its performance are the product of both: the nature 
of the three variables in each case and their mutual interactions over time. 
In the three chapters that foUow, each of these variables is explored in 
depth, both &om a theoretical perspective and in reference to the case Studies. 
CHAPTER 5 
Host Country Development 
Policies and EH&S 
Industrialization is among several dimensions of development actively pro-
moted by governments of developing countries through the mobilization of 
domestic and external resources. Multinational corporations contribute to 
that process when they engage in anyone of several forms of foreign invest-
ment, such as non-equity participation (subcontracting, licensing, technical 
assistance, consulting, and turnkey projects) and direct investments in wholly 
or joindy owned manufacturing facilities. Figure 5.1 summarizes this broad 
context, with multinational facilities representing one of the dimensions of 
development. 
Multinational corporations contribute to industrialization of developing 
countries by increasing domestic production capacity, importing sophisti-
cated technology and management skills, conducting business efficiendy, 
producing consumer goods and exports, developing backward areas, devel-
oping infrastructure, aod creating employment. There may also be advene 
effects, such as excessive costs of technology transfer, sociaI and economic 
disruption, concentration of capital, inraference with political and economic 
policies of host rountries, erosion of enviroruneotal quality, aod adverse effects 
on human health and safety. The chaIIenge to the host country government 
is to maximi ... net benefits associated with multinationals' manufacturing 
facilities through incentives and controls consistent with its broadet devel-
opment philosophy. 
Host countries, multinational corporations, and joint venture partnen (if 
any) enter the facility-siting process with established policies regarding tech-
nology transfer, environmental protection, and occupational health and 
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safety. Tho facility-siting process is initiattd whm an application fot facility 
approval by tho multinational corporation induces tho principal participants 
to proe«d with implemontation of thoir rtspectivo policits. It mtails a com-
plex chain of interactions among the principal partidpants in the course of 
nogotiations, facility dtsign, p<rmitting, and start-up, which may involvo 
many time-dop<ndmt decisions by tach party as woO as murualadjustmmts 
to thos< decisions by aU participants. A srudmt of such a process bas many 
ind<p<ndont variablts to srudy (and most art not truly ind<p<ndont of tach 
othtt) and many ways to dofino dependent variabks. 
This chapttt txamin .. , through tho prism of tho thr .. cas< srudits, tho d-
feet of host country policits that aro «Iattd to tho DE&I valUts on onviron-
mmtal and OCQIpational hazard managemont at tho facility Itvei. The _p<cific 
obj<Ctivts of this chapttt art: 
1. to explore the mechanisms of interactions amoog the principal participants in the 
facility transfer process; 
2. to identify me points in me process at which me actions that bear moot sisnificandy 
on the facility-level outcomes take pla«; 
3. to illuminate the: roles of the principal participant! in the outcomes; and 
of. to identify any trade-offs between development objectives of me host countries 
and EH&S It the facilities that can be attributed to me host country'. pursuit of 
its DE&I values. 
Although the analysis ukts into account the chronology and multiple dimm-
_ions of the inttraerions in tho facility transftt process, tho scop< of the main 
lino of inquiry is narrow. Tho host country's policits toward multinational 
corporations art tho koy ind<p<ndmt variable, the initiaton tbat &Ct aU other 
variablts into motion. The cxtmt to which tho DE&I and EH&S valuts are 
strVtd by tach MNC facility-with sp<cial empbasis on mvironmmt, health, 
and safoty managemont and p<rformance- is the koy doptndmt variablo, 
the outcome. 
Thtre baY< b«o numerous offorts to analyze India's and, to a lesser cxt<Dt, 
TbaiIand'. progress in punuing their rapective polici .. r<garding technology 
transfer by multinational corporations, gmtraUy by moans of a variety of 
quantitative indicaton of national trtnds (st<, for cxamplo, Ahluwalia 1985; 
Brahmananda and Pancbamukhi 1985; Kumar 1985; Mabajan 1985; Nair 
1988; Sd,bar 1983; Subrahmani.n 1985; Patrasul< 1991; and Komin 1991). 
Givm the naturo of data gmtrat«i by cas< srudits, wo do not intmd to sig-
nificandy contribute to tbat large-scale mode of analysis. Howcvtt, by 
aUrrwing a close-up look at tho anatomy of decisions involving host countri<S, 
U.S. multinationals, and joint venturo partnon, tho cas< srudi .. uncoVtt 
sp<cific intttaerions among tho participants and their polici .. , and aUow us 
to elicit the hows and whys of the rdationship betwe<n the ind<p<ndcnt and 
d<p<ndmt variables. 
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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Developing countties use many different methods to shape the role of the 
industtial sector and of MNC participation in that sector. As noted by 
Donges (1976), in many developing countties "virtuaUy every important 
aspect of manufacturing activiry appears to be potentiaUy influenced by some 
form of government intervention: the level, composition, and location of 
production; the methods of production; the prices of products and faaor in 
puts; the rype and concentration of ownership of production, facilities; the 
nature and degree of market competition." Cody, Hughes, and WaD (1980, 
pp. 5-6) identify two general forms of government influence: investment 
aDocations and industtial development policies (Figure 5.2). Investment al-
locations may directly target industtial enterprises or infrastruaure such as 
roads, ports, or public utilities. Investment aDocations for infrastrucrure 
development are more common and more resource-intensive, yet less visible 
in most developing countties than aDocations for public or private industtial 
enterprises. This is to be expected, as infrastruaure development has become 
an unquestioned responsibility of aU governments, even those with the most 
extreme free market economies. AdditionaUy, unlike most infrastruaure in-
vestments, aDocations for the establishment and ownership of industtial 
enterprises are prone to negative publicity from national and internatio:Ja1 
private and public interests. 
While investment aDocations by the government can exert significant influ-
ence on the behavior of international and national corporations, most devel-
oping countties have also resorted to direct intervention through industtial 
development policies. Among those, general industtial development policies 
of finance, taXation, labor, location, and foreign trade are designed to fulfill 
multiple functions in the management of a nation's economy aod playa pr0m-
inent role in defining a country's overaD business environment for investment 
by multinational corporations. Resttictions, or location requirements, are 
crafted to ensure that individual enterprises fulfill specific industtialization 
strategies and are intended to have lesser effects on other aspeas of the na-
tional economy (Cody, Hughes, and WaD 1980, p. 6). 
Industtial development policies, both general aod direa, are considered 
facilitative to multinational direa investments when the policy tools for fur-
thering national industtialization emphasize incentives and lenient condi-
tions. Policies are considered resttictive when the policy tool. emphasize 
disincentives and stipulate resttictive conditions. 
Underlying these policies is a set of broad development, equity, and inde-
pendence values. These and related values may be grouped into general con-
ceptual domains (see Hughes 1980; KiIliclc 1981; IGrkpatticlc, Lee, and 
Nixson 1984). For example, IGrlepatticlc, Lee and Nixson (1984, pp. 193-
194) suggest a fundamental division of industtial development goals into 
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two "higher order" categories: "efficiency-related" goals of industrial devel-
opment, concerned with maximizing the total welfare accruing to the econ-
omy from the efficient use of scarce resources; and "distribution-relatedft 
goals, concerned with achieving the most satisfactory distribution of total 
welfare among people. Killiclc (1981, p. 33 J identifies three categories: "effi-
ciency t· Msocial justice,- and -national cohesion.· In a similar manner, Hughes 
(1980) suggests that the principal issues of industrial development are those 
of "growth and efficiency, ft "equity and welfare, ft and "natiooal indepen-
denceft (p. 11 J. All three classifications share the common notions of equity 
and national sovereignty, in addition to those of growth and efficiency. 
Because broad aspirations such as growth, equiry, and self-determination, 
or self-reliance, are too general to guide a host country's government in the 
conduct of its development-related functions (in the case of facility transfer, 
influencing in the activities of multinationals), they may be disaggregated 
into "subsi~ objectives, capable of providing precise enough guidance 
to formulate specific development policies and investment allocations. Such 
subsidiary objectives may include dispersion of industries into underdevel-
oped areas, facilitation of industrial development through the provision of 
infrastructure, and maintenance of local control. VariOllS institutions funher 
articulate these objectives through specific laws, regulations, and policies 
and are empowered to implement them through a variety of policy tools 
(Figure 5.2). 
Officials of most developing countries will quiclcly agree on the importance 
of the limited set of broad values (listed previously) in guiding their long-term 
development process. However, the relative priorities given to each will vary 
widely. For example, "equity now, growth later t "growth now, equity 
later t and "growth with equi~ each represent fundamentally different 
development approaches. The two countries included in this study represent 
the extremes of the national development spectrum, with India representing 
the growth-with-equity model and Thailand favoring the growth now, equity 
later model. 
Differences among countries become even more visible in the area of sub-
sidiary development objectives and policies. Whereas some countries do 
much to help the industrial sector (e_g., Hong Kong), other countries (e.g., 
Tanzania) extensively regulate the industrial sector's structure, conduct, 
and perfonnana:. For example, the facilitative noninterventionist countries 
let institutions allocate funds for infrastructure and enact industrial policies 
with incentives and lenient conditionS of entry and operation. Reliance on 
direct investment allocations, disincentives, and restrictive industrial controls 
would be I ... prominent, or at least 1 ... visible. Restrictive interventionist 
countries, on the other hand, would be more inclined to put direct restrictions 
on production, employment, foreign investment, technology choice, imports, 
and exports. The most facilitative countries allow unlimited entry by multi-
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national corporations whereas the most restrictive countries have consciously 
refused foreign investment as a matter of policy (Laya 1988, p . 31). 
Thailand's recent facilitative industrial policies are representative of several 
small African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries that bave consistendy main-
tained relatively "open door" stances toward foreign investors. (U.N. 198j, 
discussed in Kirkpatrick, Lee, and Nixson 1984). India's policies, on the 
other hand, bave been representative of the handful of relatively large and 
industrialized developing countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
1odonesia, Republic of Korea, and Venezuela. Recondy, most of these 
countries, including India in 1991 , have been recondy engaged in a liberali-
zation of some of their most stringent policies, with Mexico becoming a 
leader among them. 
Multiple development objectives, and the institutions pursuing them by a 
variety of measures, collectively make up a complex web. In that web, the 
means used to attain one type of objective do not necessarily promote the at-
tainment of another. For example, measures used to achieve greater equality 
of income may impede the efficient mobilization of resources. Similarly, 
measures used to achieve dispersion of industry may interfere with, or thwart 
altogether, the efficient conduct of business. 10 such cases, trad~ffs would 
be expected, either through explicit recognition of the incompatibility and 
clever use of multiple policy options, or implicidy and incrementally through 
defaults or multiple small adjustments. Furthermore, the means of pursuing 
development objectives may either promote or compete with other objectives 
of the host country, such as worker safety or environmental protection, or 
with the objectives of the corporation, such as profit, safety, or product 
quality. 
DElld VALUES AND RELATED POUCIES 1N lNDIA 
Among the political leaders and scholars in 1odia, the search for goals and 
paths in the country's economic and social development dates to many yean 
before liberation from colonial rule. Mahatma Gandhi had a profound in-
fluence on the articulation of such thought. For Gandhi, the main objective 
of 1odia's development was to eliminate as fast as possible the poverty among 
the masses of rural and urban population. He advocated decentralized ad-
ministrative structure down to the village level, austere consumption, and 
an inward-looking economy, with small, aaft-oriented industries and self-
sufficient rural communities as fundamental social units. Gandhi's vision of 
India underwent fundamental changes during the Nehru era. Nehru shared 
Gandhi's deep concern for the overwhelming poverty that afflicted much of 
India's population and was deeply committed to its elimination. He also 
shared his mentor's deep belief in social justice, peaceful coexistence, and 
cultivation of national heritage. His major difference with Gandhi was, 
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bowever, over industrial development strategy. Whereas Gandhi vehemently 
opposed the ·souI-less" machine, which he equated with ·soul-less" society, 
Nehru's vision of India was that of a strong and seU-reliant economic power 
built through carefuUy planned industrialization. In that process, the large-
scale industrialization would emphasize capital and heavy industty-the big 
machine-and mastery over modern technology (Bhatt 1980). Nehru also 
believed that the state should actively promote industrial development through 
economic planning and through ownership of certain key industrial sectors. 
A decade before independence, Nehru influenced India's Congress to 
establish the National Planning Committee, whieb be chaired until his death 
in 1964. After independence the committee became responsible for producing 
five-year development plans and other major policy documenrs related to 
national development. One sueb key document was the First Industrial Policy 
Resolution of 1948. The resolution set the foundation for the socialist pattern 
of society in India by aUowing the state to assume complete monopoly in 
several industries and by articularing the furure growth of state ownership 
as a long-term !tend. At the same time, the 1948 model provided for a mixed 
economy in India, with a thriving private secror (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1989). 
India's government conrinues to actively regulate the economy. The COUD-
tty's economic and social development is guided rhrough a series of planned 
programs (Nair 1988). The five-year plans outline the priorities with respect 
to the investment and use of India's resources. The objective of the First Five-
Year Plan (1951-1955) was, in the words of the planning commission, "to 
initiate a process of development which will raise living standards and open 
out to the people new opporrunities for a rieber and more varied life" (Plan-
ning Commission 1952, p. 7). By the Third Five-Year Plan,lndia's key indus-
trial development values had become sharply focused (Planning Commission 
1962, pp. 4-5): 
These values or basic objectives have recently been summed up in the phrase "social-
ist pattern of society." EsscntiaDy, this means that the basic criterion for determining 
lin .. of advance must not be private pro6" but social gain, aod tha, the partern of 
development and the srructure of socio-economic relations should be so planned that 
they result not only in appreciable inacases in national income and wealth . .. . 
The accent of the socialist pattern of society is on the attainment of positive 
goals, the raising of living standards, the enlargement of opporrunities for 
aU, the promotion of enterprise among the disadvantaged classes, and the 
creation of a sense of partnership among aU seCtions of the community. These 
positive goals provide the criteria for basic decisions. 
AU oflndia's five-year plans have played an important role in defining irs 
pace and direction of development and conrinue to provide an important 
forum for articularing the key DE&:I values of the countty. SeU-reliance, 
growth and prosperity, prevention of concentration of economic power, 
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and attainment of social justice and equity ate the fundamental themes of 
the development doruments in India during the past four decades. Further-
more, these broad aspirations do not appear w have been given any cleat 
priority over one another. The reluctance to assign priorities to these highly 
desirable but obviously not always mutuaUy compatible goals, or at least to 
reali.ticaUy assess their economic and social costs, has, in faa, at times 
retarded the pace of India's development (Nair 1988). 
Industrialization as the means for pursuing the key development objectives 
has been the cornerstone of India's strategy from its very conception. In the 
Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948,1956, and 1973, and in the Industrial 
Policy Statement of 1980, industrialization has been linked to economic 
growth and prosperity, political and technological soU-reliance, and to the 
broader social agenda. The Industrial Policy Statement of 1980 lists, for 
instance, the foUowing socioeconomic objectives: rapid industrialization, 
increased availability of goods at fair prices, larger employment, higher per 
capita income, increased productivity, correction of regional and secroral 
imbalances, promotion of exports, promotion of economic federalism, con-
sumer protection, and prevention of concentration of economic power. 
To India, soU·reliance has meant technological independence, promotion 
of indigenous industries, and, where necessary, import, absorption, and 
adaptation of foreign technology. The emphasis on domestic technology, in 
preference to imports, as a means to technological soU-reliance and indepen-
dence from foreign ptoducts is clearly the objective of the Technology Policy 
Statement of 1983 (Planning Commission 1983): 
FuUest support will be given to the development of indigenous technology to achieve 
technological self·reliance and reduce dependence on foreign inputs, particularly in 
critical and vulnerable area. and in higb value added items in which the domestic 
base ;., strong. Strengthening and diversifying the domestic technology base are nec-
essary to reduce importS and to expand exports for whicb international competitive-
ness must be ensured. 
As suggested by Subrahmanian (1985, p. 423), technological soU-reliance 
is consistent in India with the uso of a mix of imported and indigenous tech-
nologies, a mix that seeks to reduce imported technologies over time. It is 
sought by an "import-adapt" strategy, which seeks selective import of foreign 
technology and its subsequent absorption, adaption, and upgrading to suit 
the domestic resources and oonditions by increasing domestic RileD activities. 
At the oonceptual level, technological seU-reliance may be defined as a 
process of increasing through domestic RileD efforts the nation's capacity to 
acquire, absorb, and adapt imported technologies to facilitate funber inno-
vation, thereby increasing technological capacity while reducing external 
technological dependence. Thus, in the punuit of technological soU·reliance 
on a national scale, the government recognizes the necessity for inIlow of 
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fo",ign technology. At the same time, however, four decades of national 
development betray an ambiguity toward fo",ign enterprises. While recog-
nizing the necessity of foreign direct investment, the government's basic phi-
losophy has been to develop its resources through the efforts of its own 
people. It has ~tedly stated its intention to rely on indigenous workers, 
capital, technology, skills, and other resources even where it means s10wer 
growth, poorer quality, domestic undmupply, and higher prices (Stoever 
1989, p. 485). Thus, the import of foreign technology has been generally 
viewed as the last resort, primarily as a vehicle for the transfer of technology 
"'Quired by the country, and has been ","trieted to technology in sophisti-
cated and high priority "",as where India's skills and technology are not 
adequately developed, in export-oriented or import substitution manufac-
turing, or for support of indigenous industries (lole Sabha Secretariat 1989). 
Phased manufacturing programs and indigenization plans for individual 
enterprises, described in Chapters 3 and 4, reflect India's import-adapt 
strategies. The essentialstratogy of India is to induce the multinational cor-
porations to establish fully integrated manufacturing processes there and to 
stimulate local satellite industries by requiring procurement of indigenously 
produced parts and materials. 
In addition to self-~ and growth through industrialization, the Indian 
government has, over the years, emphasized the need for balanced regional 
development through the dispersion of industries. Since its inception in 1951, 
the industrial licensing process has served as the major inStrUment for achiev-
ing this objective. Enforcement through the licensing process increased, and 
by 19n the government prohibited the establishment of licensable industries 
within certain geographic limits of large metropolitan cities and urban ag-
glomerations with a population greater than 500,000 people (Sekhar 1983). 
In addition to direct controls through industrialliceosiog, industrial dispersal 
has been promoted through policies of input rationing, the use of intellegiooal 
price controls of certain basic materials such as cement, and in=asing ",Ii-
ance on marleet mechanisms. The 1980 Statement on Industrial Policy sug-
gests the growing importance of incentive mechanisms to achieve industrial 
dispersal into so-called backward "",as: 
IndusttWiutioo will play an important tole in corm:tins the r<giooal imbalances 
and reviving the industrial growth to lead the economy once again to the takNlff 
stage. For the achievement of this goal, Government have decided to encourage ru.. 
persal of industry and actting of units in industrially backward area •• Special conc:eo-
sions and facilities will be offered for this pwposc: and these incentives will be growth 
and performance oriented (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1989, p. 43). ._ ._ 
Despite such efforts, marked regional diffaeoces color industrial develop-
ment in India. From the viewpoint of efficiency, these differences "'" not 
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surprising, as various theories of location have artia.lated, because natural 
resources are not evenly distributed and there are economies of scale, ag-
glomeration in produaion procrsses, labor costS, and costS of transportation 
and infrastructure (Sekhar 1983). The regional differences in industrializa-
tion in India have taken the form of inaeasing the concentration of popula-
tion, economic activities, congestion, and pollution at selected locations such 
as Bombay and Calcutta, and severe disparity in welfare among different 
regions within the country-in shon, the pattern of urban polarization typi-
cal of Third World regional development. 
In the late 1970s, pan1y in response to the ineffeaiveness of these policies, 
the planning commission set up a National Committee on the Development 
nf Backward Areas (NCDBA) to "formulate appropriate strategies for effec-
tively tadling the problem of backward areas' and "to recommend programs 
and policy measures for influencing and controlling the locational pattern of 
industrial aaivity" (NCDBA 1980, pp. 197-198). For medium and large 
facilities, the NCDBA has been advocating the "growth center" concept, 
defined as the areas having no less than 50,000 people in the 1971 census 
and having less than 10,000 workers in non-household manufacturing. The 
growth center concept recognized the need for governmental provision of 
infrastructure and the viability of business investment in terms of critical 
mass of labor and market demand. This concept was reiterated again in the 
1980 Industrial Policy Statement, which called for "economic federalism' 
through setting up so-c:a1Ied nucleus industries intended to generate ancillary 
industries in backward areas (Lok Sabha Seaetariat 1989). 
The government's involvement in the location of industries traditionally 
has been justified on both economic and social grounds, namely: (1) the dis-
parities are a result and cause of inefficiencies and will therefore hinder fur-
ther economic growth; (2) the disparities are inequitable and therefore not 
socially just. Measured by the achievement of their stated objeaives, these 
policies have drawn severe criticism from the World Bank (Sekhar 1983). 
First, the World Bank found that the government's location policy had been 
implanmted without adequate, simultaneous development of infrastructure by 
the government. Second, whereas controls effeaively prevented industries 
from being set up in certain regions, they could not induce industrialists to 
invest in the most underdeveloped areas. This has been demonstrated in a 
failure to thrive by many industrial estates set up by the government in rural 
areas. Furthermore, the incentives offered by the government in a form of 
subsidies usually failed to compeosate for the other disadvantages of the 
location. The RSult has been decreased investment in rcstriaed areas without 
a compeosating inaused investment in other areas (Sekhar 1983). 
The economic inefficiencies that have been associated with the industrial 
location policies in India have not been, according to the 1983 World Bank 
repon, justified on the social equity grounds either, partia.larly as a tool for 
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correcting intrastate disparities. This is because the mobility of the population 
and labor fora: a$$Ures that people will move toward jobs mucll more effi· 
ciently than if industry is brought to where the people are. 
Despite the aiticism, regional development through, among other means, 
government influence on dispersion of industrialization, remains a signifi. 
cant national polic;y objective in India. For example, the Seventh Five-Year 
Plan (1985-1990) desaibes the 
. .. dispersal of induStries and balanced regional growth [as an) important objective 
of planned developmen •. This is necessary no. only from the point of view of balanc· 
ing developmen. regionally, bu. also for relief from transport in the industrialized 
urban centers (Planning Commission 1985, p. 173). 
The fundamental development philosopby in India entails the simultaneous 
pursuit of multiple economic, social, and tecllnological objectives. The phi· 
losophy is conducive to active and far-reaclling governmental involvement, 
and has given rise to proliferation of policies and public institutions empow-
ered to implement these policies. The Industrial (Development and Regula-
tion) Act of 1951 gives the a:Dtrai government broad authority to implement 
several key policies related to planned and carefuny controned industrializa-
tion, sucll as the promotion of certain industries, location, public ownership, 
or export promotion. In relation to MNC facilities, this authority translates 
to close scrutiny and extensive restrictions on the business and technical deci-
sions of the prospective investors. 
India's extensive development agenda translates into a careful review of 
proposals from potential direct international investors. All proposals for 
foreign facilities are carefully saeened to determine their necessity to the 
economy and potential contribution to indigenous tecllnological development. 
The government expresses a clear preference for "technical conaborations" 
(sale or licensing of tecllnology) over equity conaborations (joint ventures) 
and is least receptive to equity arrangements for packaged tecllnology importS 
involving substantial foreign ownership. The strict limitation on equity par-
ticipation under 'the Foreign Excllange Regulation Act of 1973 (FERA) reflects 
the overan polic;y of retaining control over foreign investors and treating 
them as vehicles for achieving specific development objectives such as tech-
nology transfer and foreign currenc;y earnings through exportS. Despite the 
negative effects of FERA limitations on the volume of foreign investments 
(Nair 1988), India bas preserved that requirement over the years. The Mo-
nopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969, aimed at preventing 
capital concentration, represents another form of control through selective 
imposition of production ceilings on foreign investors (as was indeed the 
case with Modi Xerox). 
From the perspective of foreign investors, two principal instruments of 
implementing industrial polic;y in India have been: a system of industrial 
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licensing under the Indusnies Development and Regulation Act (1951) and 
a system of impon licensing and other trade policy measures under the Im-
pon and Expon Control Act (Nair 1988). The Ministry of Industry is the 
key regulatory agency for both. Given the breath of development objectives 
India is pursuing through its industrial policy, facility Ii=uing is the principal 
instrument of government's participation in that process (incentives, the 
second major instrument, plays a significandy lesser role). As explicidy stated 
by the government (Lok Sabha Seaetariat 1989, pp. 8-9), India's licensing 
system is an "essential pan" of the government's indusnial policy, which is 
aimed at attaining wide economic, political, and social objectives: by optimal 
use of investable resources; and allocation of investable resources. This is 
done with a view to: 
1. meeting needpbased requirements of industties in accordance with national 
priorities; 
2. preventing the concentration of economic power; 
3. securing balanced development of various partS of the counuy; 
4. securing the widest poosib1e dispma1 of entrepm>eUrShip and distribution of income; 
s. stimulating employment with partirular accent on absorption of agrirulrural sur· 
plus as well as discouragement of rural-to-urban migratiOD; 
6. locating the nucleus of economic activity in a dispersed manner so as to widen the 
industries' buc; and 
7. achieving optimal balance of the public seanr, organized priva .. seanr, and smaD 
private enterprise sector. 
The licensing process for a joint venture, described in Chapter 3, com-
mences with a receipt of a letter of intent from the Depanment of Industrial 
Development. The letter is equivalent to a "provisional industrial license" 
and is issued upon conformance with the development policies of India. The 
licensing process does not end with issuance of an industrial license because 
impon licenses must be renewed every six months. Thus, as long as the 
manufacturing process uses imponcd materials, the central authorities are 
active participants in the operations of the enterprise. 
The first two decades of planned development in India wimesscd large-
scale industrialization. By the 1970., however, India's inward-looking poli-
cies were increasingly criticized for having connibuted to India's alienation 
from the global modernization process and baving resulted in relatively low 
overall economic growth rates (3.5 percent per year) in comparison with the 
growth performances of some outward-looking Asian nations. Attributing 
many of India's developmental problem. to inefficiencies within the public 
sector, India embarked upon a Iibera1ization process, which was initiated 
under the Jana .. government (1977-1980), carried forward under Indira 
Gandhi (198G-1984), and then accelerated under Rajiv Gandhi (1984-
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1989). In addition, the central government began devoting serious attention 
to the adverse environmental effe," of technology. The Indusuial Policy 
Statement of 1980 explicitly rewgniud the need for preserving ecological 
balance and improving living conditions in the urban centers of the country. 
However, not until the issuance of the Environmental Guidelines for Industry 
by the Ministry of Environment and Forests in 1985 was an active role of 
the central government established in controlling indusuiallocations for en-
vironmental reasons. The Environmental Protection Act of 1986 provided 
further suppott for the central government's involvement by including envi-
ronmental considerations in the licensing process. 
For multinational corporations, the Iibera1ization process signified a more 
favorable climate in India for direct foreign investments, characterized by 
relaxed and streamlined licensing procedures and the opening up of a wider 
segment of the economy to foreign investment initiatives. These changes 
notwithstanding, today India's government remains deeply committed to 
the social policies of regional and sectoral equity in development, to the goal 
of technological self-reliance, and to the concept of active participation of 
the authorities in achieving these social objectives through, among other 
means, regulation of foreign investors in India. Rigid locational require-
ments, indigenization requirements, and phased manufacturing programs 
are among the key manifestations of this development philosophy. 
DUd VALUES AND RELATED POUCIES IN lHAILAND 
In contrast to India, which chose to aeate its own unique national model 
of development, the evolution of development strategies in Thailand has 
proeeeded along a path parallel to that of many other developing nations. 
The search for, and debate on, the national identity in development has been 
also relatively modest among nail2nd's leaders and intellectuals. Conse-
quently, fewer government documents and scholarly analyses have been 
written on that subject in Thail2nd. 
Thailand's First National Economic Development Plan in (1962-1967) 
matks the beginning of the government's formal role in pursuing its vision 
of the country through a planned and systematic process of economic devel-
opment. That vision identified economic growth as the key instrument for 
achieving national self-reliance, improved living conditions, international 
recognition, and social equity. The government's role in pursuing growth 
would be to provide the necessary infrastructure and to reorganize the COUD-
try's administrative system in order to facilitate rapid and unrestrained growth 
of the private sector. The provision of infrastructure and selective encour-
agement for private initiative provided the foundation for the First Develop-
ment Plan (1962-1966) as well .. for subsequent plans. For example, the 
·Objectives and Policies- section of the Second Development Plan (1967-
1971) explicitly states that the 
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mobilization of human and natural resources for optimum utilization iD expanding 
the productive capacity and national iDcome of the country. 10 that the benefits of 
development can be ,hared equitably by all da .... of people (discussed iD Snidvongs. 
Kasem. and Panpiemras 1982. p. 349). 
This development philosophy also provided the essential concepNaI frame-
work for the subsequent structuring of policies and instiNtions with the 
responsibility for interacting with multinational corporations. The Board of 
Investment (BOI). the Ministry of Industry (MOl). and the Industrial Estate 
Authority of Thailand (IEAT) are among Thailand's most visible such insti-
rutions. The missions and policy instruments of these instiNtion •• and their 
relative status. are a direct reflection of that philosophy. 
Established in 1960 as the first such instirution in Southeast Asia. BOrs 
mission is: 
I . to guide the country's devdopment through participation iD formulating the five-
year development plans; 
2. to formula .. an iDvesanent promotion program. iDcIuding seleaive encouragement 
of certain economic leCtOrs; 
3. to promote actively, though selectively. foreign iDvesonent by belpiDg iDvestors 
identify opportunities. overcome operational problems. and obtaiD governmental 
clearances. 
Despite the lack of authority to issue licenses or attach conditions to sucb 
Iicen .... BOI enjoys high status. partly because of its direct link with the 
cabinet (along with National Economic and Social Development Board. it is 
one of the two offices within the Office of the Prime Minister). and partly 
because of its key role as the ultimate allocator of substantial investment in-
centives (see Chapter 3 for details). The combination of amactive incentives 
(so-caIIed privileges). high staNS. and broad functions gives BOI the unprec-
edented role as one of the architects of the national development strategy as 
well as its main interpreter and implementer_ 
Key point of interaaion between a foreign corporation and the central 
authorities is the process of applying for. and negotiating the terms of. the 
BOI privileges. At this stage the bost country exerts strong influence on a 
company to act in conformance with the country's development agenda. This 
stage is conceptually equivalent to the process of considering an application 
for industrial license in India. There are. however. differences in the respec-
tive agendas of the two countries. the participating instirutions. and the ateu[ 
of governtnent control over the applicant. First. in India the process includes 
multiple agencies and involves a broad agenda. including social and economic 
considerations. In Thailand. on the other band. the context is significandy 
narrower. with a single agency-the BOI-taking the leadership and domi-
nating the agenda. with economic growth having precedence over other 
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development objectives. Furthermore, since adoption of the BOI incentives 
is voluntary, the host counuy's influence on the key choices of a corporation-
location, sophistication of technology, scale of technology, environmental 
controls, and others- is essentially indirect, leaving significant flexibility in 
the corporate decision making. The key mandatoty step-securing an indus-
trial license from the Ministry of Industry-is relatively simple in Thailand 
and made simpler yet through the help of BOI and the Industrial Estate 
Authority, as described later. This freedom is in contrast to the negotiations 
and directly imposed controls experienced by corporations entering India. 
The primary mission of the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT), 
the third primary participant in the interaction between foreign corporations 
and the government, is to develop and maintain infrastructure for manufac-
turing facilities, both domestic and foreign, through establishment of well-
serviced industrial estates. The agency was aeated in the early 1970s and 
until the 19805 operated two industrial estates outside Bangkok: Bangpoo 
Estate, established in 19n, and the home of two case-study facilities, and 
Bangchan, established in 1972. By 1991, there were 19 such estates, operat-
ing or under construction throughout the country (12 of these were within 
4S miles of Bangkok, and only one was located in theless-developed northern 
part of the country). 
Although some industrial estates are owned and operated by the govern-
ment, most are joint ventures between the government and the private sector. 
A typical ownership agreement calJs for the government to provide the initial 
infrasaucture-roads, electricity, water, sewerage, waste treaunent, and 
basic communications-and to maintain it over time. The private developer, 
who owns the land, is responsible for building additional infrastructure as 
the estate grows. The developer also chooses the buyers of the land and 
decides on the location of the new facilities. The lEA 1'5 functions include 
the regulation and enforcement of environmental and occupational safety 
standards. The lEA 1's influence on the location of facilities within the estate 
is restricted to a veto power: It may refuse to accept a new applicant at the 
estate. In exercising that power, however, the agency would risk aeating a 
conflict with its venture partner. 
Although maintaining safety at the estate is among the responsibilities of 
IEAT, insufficient influence on land aUocation severely limits its options. 
lEA 1's ability to enforce sound environmental management among the in-
dustries at the estate is also restricted. In principle, it has the authority to 
close the factories that violate pretreaanent waste water standards, misman-
age their waste, or otherwise poUute. In reality, however, such action is 
unlil<ely. First, it would reflect poorly on the image of the estate and thus be 
viewed with suspicion by the venture partner. Second, the primary role of 
IEAT is not that of a regulator but rather that of a facilitator, through pro-
vision of infrastructure and help with permits. If faced with a necessity to 
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become involved in eovironmeotal managemeot issuts, the agency would 
choose a negntiated rather than "lI imposed solution. 
The direct, though admittedly limited, authority of IEAT in regulating 
and enforcing environmeotal and ocwpational health and safety is in contrast 
to the indirect and diffuse authority of the National Environmental Board, 
desaibed in Chapter 3. The contrast is more striking because it is the board, 
not lEA T, that is legislatively empowered to implement the National Envi-
ronmental Act of 1975 (and its 1978 revisions). 
The heavy invtstment in the industrial estates speaks to the commitment 
of the Thai government to influencing location choi= of the foreign invts-
tors. Although India and Thailand are similar in that both influence location 
of MNC facilities, the similaritits eod there. In India, the location policits 
are aimed both at reducing regional inequities and at relieving urban cong .... 
tion. Accordingly, this objective is usually pursued with no partiOllar concern 
for its effect on busin ... : Industrial facilitits are located in remote areas but 
companies must develop their own tssential infrastructure. The objectives 
of the Thai location policits are primarily to facilitate foreign inVtstmeot by 
prOviding infrastructure fo! industrits, with a second goal of relieving urban 
congestion of Bangkok. The government-industry estatts accomplish both 
objectives: Ninety percent of existing and planned estates are located south 
of Bangkok proper in areas relatively attractive to prospective busints .... 
This development strategy has brought remarkable success to Thailand as 
measured by standard economic indicators. Between 1960 and 1970, the 
annual growth rate of gross domtstic product (GOP) averaged 7.9 percent, 
compared to 2 to 3 percent prior to 1960. Industrial production grew even 
faster during that period, at 10.9 percent annuaUy, and economic transfor-
mation from agriculture accelerated its pace; the relative share of agriculture 
in total GOP dropped from 39.8 percent in 1960 to 28.3 percent in 1970 
(and to 17.5 percent in 1985). After a slowdown in the early 19805, the ecl)-
nomic growth rate again accelerated to 10 percent for three CODseOltive years, 
1986-1988 (Krongkaew 1988). 
International Monetary Fund data published by the United Nations for 
Thailand reveals that Japan and the United Statts are Thailand's leading 
foreign inVtstors, accounting for 26.7 percent and 14 percent, respectively, 
of total invtstment. Recent trends show that the foreign component of Thai-
land's capital stock continues to increase as average annual inflows of foreign 
investment have riseo from $82.5 million during 1975-1980 to $280.3 mil-
lion during 1981-1985. Data for 1988 alone reveal that the foreign invest-
ment component of governrnental approvals exceeded SO percent. The 
remarkable inflow of foreign technologies into Thailand has without doubt 
contributed to the nation's rapid industrial growth and transition hom a 
mosdy agriOlltural economy to that characterized by a mix of agriOllture, 
service, and manufacturing. 
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Until the late 1960s, development policies in Thailand focused primarily 
on economic growth. Howevet, toward the end of the decade the nation's 
leadetS and intellcauals were recognizing the need to include in the concept 
of development such faaors as income disuibution, public health, and othet 
aspirations of the Thai society (Snidvongs 1982). These changing puceptiODS 
wCtC not unique to Thailand and reflected the fundamental shifts within the 
global community in the vision of development, as progressively articulated 
in the 1971 Fou1le% Report, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, the 1974 
Cocoyoc Declaration and, more recently, in Our Common Ful14re (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987). During the 1970s 
and 19805, the development agenda in Thailand gradually widened to include 
EHlleS values and a Iarget menu of DEllel values. 
Attention to environmental issues in development planning started with 
the establishment of the first environmental committee in 1971 and in 1974 
establishment of an environmental division in the National Economic and 
Soc:iaI Development Board (NESDB). After the creation of the National Envi-
ronmental Board (NEB) in 1975, NESDB continued to maintain an envi-
ronmental division, primarily for liaison with NEB, so that the views of the 
environmental agency would be taken into account in NESDB evaluations 
of proposed environmental projects and in the five-year plans. Environmental 
issues WCtC first introduced into the Fourth National Economic and Devel-
opment Plan (19n-1981), but it was the fifth plan (1~82-1987) that con-
tained a separate section dedicated to cnvironmcntaI issues. The Sixth National 
Economic and Development Plan (1987-1991) emphasized the need to pre-
vent the deterioration of the country's natural resources and environmental 
quality and sectoral/regional equality. According to a high level NESDB 
official, the key issues for the seventh plan, which wCtC being debated at the 
time of this srudy, WCtC environmental management and inclusion of public 
participation in that process, social adaptation to the increasingly industrial 
character of the economy, and regional equity in development. 
Despite these changes, the primary development philosophy in Thailand 
has remained faithful to its initial precepts, which held development and in-
dependence values supreme to others. Outward-looking economic growth 
and limited governmental constraints on private enterprises, including 
MNCs, thus arc the key paths to other desirable goods: social transforma-
tion, equity, and health and environmental protection. BOI continues to be 
the leading interpreter of the national development agenda with regard to 
multinational corporations; the partnCtShip of BOI and !EAT continues to 
provide the key instruments for facilitating business and for exerting control-
mostly by indirect approach and while intcrnally balancing its own competing 
agenda. over the behavior of the manufacturing affiliates of multinational 
corporations. The role of NEB in regulating corporate behavior, significandy 
strengthened over the years by increased staffing and participation in long-
term planning, remains relatively weak. 
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Emerging in the Thai context then, is a multinational "'rporation which, 
once permitted to enter the country, commands a significant freedom in 
most, if not an, key business and safety decisions: location, sophistication 
of technology, size and dcsign of technology, safety systems, and environ-
mental management. 
1HE OUTCOMES 
India and Thailand have erected elaborate structures in order to inDuena: 
the activities of multinational corporations. These structures consist of mul-
tiple policies, institutions, and instruments of policy implementation. Some 
institutions have narrowly defined missions and unambiguous agendas, 
such as Thailand', BOI; others bave complex missions, such a,the Ministty 
of Industty in India, which implements several developmental objectives 
through licensing. Others still have poorly defined or ambiguous missions, 
such as !EAT in Thailand. Similarly, for some policies-such as location 
policy in India - the measures of implementation are suaightforward, whereas 
others-such as the Indian policy of indigcnization-requirc multiple tools 
for implementation (phased manufacturing program, import policies, local 
procurement requirements, etc.). 
The three case studies have demonstrated that host countrics' policies 
toward MNCs that site manufacturing facilities within their territories have 
been effective in attaining several specific objectives. Thailand's aggressive 
pursuit of foreign invesanent, through liberal policies of facilitation and 
minimal governmental interfercna: with the business activities of MNCs, 
was originally conc:cived as a means of import substitution; inaeasingly, it 
has been sought as a means for rapid, cxport-oriented industrial growth, 
and has proven very suea:ssful. . 
Do Pont and Occidental Chcmicallocated their facilities within industrial 
estates, according to the Thai government's prefcrena:s, and one of them 
entered into a joint venture artangement. While meeting these objectives, 
the government kept the entire approval proocss to a brief tw~ to three-
month period in each case. Thailand', expediency stands in contrast to the 
tw~ycar proocss of approval for Modi Xerox in India. Administrative expe-
diency has continued in Thailand since the completion of the two facilities 
because of the minimal participation of the administrative bodies in their 
daily activities. 
The Modi Xerox case exemplifies the effectiveness of India's pursuit of 
technology transfer and absorptioo through policies of phased manufaauring 
proocss (PMP). In exchange for the opportunity to enter the large xerography 
market in India, Rank Xerox was required to import the full manufacturing 
process, and is continually required to ensure that nca:ssary materials and 
pans are acquired locally rather than imported. Despite certain difficulties, 
such as delays, inconsistent quality of materials, and perhaps additional costs 
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of doing business. Modi Xerox is well on its way to achieving the main objec-
tive of the national indigcnization policy: to have 80 percent of the value of 
the product contributed by local manufacturers. Currendy. the facility is 
also fully integrated and capable of conducting product innovation on a 
modest scale on the premises. 
The Modi Xerox case also demonstrates the advantages of the host coun· 
try's active participation in regulating the EH&S aspects of MNC facilities. 
The restrictions placed by the state pollution control boards on the waste 
management practices at the facility proved no obstacle to business develop-
ment. and they stimulated innovation in on·site hazardous waste treatment. 
As noted. both countries emphasize industrial dispersal through industrial 
location policies. Although India has historically placed greater emphasis on 
directly controlling the location of industries in "backward" areas via indus-
trialliccnsing requirements. Thailand', use of incentives to encourage the 
location of MNC facilities within industrial estates represents the govern-
ment's relatively recent objective to relieve infrastructure overloads within 
and around the Bangkok area. The two cases indicate that both approaches 
have proven successful. suggesting that India and Thailand have in place ef-
fective policies for influencing the siting of MNC facilities in accordance 
with industrialization objectives. The case studies also show that Thailand 
has supplemented its location policies with heavy investment allocations in 
inErastruaure development whereas India provides less inErastruaure. Largely 
through the provision of infrastructure. Thailand has been able to offer in-
vestors alternative locations that are economically viable and thus congruent 
with corporate business objectives. 
The three case studies also highlight the undesirable effects that imple-
mentation of each wuntry's development policies can have on EH&S practices 
at the MNC facilities level. 
Thailand's policy of minimal governmental interference with business 
activities. in conjunction with a weak regulatory infrastructure for environ-
mental and occupational health and safery. docs not assure the best EH&S 
perfOrtnance of industrial enterprises in general. The licensing process-
efficient and primari1y in the hands of the Ministry of Industry -limits the 
participation nf the occupational and environmental agencies. The corpora-
tions operating in Thailand are in effect free tn implement the EH&S systems 
of their choice. without significant input from the host CIOWltry'S authorities. 
The wrporare wmmitmcnt is therefore the fundamental detetminant nf safety 
and health within these factories_ The two Thai case studies exemplify strong 
corporate EH&S systems. weD-articulated policies. strong oversight by the 
parent corporation. tight lines nf communication. and clear recognition by 
the corporation of the need to adapt tn local conditions and to develop a 
strong safety awareness among the local employees_ Although the facilitative 
approach of the Thai authorities bas worked weD for the two corporations. 
it may not be so in all cases. It is reasonable to assume that multinationals 
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with less corporate commitment to EH&S might, in that climate, choose a 
less responsible behavior, leading to environmental degradation and com-
promised occupational safety and health_ 
The India case study brings to light a different dimension of suboptimal 
EH&S outcome precipitated by well-intentioned host country development 
policies. The primary issues during negotiations between the central govern-
ment and Xerox were sophistication and size of the technology, ownership 
arrangement, location, prospects for indigeniz.ation, and exports. The mat-
ters of health, safety, and environment, perceived as not inberendy prominent 
in the photocopying technology, which is neither resource intenSive nor highly 
polluting, clearly took the baclc seat to the other items on the agenda, pre-
sumably to be addressed by the state regulatory system. In that early stage, 
the combination of the antimonopoly and technology transfer policies of 
India imposed two contradiaoty requirements on the company: to baclcward 
integrate according to the phased manufaauring plan and to keep domestic 
production volume low. These requirements led the corporation to choose a 
sc.aIed down and highly integrated facility and, in the pursuit of cost-effective 
solutions, to opt for a manual rather than an engineered safety system in the 
toner produaioo portion of the facility. Although the adjustment was clearly 
adequate to meet the stringent internal corporate occupational Standards, it 
nevertheless put to the test the overall safety philosophy of the parent corpo-
ration: to use engineered health and safety systems whenever possible. It 
also made the facility more vulnerable to the unanticipated changes in the 
work environment: sudden increases in worlcload, labor disruption, and 
change in management. To ensure maintenance of EH&S standards under 
these conditions would require a persistent and focused corporate commit-
ment to safety, both by the developing country subsidiaty and the parent 
company. 
Notably, the cause of the vulnerability of health and safety structure in 
the India case is opposite to that in the Thai case; whereas the former resulted 
from the low level of control by the host country authorities over multina-
tional enterprises, the latter was caused by the multiplicity and inflexibility 
of such controls. The instruments used by India to implement policies of 
indigeniz.ation, monopoly prevention, and regional development led to trade-
offs among five desirable objectives: indigenization, prevention of monopoly, 
regional development, economic efficiency, and preferred safety system. 
Furthermore, the regulatory environment of India relative to multinational 
corporations assured that the trade-off would be made by the corporation-
either on the cost effectiveness or on the safety side-and not by the host 
country. This is for two reasons. First, with the exception of highly polluting 
or resource-intensive technologies, EH&S is not explicidy incorporated in 
the negotiation phase of the facility-siting process, and it is precisely during 
that stage that the issues of baclcward integration and down-sc.aIing of pro-
duction were negotiated. Second, the regulatory philosophy of the host 
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c:ountry in relation to multinational corporations, and the multi-agency ad-
ministrative structure driven by inertia and tradition, favors a scenario in 
which the authorities impose requiremenu and the corporation adapu, which 
is precisely what happened in the Modi Xerox case. 
From a corporation's perspective, the highly controlled business environ-
ment of a host country, as the India example illustrates, may delay business 
conduct. Recurrent renewal of impon licences, travel between the facility 
and the corporate headquaners in New Delhi, and delays in procuring locally 
made equipment, parts, and materials, all serve as examples. While promot-
ing other desirable objectives of the host country, these restrictions are cosdy 
to the corporation and, as disincentives to potential new investmenu, may 
be cosdy to the host country. 
It is pardy to shield foreign investors from these and other delays that the 
Thai government aeated industrial estates and the Industrial Estate Authority 
of Thailand (IEATJ_ The industrial estates serve as a magnet for foreign in-
vestors through incentives because of their superior infrastructure. Their 
investor-friendly administrative structure is an additional attraction. How-
ever, the geographic benefits of the estates for Thailand are pardy offset by 
their suboptimal, if unintentional, management of EH&:S. First, the estates 
concentrate large number of hazardous facilities in close proximity to each 
other. In the case of the Bangpoo Estate-the home of the two Thai case 
study facilities - tbree-quaners of the resident facilities manufacture chemi-
cals, plastics, or pharmaceuticals. Funhermore, the lack of effective zoning 
restrictions in Thailand, which is common among developing countries, 
eliminates the possibility of maintaining a distance between the industrial 
and residential areas. 
The multiple functions of IEAT illustrate even more stri.ltingly the effect 
of the pursuit of efficiency on the management of EH&:S at the facility level. 
Initially aeated primarily to manage the industrial estates, IEAT has also 
been given other key functions: to facilitate business by helping foreign cor-
porations in obtaining n«a<aty permits and to set and enforce envirorunental 
discharge standards among the resident facilities. Although the concentration 
of multiple functions within one government agency is not unique to IEA T 
or to Thailand (it is true for the Ministry of Industrial Development in India, 
which, through industrial licensing, implemenu several policies simultane-
ouslyJ IEAT stands OUt in two ways_ First, it serves three distinct interesu, 
namely the central authorities, the multinational enterprises, and iu own 
business panners in joindy owned estates_ Second, iu multiple functions as 
a facilitator, regulator, and manager may at times be in conflict with each 
other, and thus internally weaken the agency. When confronted with such 
conflicts, IEAT would most likely favor trade-offs of business interests of 
the joint venture partner, growth and efficiency desired by the government, 
and its own environmental and occupational safety objectives. Under those 
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circumstances, the freedom of corporations in choosing their EH&:S systemS, 
good and bad, is considerable. 
The chronological four-stage model outlined in Figure 2.1 provides a dif-
ferent perspective on the effect of host country development policies on 
EH&S outcomes. Those development policies were manifested during the 
negotiation stage of the siting process: the location policy in Thailand (which 
catalyzed the selection of Bangpoo estate); the EH&:S conditions imposed 
by lEA T during facility licensing; and government controls on the size and 
technological integration of the facility in India. 
Notably, although the decisions made during the first stage had significant 
consequences for the EH&S management later on, the issues related to en-
vironment, health, and safety were not explicitly included in the negotiations 
between the host countries and the corporations at that stage. From the 
country's perspective, this was partly because the three technologies were 
viewed as neither highly polluting nor resource intensive. Furthermore, it 
appears that the environmental and safety issues were perceived by the host 
countries as the domain of the permitting process, to be addressed adequately 
during the subsequent stage. 
The undesirable effectS of various well-intentioned industrial policies of 
developing countries, often in a form of interference with the host country's 
pursuit of other desirable development objectives, have been previously ex-
plored by Kirkpatrick, Lee, and Nixson (1984). These authors point to several 
such inherent conflicts: 
• industrial licensing systems may be used to promote industrial growth in remote 
region. (to meet distributional objectives) but cause new estabJ;.,hmenrs to be sited 
in high<OSt locations (contrary to efficieocy objectives); 
• minimum wage legislation may promote a more equitable disttibution of income 
but over-encourages capital-intensive methods of production; 
• restrictions on aansnationaJ corporations may encourage the use of more ·appre> 
priate" technologies and stimulate .. If-reliance and nation-building but deprive 
less-<Ieveloped countries of entrepreoeurial skills and capital resources; 
• high import duti .. may stimulate the growth of outpUt and employment in the in-
digrn<wJS manufacturing seaor, but the protection it receiveo may also lead 10 a faD 
in technical and productive efficiency. 
They also note that apparent consistencies between subsidiary objectives 
and higher order development values may, upon sautiny, rum out to be in 
conflict with each other or with other development values. In one specific 
case, a policy of industrialization of backward area" while leading to an 
increase in the average income of the inhabitants of the region (and thus 
promoting spatial equity) also increased the disparities in the individual in-
comes among the population (and thus reducing per capita equity). Further-
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more, pursuit of such spatial balance objectives by means of locating industties 
in remote areas is unlikely t according to the authors, to be consistent with 
efficiency objectives. 
The case studies provide suppon for Kirkpatrick's observations of incon-
sistencies in development policies. They also bring to light an additional 
type of inconsistency, not emphasized by other authors, namely between 
policies related to DElIe( values and those related to EHlIeS values. Funher-
more, when such strain materialized in our cases, its origins could be traced 
to aggressive pursuit of mutual development objectives by the host country 
in the course of facility licensing. We also note that the relationship between 
the implementation stages of these host country development policies and 
the EHlIeS outcomes can be indireer and delayed, consisting of incremental 
adaptations by MNC to the host country's policies. The adaptations were 
made implicitly by the key acton rather than through direct negotiations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Business Arrangements 
and EH&S 
Business arrangements between the parent corporation and its host country 
affiliate assume a variety of forms, ranging from wholly owned subsidiaries 
to some degree of shared equity partnerships with regard to marketing, con-
tracting, and licensing agreements. Depending on the arrangements, a variety 
of constraints may be placed upon the corporation's flexibility and range of 
options in the facility design and management. The MNC's attitudes toward 
entering into joint ventures, and toward the ownership and management ar-
rangements at such ventures, reflects the corporate response to these con-
straints. Similarly, host countries and host enterprises may associate benefits 
with joint ventures that often do not materialize and lead to disappointing 
outcomes. 
The ultimate structure and details of joint venture agreement is a formal 
expression of the outcome of negotiations between the venture partners, 
although informal agreements carry significant weight as well. Both reflect a 
mix of partners' institutional cultures and business motives operating within 
the boundaries imposed by host country culture and legal framework. EH&S, 
in both its hardware dimension (pollution control equipment, worker pro-
tective devices) and software dimension (organizational know-how, work-
ers' training, monitoring, reporting, inspection protocols, blueprints, and 
manuals) is but one among many issues that may be covered in a contractual 
relationship. These issues stand alongside marketing responsibilities, profit-
sharing, risk-sharing, management responsibilities, protection of proprietary 
technology, and the many other terms and conditions of aitical interest to 
the parent and affiliate. 
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This chapter explores, through the prism of the Du Pont, Occidental 
Chemical, and Xerox case studies, the effects that the choice of business ar-
rangements at MNC foreign afftliates may have on EH&S practices and 
performance. The analysis emphasizes the emergence of EH&S issues during 
the negotiations between the joint venture partners, the terms of formal and 
informal joint venrure agreements, and the downstream effectS of such agree-
ments on the faciliry's operation. 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Since the 1950s, parent-affiliate relations have undergone fundamental 
changes, driven by both the economic reordering and political restructuring 
of the last four decades. On the political front, beginning in the immediate 
postwar years and extending into the late 1960s, the surge of independence 
brought forth new expectations on the pan of developing countries in relation 
to MNCs' operations. Historical panerns of full MNC control of mineral, 
petroleum, and export agriculture rypical of the pre-World War II, colonial 
period gave way to negotiated agreements in which host governments and 
local entrepreneurs were granted major roles in both management and 
ownership of MNC operations. Shedding colonial ties in countries lilee India, 
Indonesia, and the nations of central and southern Africa prompted a wave 
of economic nationalism that manifested itself in tighter controls on owner-
ship and management of MNC operations. A wave of nationalization shifted 
a majoriry of basic industries into host country ownership. Efforts to achieve 
greater participation in MNC enterprises were particularly aggressive in oil 
and gas exporting countries (e.g., Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Nigeria, 
Venezuela) where postwar economic recovery fueled heavy demand for 
petroleum products, thereby strengthening the bargaining position of petro-
leum-producing nations. This may be contrasted to mineral exporters who, 
though prone to the same nationalization as oil producers, were unable to 
capitalize on the dependencies of industrial countries for their commodities. 
Even in those countries where large and rapidly expanding domestic markets 
attracted MNCs seeking to establish an early market position (such as India 
and Brazil), MNCs gradually became subject to heavy regulation by host 
governments seeking to enlarge short- and long-term benefits from MNC 
operations. 
The consequences of nationalization were ambiguous for the host coun· 
tries, if not counterproductive. MNCs were reluctant to invest in countties 
with a record of expropriating foreign investments, many developing coun-
tries lacked the know-how or the trained personnel to operate the newly 
acquired facilities, and, due to transitional problems in management and 
mariceting, the nationalized industry lost considerable market shares on the 
world maricet. Over the last two decades, most developing countries have 
changed their policies toward MNCs and adopted a more differentiated 
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approach to foreign investment, ranging from imposing stringent regulations 
of ownership to adopting a laissez-faire position. This change in policies has 
been accelerated with the demise of the communist doctrine and its inherent 
dogma of nationalizing private property. 
Concurrent with rapid political changes was the emergence of the manu· 
facturing scaor as the dominam growth sector in MNC investment in devel-
oping countries. Driven first by import substitution policies and, somewhat 
larer, by export-dominated industrial policies to foster domestic economic 
growth, host countries aeated incentives to facilitate establishment of MNC 
export operations, including special production zones within which hiting, 
importation, ownership, tariff, and other priviltges prevailtd. At the same 
rime, controls on production for domestic markets were tightened in an effort 
to direct the rush of MNC investment toward achieving other social objec-
tives such as protection of indigenous enterprises. retention of foreign cur-
rency, balancing growth between urban and rural regions, and building 
technology development capaciry within national enterprises. 
As MNC invesonents shihed from basic, extractive activities to the man-
ufacturing sector, and nationalistic pressures transformed developing coun~ 
tries into more active participants in their industrial growth, parent-
affiliate business arrangements became more varied and complex. With few 
devtloping countries willing to remain in the role of primary mattrials ex-
porters for processing at U.S. and European manufacturing sites, MNCs 
encountered growing demands to build indigtnous technology, protect local 
industries from monopolistic control by MNCs, enlarge tquiry participation 
by host governments and entrepreneurs, contribute to local infrastructural 
improvements, and restria profits repatriation. At the same time. growth in 
domestic markets providtd dtvtloping countries with the leverage needed to 
bargain with MNCs over the scale, location, profit-sharing and technological 
content of MNC operations. 
None of these trends implies an abrupt shift from economic dtpendence 
characttristic of the colonial period or indicates that developing nations' 
leverage would be applied to realize host country EH&S objtcrives. Indeed, 
such objectives rarely appeartd in govtrnment policy pronouncements or 
regulations that continued to emphasize developmental goals in regulating 
MNC activities-import substitution, promotion of indigenous industry, 
stlf-reliance, regional devtlopment, and job aeation. 
While devtloping countries mobilized for a more active role in regulating 
multinational investments, such initiatives were drivtn principally by the 
goal of apportioning a greater share of the profits from resource exploitation 
for the benefit of indigenous economic development. To achieve this, how-
ever, required mechanisms for controlling sucb investments. These, in turn, 
necessitated a sbift from the dominant mode of MNC wbolly owned subsid-
iaries to alternatives in which tquiry, production management, marketing, 
and other functions inaeasingly would be shared by partners. By the 1980s, 
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a few basic types of such arrangements had emetged, ranging from product-
licensing agreements with no equity participation by the local partner to a 
partnership in which the local participant holds an equal or dominant equity 
position and management responsibilities. At present, though wholly owned 
subsidiaries still dominate overseas operations of U.S. firms in terms of total 
assets and employees, joint ventures have emerged as the dominant parent-
partner relationship in new and planned operations (Contractor 1986). 
STUDIES OF JOINT VENTURES 
Cause. and Motive. for Joint Ventures 
Joint ventures can be of interest to both the MNCs and the host countries. 
Kogut (1988) reduces joint venture motivations to three: 
avoidance of excessive transaction (and therefore total production) costs through 
joint ownership/control rights and the mutual commitment of resources; 
enhancement of competitive/market position; and 
aeatioD of a vehicle to transfer so-called tacit knowledge, or know-how that is em-
bedded in the organiz.ation itself, in its routines and practices, ramer in specific pieces 
of hardware or software. 
Datta (1988, p. 88) provides a moce daharate perspective on the reasons for 
MNCs to engage in joint ventures, pointing to the following as determinants: 
• entering new and potentially profitable markets that would not be available to the 
MNC without local suppon by a joint venture parmer; 
• sharing heightened economic risks in new husiness ventures; 
• satisfying nationalistic demands and reducing risks of expropriation; 
• maintaining good relations with host governmentsj 
• pooling organizational know-how to realize synergistic benefits. 
From the perspective of a prospective host country business partner, creat-
ing a joint venruce with an MNC provides several advantages such as access 
to new technology, use of brand names and trademarks in domestic markets, 
and entry into new markets in a relatively shon time to diversify existing 
business activities. 
A view essentially compatible with Datta's is presented by Contractor 
(1986), who identifies the following motives: 
• joint risk reduction 
• economies of sca.le and/or rationalization of production 
• complementary technologies and patents 
BUSINESS ARAANCEMENTS 183 
• co-opting or blocking competition 
• overcoming government-mandated uade barriers 
• initial international expansion (for medium and small firms) 
The extent to which each of these factors affectS joint ventures in develop-
ing countries varies according to the regulatory sttucture in host counuies. 
In major markets such as China and India, both of which impose stringent 
restrictions on foreign investors, MNCs simply cannot operate with a local 
partner, either government or private, without governmental permission 
and supervision. The lure of untapped markets positions host governments 
to bargain for and extract substantial concessions from MNCs in the form 
of facility location, technology transfer, indigenization of product compo-
nents, and equity ownership shares. Furthermore, the recognition that the 
host country's laws, regulations, and political culrure caMOt be easily learned 
by expatriates reinforces the propensity of MNCs to seek joint venture ar-
rangements, even when host government policies are less rigid than in China 
or India (O'Reilly 1988). This is exemplified in the Thai case of Occidental 
Chemical, where the benefits of preserving links to a savvy local business 
family proved instrumental is expediting the upgrade and expansion of the 
chrome products facility acquired during the firm's buy-out of Diamond 
Shamrock. 
Finally, the concept of financial risk reduction cuts across all phases of 
the firms' operations, including product and process design, matetials pro-
curement, production, financing, marketing, and labor relations. For MNCs, 
operations in developing nations carty additional tisks relative to U.S., 
European, or Japanese locations, such as sudden and disruptive shifts in the 
trearment of MNC profits and political upheaval or civil strife. Under these 
conditions, joint ventures provide certain anticipatory and resilient capabil-
ities that wholly owned subsidiaries are less likely to enjoy. The tendency of 
host governments to target MNCs in times of political and economic unrest, 
though diminished since the 1960s, remains a compelling incentive to place 
the overseas enterptise under the protective umbrella of a domestic partner. 
Empirical Studies 
The theoretical conclusions about the potential benefits of joint ventures 
are reflected in the empirical studies about joint ventures. Hlalcik (1985) has 
surveyed joint venture activity worldwide during the period 1974-82. He 
specifically addresses the experiences in developing countries. His sample of 
420 joint ventures in manufacturing encompasses those occurring within 
the manufacruting sector; between a U.S. firm and at least one foreign part-
ner located overseas; and with the U.S. partner holding 10 to 90 percent of 
equity ownership. 
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Several trends are noteworthy. First, with the exception of above average 
activity in 1974, the latter years of the nine-year interval wimessed substan-
tially more activity than the earlier years. Yearly formation of joint ventures 
approximately doubled during the period, peaking in 1980 with 72 recorded 
agretments. This confirms our view that joint ventures have become more 
attractive to MNCs and host countries because of changes in economic poli. 
cies and world trade patterns. 
Second, R&D activity as pan of the joint venture agreement was meager. 
Over the nine-year period, a mere 15 percent of aU joint ventures contained 
some identifiable fonn of R&D. In relative tenns, the 4 .8 percent average 
during the first five years more than doubled to 12.5 percent during the last 
four years, a significant gain in relative terms but still minimal in absolute 
terms. Some seaors, namely t1ectric and electronic equipment, insrruments, 
and textiles, showed somewhat higher than average R&D activity (Hlakik 
1985, p. 50). Overall, while joint venture activity and, by implication, vari-
ous fonns of technology transfer a=lerated overaU, the most fundamental 
and long-term type of technology transfer - the development of indigenous 
R&D capability-continues to be the exception rather than the rule. 
Third, joint ventures with non-majority U.S. ownership totaled slighdy 
over half the sample (55 percent). Over the course of the study period, this 
figure ranged from 46 to 62 percent, with no obvious difference berween the 
1970s and early 1981Js. These figures, though admittedly nOl weighted by 
the doUar values of the enterprises, are a counterpoint to the perception of 
U .S. domination of overseas joint ventures. Foreign ownership controls im-
posed by host countries were most prominent in this sample, which may 
serve as an iUusttation for the historical shift from both extremes, free invest-
ment policies and nationalization. 
Finally, the split berween developed and developing locations shows a 
consistent bias against low-income countries (e.g., India, China) to the ad-
vantage of high (Europe, Japan) and middle-income (e.g., Brazil, Mexico) 
countries. Across aU joint ventures, a mere 3 percent occurred in the fIrst 
category, with fIgures remaining essentially constant (and negligible) over 
the study period. In contrast, middle-income countries represented 39 percent 
of aU joint ventures, peaking at 48 percent in rwo of the study years. High 
income countries accounted for the majority, 55 percent, with figures ranging 
from 47 to 65 percent. In the 1981-82 U.S. recession period, the preference 
for high income countries surged, probably a reflection of risk aversion 
among U.S. MNCs in a period of unstable international prices and politics. 
POTENTIAL CONFUCfS BElWEEN JOINT 
VEN'IURE PARlNERS 
MNCs enter into joint venture partnerships for business reasons, either 
voluntariIy or in response to the host country's pressure. Killing (1983), 
analyzing a sample of 34 joint ventures, identifies this issue as the primaty 
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motive in 57 percent of developing country ventures. In other words, over 
half the sample fonned ventures primarily because doing business in the host 
country required it. The other key motive was the need for skills-manage-
ment, technical, financial, marketing-identiEed by 38 percent of the respon-
dents. Whether cooperation is forced by governmental policies or motivated 
by business concerns, joint ventures arc not only associated with mutual 
benefits but may also lead to conflicts. 
Once the negotiations of the tenns of the joint venture agreement com-
mence, at least two forces are at work in producing differing perspectives on 
how the joint venture ought to be developed and managed (Robinson 1988, 
p. 192). First, the time value of money typically differs between parent and 
partner. MNCs nonnally view their foreign investments as long tenn, and 
are willing to live with minimal short-tenn payoff. Operating losses for three 
to five years is not uncommon for MNC invesonents, tolerated as the cost 
of establishing a market and product profile in a new area. Host country 
partners, on the other, typically seck to maximize near·tcrm retUrns with an 
eye to developing links with other domestic enterprises that they control. 
Second, the MNC and domestic partner assign different weights to product 
diversification. For the MNC, the joint venture is one component of a global 
network of production. Unlike the domestic partner who emphasizes growth 
through increased share in one or a few markets (domestic or international) 
with limited product diversification, the MNC is likely to seek growth through 
product diversification and geographical diversity. The result is an MNC's 
propensity to incur longer tenn risks for new product development and to 
use the joint venture as a testing ground (and vehicle for risk sharing) in new 
geographic areas. In contrast, the domestic partner nonnally prefers proven 
technologies, markets maximum local value-added, and has less appetite for 
experimentation in process and product development. 
We would expect these various partners' motives to impinge upon the 
EH&S agenda during negotiations between the MNC and venture partners. 
First, EH&S know-how and investments-training, hardware, management 
systems-arc by nature long-term investments. They do not directly produce 
marketable products but instead are part of what might be called the "tech-
nology infrasCtuCture" transferred abroad via the joint venture agreement. 
Because the return on investment and profit horizons of the partner are rela-
tively short and short-tenn profit maximization is a key driver in the fonna-
tion of a partnership, it is reasonable to expect initial indifference toward, if 
not overt disagreement with, the value assigned to EH&S investments during 
ntgotiations. 
For the MNC, on the other hand, EH&S technologies are likely to be 
viewed as valued assets, comparable to the types of technological, market-
ing, and capital assets it brings to the negotiating table. That EH&S invest-
ment yields primarily long-term returns in the form of risk reduction, accident 
prevention, reduced work absenteeism, and lesser plant down time is likely 
to be valued less highly by the host country partner. Under these circum-
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stances, the effect of divergent planning horizons on the valuation of EH&S 
assets may occasion disagreements on how the partnership's initial capital 
resources ought to be apportioned among competing demands. 
The MNC and its partner are also likely to have different perspectives on 
long-term EH&S management decisions. For the MNC, accustomed to 
operating in a more regulated, monitored, and litigious atmosphere, EH&S 
",mpliance is a daily task performed within an elaborate system of internal 
and external testing, analysis, and reporting of environmental and workplace 
performance. Shoddy performance has its price in terms of potential penal-
ties, liabiliry claims, and damage to product and "'rporate image. The shon-
and long-term repercussions of a major mishap or lawsuit are not limited to 
the locus of the event, but may weU be felt throughout a worldwide network 
of industrial facilities under ",ntrol of the MNC. Public image and interna-
tional reputation have been major drivers for global ",mpetitiveness and for 
gaining access to new markets. 
MNCs prefer to have sole or at least major responsibiliry for aU EH&S 
management decisions in designing and operating the faciliry. For the MNC, 
",ntrol over EH&S is a way of preserving an asset, a vehicle for accomplish-
ing an efficient and routinired risk management, for ensuting qualiry ",ntrol 
in a facility'S operations, and for maintaining a uniform identity among its 
many international operations. Because effective EH&S management is 
multifaceted and bound up with ",rporate culture as much as hardware and 
management systems, the MNC is likely to resist relinquishing any significant 
loss of influence over investment decisions and over the day-to-day operations 
of the faciliry. Funhermore, when the joint venture agreement does allow 
for a gradual transition to local responsibiliry after a specified period of time, 
as in the Oxychem and Xerox agreements, the MNC is likely to adopt a 
",nservative posture toward tenomating its EH&S responsibilities, especiaUy 
in high hazard industries. A joint venture agreement that assigns the EH&S 
management to the MNC will assure this. 
For a host country partner, however, long-term EH&S management is 
likely to be a se«>ndary concern. Government pressures on local "'rporations 
are usually limited because regulations are uneven and lor enforcement 
mechanisms are informal and often inadequate (White and Emani 1990). 
The partner's ",ncern with damages to corporate and product image are 
likely to be minimal because developing ",untries generaUy are characterized 
by less product competition, disclosure, and media coverage of environmen-
tal mishaps; thus the prospect of e",nomic losses caused by tarnished ",r-
porate image is less substantiated. Business risk owing to product, personal, 
and environmental damages is weak in ",mparison to risks prevailing in the 
United States and, to a lesser degree, other industrial countries. In addition, 
host country partners are accustomed to supportive government and public 
attitudes toward new industrial enterprises and a willingness to ignore or 
underrepon EH&S infractions. FinaUy, a joint venture partner may be reluc-
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tant to give up control over an essential part of the management tasks only 
because the MNC claims to have superior knowledge of or experience with 
EHlI<:S policies. 
These divergent perspectives of the joint venture partners may result in 
conflicting preferences in allocating funds for EHlI<:S compared to alterna-
rive (more productive) uses and in conflicts over the control of operations 
that include EHlI<:S management. However, these conflicts may be less pro-
nounced than the abstract arguments imply. First, EH&S investments are 
nortnally smaU compared to overall investment costs. Giving some priority 
to the MNC in determining EHlI<:S investments and management practices 
does not compromise the joint venture parmers' overall share of responsibil· 
iries and equity rights. In pollution-intensive industries such as petroleum 
refining, chemicals, and leather manufacturing, such investments may repre-
sent up to a fifth of initial capital investments and perhaps 10 to 15 percent 
of operating costs. With internal and external capital resources typically 
constrained, the host country partner will view skeptically MNC demands 
to make cosdy EH&S investments that reduce short·tenn returns. In tech· 
nology-based industries, on the other hand, the initial EHlI<:S investments 
are substantially smaUer, typically amounting to well under 5 percent of total 
capital investment, and therefore unlikely to produce major contention 
among partners. 
Second, host country businesses are usually reluctant to block investments 
for improving ESlI<:S performance, as they would receive the blame if an 
accident occurred. Business partners in developing countries may be less 
vulnerable to international reputation, but may experience domestic prob-
lems if they are found to have prevented an MNC from installing additional 
safety devices. Finally, learning the hardware and management aspects of 
EHlI<:S is part of technology transfer, integral to the broader question of 
implanting slcills in problem solving over the long term. The host country 
partner may welcome the MNC's willingness to assume responsibility for 
day-to-day facility management, including the EHlI<:S aspects of the opera-
tions, as in the Oxychem facility in Thailand. In addition, as the Du Pont, 
Oxychem, and Xerox cases have shown, the cost of altering standardized 
EHlI<:S systems (equipment, software, training methods, manuals) to which 
the MNC is accustomed may itself result in longer-term costs that outweigh 
the more obvious, upfront savings in equipment purchases. For the host 
country partner, MNC insistence over control of EHlI<:S is therefore likely 
to emerge as a contentious negotiation point only where substantial capital 
investments accompany such control. 
Turning now to the Oxychem, Xerox, and Du Pont cases, we see that 
none of the three facilities represents major poilu ting industries and, not 
surprisingly, encountered only modest objections to retaining control of 
EHlI<:S in negotiating their joint venture agreements and to investing in 
post-start-up EHlI<:S improvements. 
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TIlE OUTCOMES 
EH&S aspects of joint venture agreements in two case studies, Oxychem 
and Xerox, may be interpreted in light of the motives, perspectives, and goals 
of the respective joint venture parmers. The analysis focuses on the negotia-
tion process and its outcome, as reflected in formal and infonnal joint venture 
agrttmcnts. As a counterpoint to these [wo cases, the Du Pont case provides 
a pomait of a company in which the business arrangement itsclf-a wholly 
owned subsidiary-refleers the corporate philosophy of maximizing owner-
ship and management control, including especially EH&S standards and 
practices. 
Du Pont-Thailand 
Du Pont's preference in developing overseas affiliates, from most to least 
preferred are: 
• wholly owned operations, 
• contract manufaauring. majority-owned joint ventures (51-80 percent Du Pont). 
• equal ownership (50-50), 
• minority joint venrures, and 
• licensing arrangements. 
Where invesanenrs of relatively high global strategic locational or marketing 
value are at stake, a preference for wholly owned operations is partirularly 
strong, allowing Du Pont to retain absolute control over all aspeers of the 
venture: marketing, fiscal, product quality, and EH&S. This preference is 
matched by reality: Eighty-five percent of all overseas facilities operated by 
the Agrochemicals Division are wholly owned by Du Pont. 
Du Pont's reluctance to enter into joint ventures is both reinforced by, and 
allows realization of, its corporate EH&S philosophy of faithful replication 
in all worldwide subsidiaries of its time-tested formula for achieving high 
EH&S performance. Furthermore, achievement of the company's EH&S 
standards in the production and application of agrochemicals is closely 
coupled with a high degree of control over the product life cycle. Given the 
nature of the product, hazardous exposures may occur in the workplace, in 
transporting materials, during application by farmers, and at the time of 
disposal of residuals (materials and packaging), as well as in the postappli-
cation period through contamination of surface and ground water. While 
the company regards the latter as outside its realm of responsibility, the re-
maining points of exposure represent multiple opportunities to harm human 
health and the environment, especially with regard to the large numbers of 
farmers. Effecting Du Pont's EH&S standards and stewardship objectives 
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under these circumstances is feasible only if the company is directly involved 
in managing all phases of the product life cycle, from development and pro-
duction through transpon and distribution. The wholly owned subsidiary, 
though neither a precondition for nor guarantee of achieving this level of 
EH&S standards, is the business mode most conducive to such goals. In ad-
dition, it is DuPont's stated policy to rtplicatt the design of its local facilitits 
and its own management style for any foreign subsidiary. This goal can only 
be fully accomplished if the company has full control over the design and 
operation of the facility. 
In short, at Du Pont, overseas partnerships are viewed principally as a 
vehicle for overcoming country-sptcific constraints that it cannot overcome 
internally. Howevtr, since the corporation is rich in capital, technology, 
and marketing and managemtnt exptnise, such constraints are confined to 
those impostd by host countrits in such areas as maximum equity participa-
tion limits and minimum use of indigenous materials and suppliers. Outside 
of these legall regulatory inducements, what little willingness Du Pont has 
demonstrated in fotrning joint ventures has been prompted by specialized, 
compelling, and relatively infrequent circumstances - for example, a need 
to market a ntw, high margin produa in a new country. None of these was 
present in Thailand, a wholly owned and carefully replicated subsidiary. 
Thai Occidental Chemical 
The somewhat complex ownership history of Oxychem's Thai venture 
challenged the company along several dimensions relevant to EH&S. By in-
heriting the facility from a U.S. firm that placed less emphasis on EH&S, 
the company needed to reshape both management and hardware systems to 
achieve compatibility with its corporate modus operandi. This would have 
to occur with the partner's consent, with little turnover in the labor force, 
and in the face of fotrnidable barriers created by distance from the parent's 
EH&S operations center in the United States. 
We desaibed earlier how a number of the motives of home and host country 
partners for entering into joint ventures were notably absent in this case, 
while others were readily identifiable. Not relevant were the motives of gov-
ernment mandates, the need for financial risk spreading, and the requirement 
of building indigenous technological capabilities. Since Thailand's Board of 
Investment acts on the principle of incentives (duty-free materials imports, 
tax txemptions, and employment of foreign nationals- see Chapters 3 and 
5) to induce joint venture partnerships, government mandates clearly were 
not a detetrninant of Oxychem's decision to retain the arrangement it inherited 
from the previous owner. Neither did risk management associated with polit· 
ical and legal uncertainties playa significant role since MNCs-inciuding 
Occidental Chemical-h.ve long viewed Thailand's laissez-faire policies.s 
a stable and predictable setting for overseas operations. Furthetrnore, Oxy-
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chern enjoyed virtual monopoly control over the market for its chromium 
products. T ethnology transfer also does not appear as a motivating force in 
the Oxychem agreement. Neither the partner nor the Thai government itself 
demonstrated any inclination to make technology transfer a major issue, 
though Oxychem's use of Thai nationals to both design and manage the 
facility suggests that local capabilities were upgraded even in the absence of 
a formal agreement to do so. 
Among those motives that appear to have been most compelling in Oxy-
chern's decision to form a partnership was the partner's intimate knowledge 
of the Thai business climate and practices. In addition, both parties were 
willing to retain the original joint venture agreement, including, though not 
decisively, its EH&S provisions. This was true even with the early recogni-
tion that certain improvements-installation of a scrubber, diking, and safety 
gates-may require the Thai partner (according to provisions of the joint 
venture agreement) to contribute capital if existing resources were not suffi-
cient to covcr such improvements. In the same vein, and perhaps most signi-
ficant, was Oxychem's recognition that continuation of the Thai group's 
role in developing domestic markets and in providing liaison to the Thai 
government was an irreplaceable asset essential to the continued vitality of 
the venture. This was an especially ctitical asset in the highly personalized 
environment that charaacrizes Thai business operations. 
For Occidental Chemical, the decision to continue with the existing partner 
was both a convenience and a complication. By so doing, the personnel at 
the facility were largely retained, licenses from the industrial esrate remained 
identical, Board of Investment benefits were preserved, and production could 
continue without major interruption. The challenge, however, was to adjust 
operations at the site such that Oxychem's EH&S practices and standards 
were effectively transferred to the facility to improve upon the relatively re-
laxed standards applied by the former owner. To do this would require, at 
minimum, the support of the venture partner for elevating EH&S conscious-
ness among managers and workers, as well as agreement to spend approxi-
mately 15 percent of the purchase price in upgrading EH&S systems. Fur-
thermore, since the retention of the EH&S responsibilities at the plant by 
the MNC was a non-negotiable condition, the management arrangements 
would have to be struCtured accordingly. 
Oxychem's general enthusiastn for overseas joint ventures provided a 
powerful incentive to make the deal with the Thai group work, though the 
company was prepared to withdraw from bargaining in the event a satisfactoty 
arrangement could not be reached. The recollections of the company execu-
tives and managers from that transition period speak to the careful attempts 
to probe the Thai partner and the plant managers for their wiI1ingness to 
accept Oxychem's leadership in the EH&S matters and to adopt the com-
pany's safety philosophy. Visits by the vice president of Occidental Petroleum 
(Oxychem's parent company in the United States) for EH&S, and by the 
BUSINESS ARJlANGEME.NTS 191 
Oxychem's environmental and occupational health and safety specialists 
focused on personal interactions with key individuals as weU as on technical 
and economic assessment of facility needs. As a result of these visits, short-
and long-term plans were produced for upgrading the facility and for educa-
tion and training of its work force. In addition, the U.S. management was 
sufficiently assured of the partner's and manager's willingness to cooperate 
to continue the relationship. 
The operative Oxychem-Thai Group joint venture agreement, a replica 
of an earlier Diamond Shamrock-Thai Group Agreement, is a succinct 
four-page document that does not fuUy reflect the nuances of the negotiations 
that preceded it. It contains the major headings typical of joint venture agree-
ments, but notably little detail or guidance after these major topics appear. 
After brief statements concerning the organization, capitalization, transfer 
of shares, board of directors, debt financing, and project description, a single 
paragraph is devoted to "Environment, Health, and Safety Standards." This 
comprises of two principal conditions: 
t. the facility will be brought up to standards of the U.S. parmer as weU as appli. 
cable Thai laws regulations; and 
2. in the event internal funds arc inadequate to cover such improvements , the pan· 
ners will add to the venture's working capital in proportion to their shares 
(Thai Occidental 1990). 
No explicit mention of EH&S management responsibilities appears, though 
the first item may be interpreted as assigning them to Oxychem. Clearly, the 
informal understanding between the parmees relative to management of 
EH&S at the Thai Oxychem facility is an important component of the ar-
rangement. Its main strength is a high degree of adaptability to changing cir-
cumstances at either corporation or in the host country's business environment. 
Funhermore, given the Thai parmer's minor interest in becoming involved 
in day-to-day management issues, including EH&S maners, this arrangement 
gives the MNC significant latitude in implementing its management and 
EH&S philosophy. 
On the other side of the ledger, the arrangement leaves many issues open 
to interpretation and therefore commits the multinational to long·term in· 
volvement in the daily maners of EH&S management. In the Thai Occidental 
case that involvement includes active oversight by the parent corporation 
over the facility, including environmental and safety assessments, and visits 
by the professional and corporate representatives of the parent corporation. 
The negotiated plan to transfer the key management responsibilities at the 
enterprise to a representative of the Thai group after the initial years of joint 
management (the implementation of which was under way at the time of 
this study) will undoubtedly further test the merits of the flocibility and in-
formality of the joint venture arrangement. 
- - -------------------
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Modi Xerox 
In contrast to the Oxychem agreement in which the Thai government was 
a peripheral player, the Mcxli Xerox agreement must be viewed against a 
backdrop of government approvals of virtually every key decision affecting 
ownership, financing, export allowances, location, and technology transfer. 
Partnership negotiations, which followed the original Memorandum of 
Understanding between Xerox and Indian Reproductive Systems (which 
represeoted the Modi organization) were characterized by multiple iterations 
amid governmental rigidity on virtually all key issues. The initial 40 percent 
ownership cap allowable under Indian law set the stage for the Indian partner 
to negotiate substantial management and operational authority from the 
outset of the venrnre. Though the original division of "technical" responsi-
bilities (engineering, design, construction, installation, product quality) and 
"business" responsibilities between Rank Xerox and its partner, respectively, 
was adjusted early in the life of the venture, the host country partner was 
assured of substantial negotiating leverage by virtue of its ownership share. 
This, of course, was precisely the intent of mandatory Indian equity position, 
to ensure that direct foreign invesunent serveS the broader gove,rnmental 
goal of nurruring domestic managerial and technological know-how. 
From Rank Xerox's perspective, strengthening its foothold in the potentially 
enormous (and substantially untapped) Indian market for photocopying 
equipment represented a powerful incentive to accept a series of government 
requirements: a limit on equity position; a ceiling on the production scale 
for the domestic market; a substantial allocation of production for exports; 
and a gradual indigenization of production materials (see Chapter 4 for 
more details). Operating under the burden of these requirements did not dis-
suade Rank Xerox from pursuing the joint venrnre. Indeed, their potential 
impact on profit margins and market share was cushioned by links with an 
Indian organization that could ensure financial stability, a countrywide 
marketing presence, a long-term vision of the investment compatible with 
Rank Xerox's, and a shield against risks associated with a politically volatile 
environment. 
Negotiations between the partners devoted little attention to EH&:S mat-
ters specifically. The reason may be that, because Rank Xerox was supplying 
virtually aU the technical know-how to the venrnre, it would have been 
illogical and inefficient to separate the questions of the process, product, 
and environmental technologies in discussions over the proposed facility. 
Although f.H&:S concerns are not explicidy mentioned in the 1983 Technical 
Agreement (Rank Xerox-Modi Xerox 1983), "know-how" is broadly con-
strued to encompass "secret formulae, processes, technical data, drawings, 
designs, recipes, product specifications, technical information including in-
formation for teSting and controlling the quality of Xerographic Machines 
and all other technical information whether patentable or not . . •• 
Further provisions covering the Transfer of Technical Know-How (Article 
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IV) require Rank Xerox to "provide and impan outside India to Modi Xerox 
the Rank Xerox Technical Know-How for the design engineering, erection, 
commissioning, operation and maintenance of the Plant and process equip-
ment for manufacture of the licensed product .. . " and that such know-how 
shall include: "(a) basic design and engineering including drawing for the 
Plant; (b) plant lay-out; and (c) specifications of machinery, equipment in-
cluding those pertaining to construction and fabrication, erection, commis-
sioning, operation and maintenance of the Plant and process equipment." 
Although these provisions may be interpreted as effeetively, if not formally, 
assigning the EH&:S responsibilities to Rank Xerox, they did not preclude 
the possibiliry of disagreements (which, in fact, later materialized) as to the 
boundary between technologies integral to the production process and those 
EH&:S investments that are desirable, but not essential to, the production 
process. Neither did they set the philosophical or organizational foundations 
for addressing and resolving any disagreements that might arise in the furore. 
Thus, similar to the Thai Occidental case, and in spite of the vast differences 
in the circumstances of the two cases, many details of choosing and imple-
menting EH&:S at the faciliry were left to furore interpretation by the joint 
venture parmers. 
Another reason for the lack of explicitness in addressing the EH&:S issues 
in the joint venrore agreement may have been the perception by the panners 
that the extensive regulatory requirements already operative in India on the 
state and federal levels would suffice in assuring an environmentally sound 
and safe faciliry and would not leave much freedom in choosing the appro-
priate response. Such perception would only partially reflect the realiry. It is 
true that many regulations exist in India. Some regulations and standards 
affecting both workplace and environmental conditions had been in place 
since the Factories Act of 1948, many more were enacted in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s, giving the central government a poliey- and standard-
setting function, and the state authorities a broad mandate to regulate the 
domestic and foreign industrial enterprises (White and Emani 1990). In 
reality, however, deficient enforcement practices (inspection, monitoring, 
repon review) on the pan of state officials give most enterprises high flexi-
bility and signify an active, self-policing role for any new enterprise, including 
Modi Xerox. 
All negotiations, agreements, and licenses were consummated months 
before the Bhopal disaster of December 1984. While it is impossible to artic-
ulate preeisely how this timing affected the prominence and ultimate resolu-
tion of EH&S management responsibilities in negotiations, it is reasonable 
to speculate that Bhopal had the effect of reinforcing the arrangements ulti-
mately agreed upon. Though the Rampur facility is a comparatively low 
hazard facility, the post-Bhopal environment is one of increased corporate 
accountability, disclosure, and heightened awareness of fmaneial risks asso-
ciated with workplace and community hazards. 
During construction and since begirming operations in 1986, the tacit 
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assumption underlying the joint EH&S-related decisions has been to rely on 
the MNCs expertise and vast experience in that area, and to assign it a lead-
ing role. Indeed, the Xerox managers and executives who offered their per-
spectives on this issue in the course of the study viewed the MNCs leadership 
as a precondition for a successful long-term parmership, although all stressed 
the importance of melding Xerox and Modi styles into a Modi Xerox hybrid. 
That melding process faced occasional differences in the safety philosophy 
and practices. During construction, for example, the partners differed on 
the need for instanation of an advanced fire protection system, with Xerox 
arguing for a company-<lerived, performance-based system, while the parmer 
favored a lower external standard imposed by the insurer. The incremental 
capital costs at stake were not enormous, and the Rank Xerox position pre~ 
vailed after it demonstrated that additional fire protection was in the best 
long-term economic interest of the facility. However, the episode was an 
early example of different EH&S philosophies, one driven by meeting the 
minimum external standards, and the second driven by a corporation's inter-
nal safety standard. 
The additional stress on this hybrid comes from the modifications in the 
standard facility blueprints, introduced by Xerox in response to governmental 
requirement for a full production line within one facility. This requirement 
shifted the balance in the mix of engineered pollution controls, personal 
safety devices, and behavior modification of workers away from automation 
(see Chapters 4 and 5). Under these circumstances, workers' training, the 
parent company's continuous oversight, and the adoption by the local man-
agement of the MNC philosophy, preferably augmented by explicit terms of 
joint venture agreement, take on an additional significance. Though man-
agement in India claims that a singular culture bound by a shared vision has 
evolved in the Rampur facility, the character and performance of that hybrid 
over the long-term remains an open question. 
BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS AND EH&S: 
EMERGING THEMES 
Effects of Ownership and MNC Management Style on EH&S 
The Du Pont case may be juxtaposed with the Oxychem and Xerox cases 
to illustrate the contrast between maximum corporate control over EH&S 
matters, and a solution that requires the MNC to adapt to the constraints 
introduced by teaming with a venture partner. Whole ownership in general, 
while by no means assuring high EH&S perIormance, gives corporations 
freedom to implement their EH&S system of choice. Such freedom would 
be particularly valued by corporations like Du Pont, with highly developed 
corporate culture and EH&S know-how. For those, maximum standardiza-
tion and replication of both human and hardware aspects of EH&S system 
from the home country would be the most likely approach. 
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Du Pont's practice of replication is a key example of a specific style of 
operating facilities in developing counnies. This style is characterized by 
standardization and centralization. Although this style is more conducive to 
wholly owned enterprises, it can also be extended to joint ventures if the 
joint venture parmer perceives replication as an advantage for pursuing its 
own interests. In this standardization·centralization management style, the 
venture enjoys the benefits of know-how and confidence based on facility 
performance elsewhere. Adaptation to local culture is minimal under the 
assumption that host country workers and managers with sufficient training 
can bring to the workplace essentially similar behaviors as parent country 
workers and managers. This centralized approach, however, has its risks. 
Because its success depends largely on decisions and solutions originating 
remotely from the facility, changes in parent country ownership through 
merger or acquisition, and/or commitment to EH&S owing to financial or 
other forces, may leave the affiliate without the internal resources and expe-
rience to continue EH&S programs at high performance. Such risks occur 
especially when strong EH&S performance is largely contingent upon the 
parent's continuous oversight rather than on the adoption by the affiliate of 
the fundamental philosophy underlying the acquired EH&S behaviors. The 
Du Pont case underlines the importance of this point as the company has in-
vested considerable time and dfon to implant corporate EH&S values at 
the facility and to internalize its safety culture within its work force. Inter-
nalization of standardized EH&S practices reduces the vulnerability of for-
eign subsidiaries in the absence of direct control from the corporation's 
headquarters. 
At the other end of the corporate spectrum, flexibility and adaptation to 
country- and site-specific conditions would predominate among MNCs with 
less commitment to creating a homogeneous worldwide corporate culture, as 
typified by Occidental Chemical. This flexible-adaptive style has its strengths 
and weaknesses. On the positive side, dependence on the parent is diminished 
in comparison to the more centralized arrangement, and the company assigns 
more confidence in the indigenous capability to troubleshoot and find more 
locally compatible solutions for environmental and safety problems. These 
mechanisms would be effective even in the absence of parental oversight. 
Assignment of EH&S responsibilities is likely to invest local managers and 
workers in problem solving and, in effect, nurtures indigenous capacity and 
self-reliance characteristic of the Thai Occidental facility. The limitations 
derive from uncertainties - uncovered but not fully resolved by the three 
cases studies - as to how quickly and how effectively parent company prac-
tices can be transplanted to developing country affiliates and how effective 
local practices are in a modern technological environment that ofron is alien 
to the traditional cultural means of protecting workers and public health. 
Workplace practices reflect a wide range of cultural forces that shape work-
ers' and managers' attitudes toward EH&S, and transplanting parent country 
practices does not take place in isolation from these larger social conditions. 
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Thus, the decentralized approach brings with it certain tensions between 
promoting indigenous EH&S management capabilities and the achievement 
and maintenance of parent country performance standards. 
Regardless of the MNC preferences on the continuum bound by the cen-
tralized and decentralized management styles, joint ownership introduces a 
significant additional reduction in the corporate degrees of freedom. These 
additional constraints may lower the system's buffering capacity such that 
small changes in the EH&S system may have greater effects on the EH&S 
performance than in wholly owned enterprises. For example, teliance on in-
dividual protective devices instead of automated emission controls in the 
Rampur facility may increase future risks upon consolidation of management 
responsibilities in the hands of the host country partner unless the partner's 
commitment to Xerox EH&S principles proves equal to that of the parent 
corporation. 
Under these cirwmstances, various EH&S management choices-investing 
in safety and pollution control ttchnology versus less automated systems; 
aggressive behavior modification of workers to make them indistinguishable 
from those in the parent country; developing a strong culture at the facility 
versus relying on the parent's oversight-take on additional significance. 
Some of these decisions reside well upstream in the negotiation process when 
the joint venture chooses among alternative technologies and hardware sys-
tems. Others appear further downstream after a facility is operating, and 
EH &S perfortnance is more closely linked to management and worker dili-
gence in following procedures, to the allocation of resources for training and 
retraining staff, and to ensuring maintenance and repair functions receive 
adequate management attention and reSOurceS. AU are heAvily influenced by 
attitudes of the joint venture partner, and aU affect the long-tertn EH&S 
perfortnance. 
Tertns of Joint Venture Agreement 
The issue of division of EH&S responsibility at the facility, inseparable 
from that of authority over its daily management, can be viewed as closely 
linked to the issue of distribution of equity shares among partners, although 
Killing (1983) and Robinson (1988) have argued that no automatic link be-
tween ownership and control should be assumed. Allocating control of various 
facets of an overseas joint venture (including EH&S) can be, according to 
these authors, negotiated as part of the joint venture agreement, independent 
of the equity shares among partners. Each can be viewed on a continuum 
ranging, in the case of management control, from one dominated by either 
partner to that shared or divided according to the specific provisions of the 
ioh"lt venture, its articles of incorporation, or some other legal instrument 
used to allocate rights and responsibilities. Any such arrangement, in tum, 
may occur irrespective of wherher equity is split equaUy or unequally in any 
propottion among partners. 
BUSINESS ARAANGEMENTS 197 
One of the differences between joint ventures negotiated today and those 
of early years is that shon- and long-t<rm EH&S implications are increasingly 
penetrating corporate thinking and color the relationship between joint ven-
ture paoners at all Stages of facility life. The Xerox and Oxychem case studies 
indicate that the EH&S matters were indeed on the corporate agendas from 
the earliest stages of their interactions with the respective partners. The cor-
porate objectives were also clearly delineated: to implement their respective 
EH&S standards, to take the leadership and primaty responsibility for 
EH&S throughout the facility'S life, and to maintain major influence over 
its daily management. Given such clarity in agenda, it may be surprising 
that the actual language of the two joint venture agreements is quite general 
regarding EH&S matters, and in the Modi Xerox case essentially implicit, 
leaving much to the informal arrangements among the partners. 
The lack of specificity chaf3cteristic of the investigated Oxychem and 
Xerox cases need not be perceived as a weakness in the process, although it 
c<nainly makes EH&S performance vulnerable to counter-supponive pres-
sure. Informality allows for flexibility and adaptability to changing circum-
stances. Some are internal to the host country enterprise, such as transition 
in management responsibility toward the host country partner. Some are 
external to the enterprise, such as a merger or acquisition of the parent com-
pany. Even the most experienced MNC has imperfect capability ro predict 
future EH&S choices while negotiating the terms of the parmership. Most 
importantly, such flexible arrangements recognize, if only by implication, 
the necessity for the foreign affiliate to become an entity wherein managers 
and workers are equipped and willing to address issues that may arise over a 
facility's life and to maintain EH&S performance that is consistent with the 
EH&S values of a socially responsible parent corporation. 
Self-sustainable EH&S Systems 
The need to create a sustainable EH&S system applies to all MNC foreign 
subsidiaries, those under extensive control by the parent as weU as those en-
joying greater autonomy, those wholly owned as well as those partly owned 
by MNC. The concept of sustainable EH&S systems refers to a management 
system that assures effective and consistent EH&S performance over time. 
A system is effective if it accomplishes the desired safety and environmental 
health objectives with the least monetary and motivational costs; it is consis-
tent if it has institutional means at hand to sustain this performance standard 
even in the presence of changes in hardware, operations, and management 
style. From the previous discussion we can assume that the more decentralized, 
jointly owned enterprises are more capable of implementing an efficient 
strategy to implement EH&S standards than centralized enterprises. How-
evert the decentralized system is usually more prone to mishaps and pitfalls 
over time, particularly if a sufficient and technology-compatible safety culture 
is missing. The curt.nt global movement among multinationals toward de-
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~tralization, and by developing countries toward greater participation in 
technology imponed by MNCs, adds specific weight to the consistency aspect 
of sustainability. However, both styles-the standardized-centralized and 
the decentralized-flexible approach-do not automatically guarantee more 
or less sustainability. Each style has to develop its own policies and strucrures 
to ensure effective and consistent EH&S performance. 
How can that be accomplished? Vast corporate experience has accumu-
lated over the paS! two decades on EH&S management at distant affiliates 
in developing countries. Although the scope of this book does not include 
exploration and critical evaluation of that body of experience, one of the 
major themes emerging &om the three case studies is that EH&S performance 
probably depends as much on successful transplantation and internalization 
of corporate rulture to the subsidiary as on the allocation of management 
responsibilities, pollution-control and safety-hardware oversight by the par-
ent corporation and on host country regulations and enforcement. 
In addition, corporate culture can effectively compensate for the vulnera-
bilities in other aspects of an EH&S system that are attributable to business 
arrangements. Its imponance therefore grows in proportion to the extent of 
such vulnerabilities. For example, a distant parent's difficulty in enforcing 
individual safety behaviors at the facility, differences in commitment to 
EH&S among the panners, acquisition of the parent or panner companies, 
or risks potentially associated with transition of management from the 
MNC to host country panner can be significandy offset by local management 
and workers who share the parent corporation's values, beliefs, and norms. 
No formal agreement, no matter how finely strucrured, offers a viable sub-
stitute for this unity of mission and vision. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Synthesis: Value Conflicts 
and Implications for International 
Technology Transfer 
The facility-siting process is dynamic and interactive. The host countty's in-
stitutions, the multinational corporation, and the joint venture panner are 
its principal participants. Each enters the process with a set of objectives 
and expectations tha t it is empowered to pursue by means of a variety of 
policy tools. 
The objectives of the key actors are deeply rooted in their values. Chapter 
2 identified rwo clusters of values most likely to explain the behavior of the 
principal participants in the course of facility-siting: environment, health 
and safety values, development, equity, and independence values. The first 
group includes values related to human well-being as well as those related 
to prctection of nat"ral resources. DE&1 values include those related to 
economic growth, such as national prosperity, corporate profitability, stan-
dard of living, or productive capacity, as well as those related to national. 
political, and social goals. such as equitable sharing of the fruits of growth. 
social justice, self-determination. and international reputation. Collectively. 
the values. objectives. and expectations of the key actors guide their interac-
tions and ultimately shape facility design and performance in relation to en-
vironment. health, and safety. 
The explanation of the siting process and facility characteristics observed 
in the case srudies began in Chapter 4 with identifying three factors that 
constrain the range of options available to the key actors that indirectly in-
fluence EH&S outcomes: corporate safety culture, host countty development 
policies, and business arrangements at foreign affiliates. Each factor was ex-
plored in depth. The theme of Chapter 5 was that the pursuit of development 
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objectives by host countties via policies toward multinational corporations 
may indirectly affect environmental, occupational, and safety performance 
of facilities. The analysis in Chapter 6 focused on the key role of corporate 
mlture in facility negotiations and performance. Chapter 7 focused on the 
effects of two elements of the business arrangements-.he nature of facility 
ownership and the management arrangement between joint venture pan-
ners-on EH&S outcomes. 
The purpose of this final chapter is to consolidate .he key findings of the 
study, distinguishing between those that appear specific to the three cases 
and those that may be generalizable. The analysis concentrates on the entry 
of EH&S considerations into the facility development process, the roles 
played by the key actors in shaping the environmental and occupational 
aspects of MNC facilities in developing countries, and the nature of interac-
tions among the two groups of values, including both conflicts and trade-ofis. 
CONCEPTIJAL MODELING OF FACILITY SITING PROCESS 
Facility-siting may be conceptualized as a sequence of events that starts 
with a contact between the corporation and the government of the host 
country and ends with an operational facility. In Chapter 2, four stages of 
that process were identified: negotiations, construction, start-up, and sus-
tained operations. The key types of decisions and events within each stage 
also were discussed. 
This study has focused primarily on the first two Stages of facility transfer. 
The analysis of the subsequent two stages has been conducted only to the 
extent necessary to (1) understand the effects of the first two stages on the 
management and performance of EH&S in the three facilities, and (2) to 
understand the policies of the three corporations relative to EH&S manage-
ment at their foreign affiliates. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation criteria 
were used to analyze the stages of the facility's life cycle. The qualitative cri-
teria included an inquiry into the corporate policies on foreign affiliates, 
evaluarion of management systems for implementing EH&S at the foreign 
affiliates, and specific manifestations of commitment to EH&S goals. These 
were supplemented with quantitarive performance indicators such as stan-
dardized incidence rates, compliance with corporate standards (for Xerox), 
and, for Oxychem, environmental assessment $Corts. Funhermorc, since it 
was not the purpose of the study to compare the performance of the three 
facilities with each other or to draw inferences about performance of multi-
national corporations in general, the analysis of data was limited largely to 
comparisons of facilities within each corporation. We examined to the extent 
possible whether the EH&S management practices at the overseas affiliate 
approximates that of a similar facility in the United States; what the nature 
and extent of any differences are; whether any differences from the parent 
country's facility are likely to increase or dcaease EH&S risks; how the 
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U.S.-based facilities of the company compare in perfonnance with its foreign-
based facilities; and how the choice of engineered controls, management 
systems, uaining, and personal protective devices evolved. As shown later 
in this chapter, the analysis of the third and fourth stages of the life of each 
facility was not only crucial for achieving the objectives of this chapter, but 
also introduced important dimensions to the concepts of functional equiva-
lency and corporate environmentalism. 
The chronological model introduced in Chapter 2 is primarily operational: 
It identifies the decisions and events typical of the various stages of facility 
development without characterizing the contributions made to these decisions 
and events by the principal participants or to the EH&S outcomes at the 
facility level. Now, however, the case srudies conducted in the preceding 
three chapters can be used to illuminate (1 ) the key forces at work at each 
stage, and (2) their entry into the process. These arc summarized in the inputl 
output model shown in Figure 8.1. 
Input and output arc descriptive tenns denoting the caregories of variables 
that shape the interactions among participants at each stage of facility devel-
opment and contribute to the facility-level outcomes. Two types of inputs 
can be distinguished: those that characterize the principal participants-
their values, policies, and practices-and termed key variabLes, and those 
that represent the decisions made during a particular stage and that affect 
the events of the following stage, termed intervening variables. Collectively, 
both types of inputs repetsent the constraints on, as well as opponunities 
for, each key actor at each stage of the process. 
Although the input / output model contains greater explanatoty power 
than the operational model introduced earlier, it nevenbeless remains highly 
simplified and linear, reducing the complex interactions and feedback loops 
to a unidirectional flow . Moreover, to maintain consistency with the focus 
of this srudy. only those inputs that are related to EH&S outcomes arc in-
cluded. Nonetheless, the model serves as a helpful tool in synthesizing the 
major findings of the .rudy into a generalized framework applicable to other 
corporations and host countries. 
THE KEY FINDINGS 
The Corporations 
Multinational corporations as initiators of EH6-S dialogue and negotiation. 
Throughout the facility-siting process, the three corporations displayed 
leadership in most matters related to EH&S. They entered the process with 
well-articulated policies, explicit occupational standards, and time-tested 
procedures for achieving high levels of EH&S perfonnance in the overseas 
affiliates, ohen implemented in advance of, or in place of, the host country's 
practices. For example, the corporations chose to rely on their own occupa-
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tional standards rather than those of the host countries, and for products 
with significant downstream hazards (pesticides and leather-tanning agents) 
took an active interest in managing those hazards. [n the absence of adequate 
local regulations covering hazardous waste disposal, the corporations also 
assumed primary responsibility in that area: both companies with facilities 
in Thailand chose on-site treatment of hazardous waste instead of an off-site 
landHiI. 
The two companies engaged in jointly owned enterprises also put signifi-
cant emphasis on maintaining control over the management of EH&S in 
their respective facilities_ The nonnegotiable corporate goal in each case was 
to create the conditions favorable for implementing the corporate formula 
for achieving safe and environmentally sound conditions at the forthcoming 
foreign affiliate: a special mix of technology, training, management, and en· 
forcement. In the Occidental Chemical case, such conditions were partly 
accomplished through a written agreement that specified the Oxychem stan-
dards be adopted at the facility . In the Xerox case, the joint venture agree-
ment was less explicit, relying instead on informal agreements outside the 
agreement. Equally important in each case was the achievement of under-
standing between the partners of shared safery and environmental philosophy, 
cooperation, and the undisputed leadership by the multinational corporation 
in designing and implementing EH&S systems at each facility. 
The corporate leadership in the EH&S area is attributable to several fac-
tors. A commitment to establishing environmentally sound and safe facilities, 
regardless of locations and of local regulations, is clearly one. Such a commit-
ment would motivate a company to ensure control over the decisions that 
may affect future EH&S outcomes. Hence, the propensity to take charge. It 
is noteworthy, of course, that the three corporations represent one end of 
the corporate spectrum in terms of size and resources available for EH&S 
management and, therefore, are not representative of the industry as a whole. 
In addition, the ventures examined are recent, the oldest (Du Pont) dating to 
1982. The companies and their choice of case-study facilities undoubtedly 
shift the balance toward the more desirable EH&S outcomes. 
Another factor that explains the corporate initiative in the EH&S matters 
derives from their unchallenged leadership in the matters of technological 
design and quality control-their primary contribution to the host country-
namely, the fundamental link between product quality and EH&S perform-
ance. The corporate representatives interviewed for this study consistently 
perceived high product quality and high EH&S performance as coupled 
results of a well-managed enterprise. A faithful replication-in its design, 
management systtm, and training practices-of an existing facility in a parent 
country, typically is the most cosHffective method of assuring that the locally 
manufactured product is identical to that manufactured in the parent country. 
The Occidental and Modi Xerox cases iIIustrase this perspective. Many 
process and material changes in the Thai Occidental facility simultaneously 
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increased cost effectiveness, improved safety, and improved quality of the 
product, a major reason for the business failure of the previous owner. In 
the India case, the corporation introduced numerous modifications in the 
facility's safety and process design in response to the host country's policies, 
including some that reduced the degree of automated safety, but carefully 
avoided any modifications that could affect the quality of the product. 
Corporate confidence in their technology and management capabilities 
also played a role in the corporate quest for EH&S leadership . For the three 
companies, EH&S expertise formed part of the technology package-a set 
of tested and proved skills, knowledge, and hardware-brought to the host 
country. Both host countries and joint venrure partners welcomed and en· 
couraged this transfer of EH&S know-how. 
Corporlltions Il.5 responsible pillyers. The srudy produced consistent evi-
dence of the companies' serious commiunent to sound environmental and 
occupational management. Some manifestations of that commitment already 
were mentioned, such as downstream hazard management, explicit artiru· 
lation of corporate policies, and control over EH&S management in joindy 
owned enterprises. The three corporations also apply uniform worldwide 
performance standards at the facilities for occupational accidents and expo-
sures and showed a consistent drop in accident rates over the past decade. 
Although limited, the database available on compliance with the corporate 
standards at the three facilities showed no significant depanures from com-
pany averages. A broader comparison of the safety performance between 
the U.S.-based facilities and the international facilities of each company, 
measured by standardized incidence rate, showed that the international 
facilities have over the years performed in each case as weU as, or better 
than, their domestic counterparts. Because of the uncenainty in practices of 
reponing incidents leading to lost work days, such findings warrant caution. 
One of the limitations of the data coUected through this srudy is the super· 
ficial evaluation of the actual performance of the three facilities. This is 
partly because of a primary focus on negotiations, construction, and, to a 
lesser atent, on start-up, and sustained operations. Moreover, at the time 
of this srudy the three facilities were still relatively new, thereby disaUowing 
the performance tracking over a 5· to lO-year period necessaty for more 
reliable performance measurement. Within these limitations, the srudy un· 
covered no evidence of major shortcomings in the facilities' performances. 
AU three appeared to comply with corporate standards, and aU have been 
subject to consistent oversight by the parent EH&S managers. 
While these findings are no doubt slanted by the self-selection of corpora· 
tions and facilities, they depart from the view that facilities of even leading 
corporations in developing countries are likely to under perform in relation 
to the parent country counterparts, owing to the lax regulatory climate of 
such countries (Ives 1985, Casdeman 1987, Flaherty and Rappaport 1991, 
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Rappapon and Flaheny 1991). Most challenges to that notion of "double 
standard" have traditionally come from the industry itself, primarily through 
emphasizing the imponance of reputation, liability costs, and moral responsi-
bility as the motivating factors (Winter 1988, Anderson and Leal 1991, 
Bergen Conference 1990) and have therefore been viewed with skepticism. 
Although independent repons to the contrary have been made as well (Royston 
1985), little supponing empirical data have been available until now. 
In the limited sample of firms we analyzed, the interviews with the mana-
gers and executives of the three corporations pointed to liability, global 
reputation, and moral responsibility as powerful inducements to responsible 
corporate conduct. In addition, the three case studies indicate that the effects 
of pursuing quality control and cosHffectiveness are equally imponant. 
The presence of direct economic and technological components among 
the factors favoring responsible corporate EH&S conduct is likely to be 
characteristic of a wide range of technologies and corporations, including 
those with lesser resources and corporate commitment of the EH&S values 
than the three participants here. 
Notwithstanding the apparent commitment to sound EH&S performance, 
the three corporations exhibited a surprisingly modest interest in retrospec-
tive and interregional evaluation of the actual performance of their many 
facilities, as discussed in Chapter 3 . Indeed, most of the comparative per-
formance analyses presented earlier in this book, both interfacility and time 
trends, were produced in response to specific requests that developed over 
the course of the research. It appears that the primary corporate use of the 
quantitative performance indicators is to set internal goals for each facility, 
to motivate local personnel to improve facility performance, and to spot sig-
nificant depanures from company averages. Other potential uses of the 
quantitative performance indicators - for example, as an analytical tool for 
testing the double standard hypothesis-does not appear to hold intrinsic 
interest for the firms. This finding is particularly significant considering that 
the three corporations represent the leading end of the corporate spcctnun 
in terms of size, resources, and commitment to EH&S. 
The corporate commitment to EH&S revealed in this study does not nec-
essarily equate with long-term guarantees of strong performance. EH&S 
performance is tightly coupled with the culture of the parent company and 
with the effective transplanting to the foreign subsidiary. Corporate culture 
is, however, a dynamic phenomenon, continuously in need of reinforcement 
and feedback, and highly sensitive to future internal and external changes in 
economic circumstances, corporate leadership, shifts in management arrange-
ments, relaxation of parent corporation's oversight, aod changes in the 
ownership arrangernenlS. Thus, the furure performance of the three facilities 
will only be answerable through monitoring over a period well beyond the 
time of this study. 
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The Process 
Environment. health. and safety considerations during negotiations. The 
case studies show that while the environmental and occupational matters 
were notably absent from negotiations between the corporations and the 
host countries, they were prominent dueing negotiations between the corpo-
rations and their respective joint venture partners. This is to be expeued 
since many issues commonly included in formal joint venture agreements-
division of management responsibilities, hiring authority, equity participa-
tion, liability-are integrally related to EH&S control. 
In the two cases, the joint venture agreements gave the MNCs principal 
authority for EH&S management and, at least during the initial years of the 
facilities operation, the major role in overall management. However, these 
EH&S arrangements were formalized only in the most general language in 
the written documents. The tasks of defining the implementation tools and 
principles, and of resolving any future disagreements, were left largely to 
the partners and to the managers of each facility, to be worked out informally 
over rime. 
It is not clear whether the informality in the EH&S arrangements between 
partners was intended by the MNCs or was simply an outcome of negotia-
tions that primarily focused on other matters. In any event, its major conse~ 
quence was that of assuring a commitment to corporate EH&S philosophy 
by the host country partner and a willingness to do whatever was necessaty 
to achieve that goal. The chronologies of the two joindy owned ventures in-
dicate early and systematic attempts by the MNC to secure such a commit-
ment. Occidental Chemical was even willing to forgo the business deal in 
the event it could not secure control of EH&S at the Bangpoo facility. In 
both cases, it appears that the joint venture partners were essentially receptive 
to the idea that safety is a good business investment or, as an Occidental 
Chemical executive phrased it, "pay now or pay later." 
Beyond these general agreements, however, several questions remain un-
answered, due in part to the design of the study and in part to our inability 
to gain access to the joint venture partners. These include the depth of the 
long-term commitment by the host country venture partner to investing in 
engineered safety infrastructure; the depth of the long-term commitment by 
the MNC to continuous reinforcement of its EH&S philosophy and, if nec-
essary, to overriding the partner in disagreements; the future effects of shifts 
in top management responsibility to the host country partner; and the long-
tenD effects of local conditions on the MNC's success in maintaining the 
safety culture at its foreign afmiate. In short, relationships between the joint 
venture partners in Stage 4-sustained operations-remains unchartered 
territoty. 
In contrast to the joint venture partners' negotiations, those between the 
corporations and the host countries largely consisted of economic, technical, 
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locational, and ownership-related aspects of the proposed facility. In each 
case, the host country, which greatly influenced the agenda, actively pursued 
its development objectives. India viewed the Modi Xerox application as an 
opportunity to pursue multiple economic, social, and technological objec-
tives. The remote location of the facility reflects the policy of regional devel-
opment; the full integration of the xerographic technology in Rampur reflects 
the country's pursuit of advanced foreign technologies; the ceiling on domestic 
production serves as a preventive measure against market domination by 
multinationals; and the ceiling on MNC equity participation is aimed at 
limiting the MNC's power and promoting domestic industrial development. 
The protracted and inflexible (from the MNCs perspective) negotiations 
were consistent with India's regulatory style, which is characterized by active 
and far-reaching government involvement through extensive use of direct 
controls. 
In Thailand, where economic growth receives decidedly more weight than 
in India, expedient and mostly indirect administrative procedures took the 
place of direct negotiations. Whereas the Board of Investment was clearly 
interested in the matters of location, equity participation, and the size and 
nature of technology, its mode of influencing the companies was indirect, 
via incentives, which prese:rves corporate choice in final decisions. 
In the three cases, the host countries' authorities most directly engaged in 
negotiations with the MNCs delegated EH&S matters to local authorities 
and, for the most part, to the later stages in the facility-siting process. Thus, 
in Thailand the major (though not exclusive) regulatory responsibility fell to 
the industrial estate, whereas in India it rested with the local and state 
authorities. 
In India, the minor role of EH&S considerations during negotiations may 
be traced to the system of environmental and locational regulations for 
manufacturing facilities. Environmental issues become significant to the 
central government when the potential impacts of the proposed facility are a 
dominant, rather than incidental, feature of a proposed facility and when 
such impacts are geographically sensitive. This is the case with highly pol-
luting, resource-intensive industries such as metal processing, paper manu-
faauring, mining, or energy generation. In those cases, environmental concerns 
tend to emerge early and prominently as part of negotiations over facility 
location. For less polluting industries, such as the Modi Xerox facility, the 
environmental impacts are viewed as a routine matter best handled by state 
authorities during the design, construction, and operational stages of the 
facility-siting process. That this was the case in the Rampur facility is evident 
from the industrial license issued by the Ministry of Industry after rwo years 
of negotiations; the license is conditioned upon compliance with all appli-
cable state environmental regulations. 
In the rwo Thai cases, the delegation of the EH&S matters largely to the 
industrial estate authorities is consistent with the country's administrative 
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structure, with the relatively minor projected environmental impacts of the 
two facilities, and with Thailand's laissez-faire posrure vis-~-vis multina-
tionals. However, the dominant developmental mission of the Industrial 
Estate Authority in Thailand, as compared with state poUution control 
boards in India, together with weak enforcement, creates the preconditions 
for minimal sustained government oversight. Our findings and prognoses 
are consistent with the results of a survey conducted by the United Nations 
among multinational investors in facilities in Thailand: inclusion of envi-
rorunental conditions in fotrnal documents was uncommon; the great majority 
of those interviewed admitted to meeting only the minimum EH&:S require-
ments of the host country; and a majority believe that a double standard 
was widely practiced by multinationals in Thailand (United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 1988 and 1990). 
Based on analysis of negotiations between host country and MNC inves-
tors in highly poUuting or resource-intensive technologies in Ireland, Mexico, 
Spain, and Rumania, Leonard (1985,1988) also notes the low visibility of 
EH&:S matters. When EH&:S negotiations did occur, it was on a case-by-
case basis rather that in response to formal host country or corporate policies 
and usuaUy in response to local public pressure or the initiative of a concerned 
local official. Among the factors identified by Leonard as contributing to 
the absence of EH&:S negotiations were: 
1. procedural factors-general bargaining that tends to proceed in stages, with each 
stage centering on a different level of government and different aspects of the 
enterprise. That increases the likelihood that the EH&S matten will faU between 
the aaw, espec:ial1y when the connection-often indirect-between the early 
decisions and their EH&::S implications arc not perceived at anyone stage by the 
parties involved. 
2. institutional factors-environmental policies often developed and implemented 
by local and regional authorities, whereas the licensing process and the accom-
panying negotiations are led by cenual authorities. Funhermorc, it is not uncom-
mOD for the central authorities to have few means of ensuring that the EH&S 
condition. they would like to impose on the MNC will in faa be endorsed and 
enforced by regional and local authorities. 
3. conceptual/historical facton-host country institution. that often suffer from 
lack of experience, poor a=ss to technical information, .hort planning horizons, 
narrowly defined missions, and lack of vision. 
Conditions contributing to low EH6cS profile during the negotiations in 
our case studies can be found in the list. Yet the similar practices of delegating 
most EH&:S responsibilities to local authorities demonstrated by two coun-
tries as different as India and Thailand suggest that relatively nonpoUuting 
industries are handled in similar fashion in other countries, regardless of the 
political and socioeconomic context. 
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Our cases also suggest that many procedural and institutional factors listed 
by Leonard, and operative in our cases, are linked to the dominant develop-
ment philosophy of the host country. Thailand, where the institutional mis-
sions, responsibilities, and procedures bearing on the EH&S directly reflect 
the country's overriding commitment to development value'S, serves as a 
particularly teUing example. 
Environment, health, and safety considerations during construction and 
downstream stages. This is the stage when the multinational, as the owner 
of the technology, is expected to assume a leading role, although that lead-
ership is constrained by three sets of factors: various host country constraints 
previously solidified through negotiations and exerted indirectly through 
the conditions of industrial license; the need to account for the joint venture 
partner's views; and the necessity to respond to the host country's environ· 
mental and occupational regulations. 
Relative to the negotiations, EH&S was a pervasive theme during the 
construction stage, although manifestations were highly case-specific. The 
three case studies show that the MNCs responded to the constraints created 
during the negotiations in a manner consistent with their respective safety 
philosophies and past experiences with foreign affiliates. Du Pont, having 
achieved the greatest flexibility of the three (owing to whole ownership and 
the limited role of the Thai government), proceeded to design a facility prac-
ticaUy identical to any Du Pont formulation/packaging plant anywhere in 
the world. Blueprints for facility design and construction were developed at 
the U.S. headquarters. This was to be another Du Pont facility that happened 
to be in Thailand, with only minor modifications to a standard design. At 
this stage, for example, the company instaUed a vacuum system for dust 
control in order to eliminate the need for face masks, a particularly cumber-
some device in the Thai climate. 
For Occidental and Xerox, the construction stage necessitated adaptation 
to constraints introduced by the joint venture partners, the host country, 
and, in the case of Occidental, the history of the facility itself. These included 
scaling down and redesigning the India facility; upgrading and significantly 
modifying the Thai facility; and, in both India and Thailand, introducing 
workers and management to the corporate safety philosophy and policies. 
Also during construction the host countries began implementing their respec-
tive environmental and safety regulations. True to its philosophy vis-~-vis 
multinationals, the Thai government showed only modest interest in the 
design of the safety and environmental features of the facilities. India, in 
contrast, exercised considerable oversight over the environmental design 
aspects, such as waste water and hazardous waste treatment technology. For 
the MNCs, the prominence of EH&S considerations during construction is 
most likely a general phenomenon for firms with strong commitments in 
that area, since design decisions are integral to long-term EH&S performance. 
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Our limited analysis of the downstream stages of the three facilities sug-
gests that EH&S played a significant role in the interactions of the key aaors 
during start-up and sustained operations, both in the highly regulated India 
and the more open Thai settings. This took the form of EH&S training, 
adaptations in process and management, inspeaions by host country offi-
ciaIs, and oversight by the parent corporation. From the corporate perspec-
tive, these activities are typical for hazardous technologies and likely to occur 
to some degree at all foreign aff~iates. 
In summary, the case studies suggest that the EH&S considerations enter 
the facility-siting process in a predictable manner, conceptualized in Figure 
8.1. For relatively nonpolluting technologies, their entry during the first 
two stages is initiated primarily by the MNC. In wholly owned ventures 
EH&S matters playa minor role during the host country I corporation nego-
tiations, followed by high visibility during construction. In joint ventures, 
the EH&S matters are prominent during the negotiations between the part-
ners, again primarily due to the MNC initiative. During the downstream 
stages, the EH&S matters are a recurrent theme in the interactions of all 
principal participants. 
Downstream EH &S consequences of upstream business decisions. The 
relatively minor role of EH&S during negotiations between the host country 
and the corporation does not imply that EH&S outcomes are unrelated to 
such negotiations. To the contrary. One of our major findings is that the 
decisions made jointly during the negntiations by a host country and a corpo-
ration, which appear remote from the safety matters, nevertheless had signif-
icant though delayed effeas on the EH&S outcomes. Moreover, these effeas 
created in some instances a strain between host country development and 
EH&S objectives, created inadvertently by the vigorous pursuit a develop-
ment agenda. 
The specific workings of the Thai industrial estates illustrate that phe-
nomenon. The estates successfully serve as magnets for foreign investors 
because of their superior infrastructures and relief from congestion in 
Bangkok. However, they also allow, or even induce, the concentration of 
large numbers of hazardous facilities in close proximity to each other and to 
the neighboring community. 
The multiple functions of the Industrial Estate Authoriry of Thailand, 
which manages the industrial estates-to help foreign corporations obtain 
necessary permits, to manage the infrastructure of the industrial estates, to 
coexist productively with the joint venture partner, to set and enforce envi-
ronmental standards, and to oversee the safety of the resident facilities-
illustrate even more strikingly the effects of the Thai pursuit of efficiency. 
They produce a weakened, conflia-averse agency with strong preference for 
negotiated rather than imposed solutions to any confliCts. This gives multi-
nationals substantial flexibility to implement the EH&S systems of their 
choice, good and bad, without measurable input from the authorities. 
Would the safety and environmental outcomes of negotiations be more 
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favorable if efficiency played a secondary role to government-initiated direct 
influence on the activities of multinational corporations? The India case 
shows that such a system may create a different set of trade-offs. In this case 
the combination of the antimonopoly and technology transfer policies of India 
imposed on the company two contradictory requirements: to "backward 
integrate" the technology, and to keep domestic production low. These re-
quirements led the corporation to choose a scaled down and highly integrated 
facility and, in pursuit of cost-effective solutions, to opt for a manual rather 
than an engineered safery system. Although the adjustment was clearly ade-
quate to meet the corporate occupational standard, it nevertheless put to test 
the corporate safety policy of using engineered safety systems as the primary 
method of controlling employee exposure to hazardous agents. 
To ensure maintenance of EH&S standards under these conditions will 
require of Modi Xerox a persistent and focused corporate commitment to 
safety on the part of both Rank-Xerox and Modi Xerox management. Its 
success wiu also depend on the effectiveness of transfer of corporate philos-
ophy to the joint venture partner and to a work force that wiu outlast the 
initial intense oversight by the parent company and serve as the principal 
players for addressing future EH&S problems. We observed the beginnings 
of such an effon at the case study corporations, but clearly continuation 
cannot be assumed. As analyses of the Bhopal accident have shown, accu-
mulation of unfavorable external economic, regulatory, iocarionaJ, and 
management conditions, in conjunction with inadequate corporate commit-
ment to safety, can lead to gradual deterioration of standards with potentially 
disastrous consequences (Bowonder, Kasperson, and Kasperson 1985, 
Gladwin 1987a, Shrivastava 1987, Weir 1987). 
Summary of variables. Based on the foregoing discussion, the leey vari-
ables introduced in the conceptual model in Figure 8.1 may now summarized. 
The case studies also suggest that these inputs may be generalized to other 
cases where conditions are comparable: a host country with a well-articulated 
development agenda and a multinational corporation with strong commit-
ment to environment, health, and safety. 
During the first stage, host country development policies are a key inde-
pendent variable. In addition, the company's policies relative to EH&S at 
international affiliates play an important role by shaping its attitudes toward 
joint ventures, and toward negotiating with venture partners. The outputs 
of the first stage, manifested in an industrial license and joint venture agree-
ment, represent de facto a comprehensive blueprint of the facility before the 
engineer's blueprints are produced. 
During the second stage, which is dominated by the technology owner, 
the MNC's policies on EH&S continue to playa major role. The host coun-
try's presence, secondary to that of the MNC, is manifested primarily through 
various EH&S permits. The perspective of the joint venture partner on 
EH&S matters may also affect the design of the facility, including its envi-
ronmental and occupational features. 
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During the third and fourth stages, corporate policies relative to their for-
eign affiliates, including training, enforcement, oversight, and reporting, 
clearly play an important role. Similarly, host country enforcement plays a 
significant part at both stages. In addition, the long-term EH&S performance 
at the MNC facilities will depend on the extent to which the corporate safety 
culture is transplanted to the foreign affiliate. This will be panly reflected in 
the training system implemented during the stan-up stage. Other elements 
of that culture are, however, less tangible, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
The management arrangements in jointly owned ventures are also impor-
tant in the last two stages, primarily in cases where parmers differ in their 
EH&S objectives and where the joint venture agreement provides for gradual 
transition of management from the shared arrangement to one dominated 
by the host country partner. The significance of this factor in maintaining 
safety at MNC facilities has been raised by several authors (Ashford and 
Ayers 1985, Gladwin and Walter 1976, United Nations Centre on Transna-
tional Corporations 1988, p. 233). Finally, a variety of external circum-
stances has affected the long-term facility performance, as the Bhopal case 
dramatically illustrates. These are the key variables of future developments. 
Figure 8.1 highlights the importance of corporate culture in determining 
the facility-level EH&S outcomes. In its different forms, such as corporate 
policies on international EH&S management and on joint ventures, corpo-
rate culture affects all stages of the process. It also illustrates the large array 
of constraints on the principal participants as they progressively address 
various issues over the course of the ttansaction. These consa-ainrs rapidly 
increase in number at the conclusion of negotiations and remain numerous. 
Once the negotiations are completed, the flexibility of the principal partici-
pants, including the corporations, is severely limited. 
As proposed earlier, the case studies suggest that the types and timing of 
the inputs shown in the conceptual model - the key variables and intervening 
variables-are common to other cases of facility siring. That is not to say, 
however, that similar starting ingredients (type of technology, type of cor-
poration, type of host COUDtry regulations) will yield similar products in a 
form of facility management and performance. At the hean of this generic 
model is a complex chemistry of interactions of policies related to environ-
ment, health, and safety values and those related to development, equity, 
and independence values. Outcomes are difficult to predict. When these 
interactions lead to tension among mutually desirable but competing objec-
tives, corporate culture may become a crucial determinant in how that ten-
sion is resolved. 
Lessons Learned 
Hidtkn trade-offs. How clearly do the host countries and multinational 
corporations perceive the linkages between the negotiations and their down-
stream consequences? How clearly do they perceive the connections between 
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valuts and specific implementation policies? How explicitly ar< trade-offs 
made? The answers vary and depend on case-specific circumstances. The 
limited scope of this study allows for tentative but instructive observations 
at best, based on a mix of evidence and inferences. 
In the case of Thailand, the increasingly urgent concerns voiced during =t 
years over the environmental effects of rapid industrialization of the country 
suggest that the trade-offs highlighted by rwo of the case studies are not new 
discoverits. (Christensen 1990, Hirsh and Lohmann 1989, Ruyabhom and 
Phantumvanit 1988). The types of trade-offs illustrated by the Xerox case, 
however, were different. They were indirect and incremental and arose in 
response to early decisions not apparently related to EH&S matters. Such 
trade-offs were less likely to be foreseen during negotiations. This is for 
several reasons. 
First, a substantial interval (usually several years) normally separates the 
negotiation stage and the construction and operation phases. In India, that 
interval was close to four years. Even in the expedient Thai system of indus-
trial licensing, the interval would have likely approached a year or more. 
Second, the complexity of the linkages berween the independent variables 
and the EH &S outcomes at the facility level further complicates the predictive 
ability of both corporation and host country. It favors making decisions, in-
cluding any trade-offs, incrementally and in a fragmented manner. In the 
Modi Xerox case, for example, the EH&S managers were not included in 
the decision to implement a fully integrated small-scale plant. Similarly, the 
safety technology was chosen incrementally at the facility, partially by trial 
and error. 
Third, the division of responsibilities for regulating multinational corpo-
rations among several host country instirutions is a significant obstacle to 
formulating a comprehensive view of the ongoing interactions. Each instiru-
tion is committed to its particular mission, shaped by its historical context 
and by select valUts, which it pursues through narrowly conceived policits 
and objectives. This is particularly vivid in the Thai system where the mission 
of the Board of Invtstments is distinctly different from that of the National 
Environmental Board and where the administrative process does not envision 
a platform that forces both instirutions to jointly consider the economic, 
geographic, health, environmental, and other aspects of. proposed facility. 
Although in India the process attempts to create common ground in the 
form of the technical committee assembled within the Ministry of Industry, 
the scope of the committee's deliberations may not be all-inclusive. Conse-
quently, the agencies most likely to bring up the matters of environment, 
health, and safety, such as state pollution control boards or the state inspector 
of factories, were excluded from the first stage of the process. 
Finally, it is unlikely that government officials, whose primary responsi-
bilities are to see that the specific development policies are implemented and 
objectives achieved, would know, or want to know, about the potentialef-
feers of their efforts on the safety systems in the facilities. 
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The practical meaning of functional equivalency. Among the dimensions 
of the debate on the nonns of conduct for multinational corporations in 
developing counmes, two questions have been patticularly prominent: 
Should the MNCs apply uniform worldwide standards, even if that means 
inconsistency with local regulations (when such are less protective than their 
own)? Should the EH&S objective be to install systems at foreign facilities 
identical to those in their domestic counterparts, or should the functional 
equivalency be sought instead? 
A decade ago, Shue (1981) conceptualized the first question as a conflict 
between EH&S values and economic values and used the principle of an in-
dividual's right to no harm to argue in favor of equality in protection among 
MNC domestic and foreign facilities, regardless of the host country's regu-
lations. That question has also underlined the recurrent accusations that 
MNCs apply double standards in the operations of their home and develop-
ing counmes facilities (lves 1985, Castleman 1987), counteracted by claims 
that MNCs operate according to high standards (Royston 1979, 1985). 
From a nonnative perspective several governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations and trade associations, leading multinationals, and various 
consensus-seeking groups (Renn et al. 1991) have become vocal proponents 
of uniform standards as well as functional equivalency. The Tripartite Dec-
laration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
by the International Labor Organization (1977) called for "the highest stan-
dards of safety and health." More recently, the World Commission on En-
vironment and Development called for the "highest safety and health pro-
tection standards practicable" (1987), while the OECD Ministerial Declara-
tion (1989) stated that "affiliates of enterprises which are based in OECD 
countries should operate those facilities at equivalent levels of safety." The 
UN Commission on Transnational Corporations echoed these sentiments 
(1991) by stressing in its report to the secretary general the need for unifOrtn 
worldwide standards. 
The arguments presented by the three companies in support of unifortn 
worldwide standards are compelling. In addition to moral obligations, the 
corporations cited economic arguments: It is more cost--cffectivc to have a 
single implementation and enforcement system worldwide; it is also more 
cost-effective to install engineered safety during facility construction instead 
of retrofitting later, an increasingly likely scenario as developing counmes 
catch up and mimic industrialized countries in their environmental and oc-
cupational regulations. 
Friedman (1991) defines functional equivalency as maintaining the same 
level of protection of human health and environment among facilities by 
employing site-specific methods for achieving it. For example, different tech-
nologies may be employed among facilities to achieve compliance with a 
uniform worldwide occupational standard; or a company may substitute a 
best-available-technology method, legaUy mandated in the United States, 
SYNTHESIS 217 
with an environmental standard in order to protect the natural resour~s 
from effects of pollutants. So defined, functional equivalency is distina from 
faithful replication of rhe EH&S system of an equivalent facility elsewhere, 
both in terms of hardware and management. 
Three arguments in favor of functional equivalency (rather rhan exaa 
replication) are rhat it favors adaptation to local conditions, usually necessary 
to implement the manufacturing process and ohen actually a sour~ of im· 
proved performance; it circumvents certain parent country requirements 
rhat may be motivated by social or legal reasons, and not be directly related 
to improved performance; it is rhe closest approximation of rhe cost-effective 
reproduction of an equivalent domestic facility, which, as discussed earlier 
in rhis chapter, may be favored on the economic grounds. 
The difficulty with Friedman's definition is its lack of specificity on how 
rhe equality in rhe level of proteaion should be measured and ascenained. 
The simplest approach would consist of compliance wirh uniform worldwide 
corporate occupational and environmental standards. That definition is 
very useful because it allows for relatively objective evaluation of compliance 
wirh that EH&S objective. 
Applying rhat definition of functional equivalency to rhe rhree case studies 
(while acknowledging its limitations) shows rhat the three corporations in-
deed adopted functional equivalency as rheir objective and that each inter-
preted rhe concept according to the case-specific circumstances and to its 
own tradition. Du Pont, which has rhe longest accumulated experience with 
occupational safety and whose corporate culture accords high value to tra-
dition, consistency, prediaability, and foresight, was least likely to experi-
ment wirh time-tested design and implementation systems. Funhermore, 
the simplicity of rhe Du Pont technology, rhe existence of a similar facility 
elsewhere, and rhe wide-ranging flexibility rhe company had in rhe Thai envi-
ronment further reinforced reliance on a well-tested model. Not surprisingly, 
Du Pont attempted to replicate as fairhfully as possible all rhe components 
of its EH&S system, using equivalent Du Pont domestic facilities as templates 
and making some additional local adaptations. 
In rhe cases of Modi Xerox and Occidental Chemical, rhe companies relied 
on rheir respective accumulated experience, but did not attempt to replicate 
their equivalent facilities elsewhere by installing identical safety and pollution 
control systems. Instead, they chose rhe engineering safety and pollution 
control systems during facility design and construction, and later relied on 
performance indicators, such as compliance wirh corporate standards and 
recordable incidence records, to verify rhe functional equivalency of rhe facil-
ities. The difference can be attributed partly to rhe faa rhat Modi Xerox 
and Oxychem facilities were more complex and represented substantial 
departures from their closest equivalents in orher countries. 
The rhree case studies suggest rhat the terms of rhe debate have been gener-
ally miscast in relation to EH&S leaders within rhe industrial sector. Uniform 
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standards and functional equivalency are the most sensible and workable 
principles for such corporations to adopt. Therefore, the question should be 
not whether junctional equivalency ought to be the objective, but how to in-
terpret that principle. The case studies also indicate that corporations retain 
a substantial flexibility in that interpretation and therefore the outcome is 
consistent with general corporate philosophy on business development and 
EH&S. 
The flexibility in implementation of the uniform standards and equivalency 
principles clearly represents a window of opportunity for some companies, 
but for others it is a loophole for compromise. The individual interpretation 
will no doubt be determined by the depth of the corporate commitment to 
the fundamental environmental and safety values. 
Value conflicts and trade-offs. Most observers believe that national and 
corporate development goals must be harmonized with EH&S values. This 
consensus rests upon two assumptions. 
First, for the most pan, this literature takes for granted that view that the 
several distinct social, individual, and environmental values included in the 
EH&S cluster are in fact mutually compatible. We share this view, and it is 
easy to sketch some of the arguments that might suppon it: Environmental 
protection promotes public health; facility desigu and management choices 
that limit toxic environmental discharges are consistent with design and 
management choices to limit workers' exposure; and a strong safety culture 
is prerequisite to an environmentally responsible corporation. 
Second, with only a few exceptions, it is assumed that multinational cor-
porations and developing countries have sufficiently strong and similar 
commitments to EH&S values to permit constructive and collaborative pur-
suit of shared goals. Our conclusions are generally consistent with this view. 
None of the key actors whom we have studied can be fairly represented as 
having an overriding interest in a single value (e.g., economic growth, cor-
porate profit, or national self-determination). 
With regard to the two countries we have studied, India is the stronger 
case in point. A strong national commitment to development is modulated 
by commitments to self-reliance and to independence and to environmental, 
health, and safety values. But Thailand's decision to adopt a development 
path driven by the view that "wealthier is healthier" should not be taken as 
evidence of a unidimensional national commitment to this one value. On 
the contrary, it should be taken as evidence of a different understanding of 
the relationships between different values in specific economic and histotical 
circumstances. Thai policy has given ptiority to the pursuit of economic 
development goals, not because it devalues equity or ignores EH&S con-
cerns, but because it was based on a particular understanding, which con-
strues economic development as the instrumental precondition for fulfilling 
other values. As Thailand's economic and political situation has evolved, so 
has the sequential viewpoint of the relationship between development and 
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EH &S policies. One sees today that increasing attention to the environmental, 
social, and cultura1 aspects of economic development. 
With regatd to the three corporations, it is equally dear that each company 
is concerned with multiple values. To be sure, each company's initial decision 
to build in Thailand or India was motivated by corporate development 
values: profit, market share, and market access. Nevenheless, each step taken 
to implement that initial decision was clearly conditioned by respect for the 
host countries' development policies and by local socioeconomic realities. 
All three corporations made design, invesnnent, and management decisions 
with an eye toward betteT EH&S performance than host country regulations 
require. Our research suggests that these decisions are grounded in a complex 
set of ethical, cultural, economic, and technical considerations-not in a 
simplistic devotion to any single overriding value. 
It is now widely understood that in order to provide for the well-being of 
future generations, it is necessary to treat the Earth's natural resources as a 
precious and irreplaceable endowment. In a similar way, many large and 
visible multinational corporations now understand that their own prosperity 
and survival is tightly linked to their EH&S attitudes and reputation . This 
understanding is evident not only in new corporate suucrures and policies, 
but even in such slogans as "Safety pays.' Since both of these understandings 
are widely shated by the important players in international technology 
transfer, it is not surprising that our research - focused on good corporate 
actors and sophisticated host nations-found all the key actors to be con-
cerned with multiple values. 
In panirular transactions, it can be difficult to perceive this commitment 
to the multiple goods included in the DE&I and EH&S value sets. But this 
is an issue of perspective; for, in the same way, it is impossible to appreciate 
the harmonious interplay of multiple colors and shapes in a painting if one 
focuses only on particular brushstrokes. As the aesthetic coherence of the 
picture emerges only when all the individual strokes are taken in their inter~ 
related aggregate, so the value coherence of a particular facility siting or 
technology transfer may emerge only when all the particular decisions and 
transactions (regatding business arrangements, facility design, management, 
etc.) are taken in their interrelated aggregate. 
Although it is clear that all the major actors studied in this reseatch were 
guided by a substantial set of shared values, the specific decisions investigated 
in the case studies represent, for the most pan, the brushsuokes rather than 
the painting. And at this level, one cannot expect unbroken harmony. On 
the contrary, there is considerable competition and conflict between the vari-
ous values and goods, which (on a larger scale) are sought by aU participants. 
Most of the value conflicts noted in the case studies were experienced inter-
nally by the key actors. For example, key Thai actors were acutely aware of 
the evolving tensions between economic gmwth and EH&S protection. India 
officials struggled to balance a long list of worthy social and national goals, 
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knowing that each goal has a significant economic price. And in at least one 
of the corporate cases, there was a clear internal tension between the com-
pany's development and business values and its EH&S values. 
Perhaps the most obvious conflicts between actors in the case studies cen-
tered on discussions between the MNC and the local venture partner regard-
ing the level of capital and managerial invesrment in EH&S performance. 
Reviewing all the value conflicts noted in the case studies, several obser-
vations emerge. First, the most difficult conflicts appear to be internal con-
flictS experienced by the host countries. Because these conflicts are deeply 
rooted in each country's history and national identiry, and may only be 
resolvable by significant policy and institutional shifts, their resolution will 
be a chaUenging task for any government. By comparison, the internal value 
conflicts experienced by the corporate players, which were typically resolv-
able by modest aUocations of additional resources, seem almost triviaUy 
simple. 
Second, value conflicts may not be identified by key actors until the siting 
process is far advanced (or even completed). In part, this is because there are 
so many other issues to be dealt with and so many institutions and individuals 
involved. In part, it is due to the incremental nature of the decision process 
itself. In the India caSt, for example, the host country~5 unwillingness to 
make trade-offs between its multiple development objectives was simply in-
ternalized by the MNC and became an internal economics versus EH&S 
problem for the corporation. The failure to recognize and explicitly consider 
value trade-offs earlier in the process has serious costs: Choices may be 
made without a clear perception of their indirect or long-term implications 
for the central value trade-offs, and the key actors may miss opportunities 
to negotiate or devise solutions that produce more optimal results for all 
concerned. 
Third, the value conflicts uncovered by our case studies are almost aU of 
the "weak" variety-meaning that the policy and implementation options 
that would best advance some value competed for scarce attention and re-
sources with the policy and implementation options that would best advance 
other values, but that there is no inherent conflict between the values them-
selves. Moreover, all these conflictS could have been significantly ameliorated 
(though not eliminated) by creative institutional and policy changes, by 
greater foresight and flexibility in the negotiating process, or by an increased 
allocation of national or corporate resources. 
For example, in Thailand, a more balanced distribution of power between 
the agencies dedicated to economic growth and those dedicated to EH&S 
objectives, coupled with some decentralization of the government's EH&S 
regulatory and enforcement network, might substantiaUy improve EH&S 
outcomes without reducing the pace of direct foreign invesrments. In this 
regard, India offers a model of development regulation that Thailand might 
emulate_ At the same time, Thailand's strategic use of its menu of invesrment 
incentives offers India a model that could substantiaUy increase corporate 
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investment without compromising national social goals or international 
prestige. 
Ongoing value conflicts between the MNC and the joint venture partner 
can be alleviated by the MNC holding a majority or complete ownership (as 
in two of the cases) or by explicit management agreements that give the 
MNC control over facility design and EH&S management. In the India 
case, these conflicts could have been dealt with mott easily if the host country 
had shown greater flexibility in its policy implementation and if the full costs 
of EH&S management had been put on the table early in the negotiation 
stage. 1 
In conclusion, this srudy does nOt suppon the commonly accepted belief 
that strong conflicts between DE&I and EH&S values are an inevitable fea· 
rure of international technology transfers. Nor does it suppon the belief 
that, when value conflicts do arise, they will typically be of the inter·actot 
type, between the host country and the MNC-and, more particularly, that 
they will center on conflicts between corporate business values and host 
country EH&S values. Three explanations for this finding are possible. 
First, the self·selected actors involved in these three case studies may rep· 
resent only a small and atypical minority of the actors involved in technology 
uansfer worldwide. On this hypothesis , the o1d stereotype may still ~ true 
for most actors, but some socially responsible MNCs have shown that it 
need not remain true. 
Second, the srudy may reflect recent but fundamental changes in the atti· 
tudes and relationships of developing countries and multinational corpora· 
tions. As corporations and countries struggle to implement a new vision of 
sustainable development, they are more likely to deal cooperatively with the 
multitude of competing goals, values, and constraints. On this view, changing 
attitudes and circumstances have made the old stereotypes obsolete. 
Third, as ideologically driven rhetoric gradually gives way to pragmatism 
and flexibility, business and DE&I and EH&S values may be naturally 
moving toward a new and very different equilibrium. From this perspective, 
the old stereotypes-replete with severe conflicts and evil actors-may have 
run their course. 
Corporate environmentalism. Throughout this volume, repeated refer· 
ences have been made to the changing relationship of the multinational cor· 
porations and society, especially concerning the EH&S and international 
development. More recently, the concept of corporate environmentalism 
has taken root among the progressive corporations to give voice to that gen· 
eral philosophy (Woolard 1989, Winter 1988). 
What is corporate environmentalism in relation to MNC overseas facilities 
and, more pointedly, how can it be achieved at these facilities? The case 
'In fact, in 1992, immediately foUowing the completion of the Rampur caK INdy, India 
embarked OD such a liberalization policy toward multinational corporation., which includes 
lifting the restriaions on majority ownership by MNC. of their foreign affiliates. 
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studies suggest that the corporate view of that concept can be operationally 
defined through the following principles of conduct: 
• The corporation needs to maintain major lnOuence over the design and management 
of the facility, regardless of the ownership arrangements. 
• The corporation needs to assume leadership in many decisions concerned with 
EH&S, regardless of the degree of host countty regulations and enforcement. 
• Foreign facilities should be, at minimum, funaionally equivalent to those at domestic 
facilities. 
• Transfer of home country EH&:S systems to developing counmcs requires site· 
specific adaptations to accommodate local naNfal environment, infrastructure, 
nature of the work force, and social arrangements, as well as culrufal, historical, 
and religious circumstances. These adaptations determine the ultimate mix of four 
EH&S implementation tools for achieving functional equivalence: engineering 
controls, management system, education and training, and personal safety devices. 
• Transfer of corporate commitment and policies to the foreign affiliates, combined 
with clever local adaptations, realistic planning horizons, and district implementa-
tion, assures the equivalence in EH&S perfonnance. 
In short, the three case studies suggest that the corporate concept of envi-
ronmentalism in overseas facilities derives from a fundamental confidence 
in the power of ttchnology and good management, capacity to innovate, 
value of parent company's aperience, and the force of corporate accounta-
bility. It is also premised on the assumed relative corporate freedom in 
implementing these principles of conduct by the cotporation. This confidence 
appears to be shared by other organizations and individuals, as illustrated 
by policy statements calling for cotporate contribution to sustainable devel-
opment (International Chamber of Commerce 1989, United Nations Centre 
on Transnational Corporations 1988, United Nations Environmental Pro-
gtarnme 1989). 
The case studies indicate that the cotporate freedom can be significantly 
constrained by the host country's pursuit of development objectives, the 
nature of the relationship with a joint venture partner, and by its own tradi-
tion and culture. Whereas it is unlikely that such constraints would result in 
major compromise in EH&S perfonnance among socially responsible cor-
porations, other subtle trade-offs may occur, especially when the connection 
between the upstream decisions and downstream facility outcomes are not 
perceived early in the process. In light of these findings, the concept of cor-
porate environmentalism may need careful and repeated reevaluation. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our chronicle of three facilities suggests that sound EH&S perfonnance at 
the MNC OVelseas facilities requires more than the know-how and resources 
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and a commitment by the key actors to do the right thing (Renn, Brown, 
and White 1991). Specific procedural and structural changes may be neces-
sary if the trade-offs between the EH&S and DE&I values at work during 
facility development are to be satisfactorily reconciled. Based on the study 
results, we recommend three such changes, addressed specifically to host 
countries and MNCs committed to responsible EH&S management. 
1. Include environment, health, and safety in the agenda for negotiations between 
the host country and the MNC. For technologies not perceived as highly polluting, 
acutely hazardous. or resource-intensive. EH&:S issues arc likely (0 be introduced 
in(O the development process after the main features of the facility have been set-
tled. Without a concerted effort to alter the current modus operandi, both sides 
will continue with their current patterns: a reactive corpora(e actirude of "do not 
bring it up unless asked to do so" and a host country focused primarily on social, 
economic, and political priorities. 
Shifting EH&:S issues into the earlier pan of the process would have several 
benefits. First, it would give the key players a clearer vision of the links between 
non-EH6cS decisions and their downstream, indirea EH&S consequences. Second, 
the key players would be more likely to recognize when a competitive relationship 
exists between EH&S objectives and DElId objectives, and to seck solutions that 
do not unduly burden one or the other of these desirable objectives. Third. it 
would facilitate inclusion of EH&S into the overall cost calculus, from both an 
internal corporate perspective and a social, host country perspective, of various 
alternatives for the design, location, ownership, and management of the facility. 
In a world in which EH&S issues were treated openly as shared responsibilities 
of the MNC and the host country, the arguments in favor of this proposal might 
encounter little resistance. However, the reality of the negotiations, as tradition-
aUy practiced, provides the key players with little incentive to operuy discuss their 
own internal value conflicts, much less mclude them in efforts to reconcile them. 
This is panicularly, though by no means exclusively, true of MNCs suspected of 
trading off EH&S for financial gain. Furthennore, as enumerated in the earlier 
sections of this chapter, there are on both sides fonnidable institutional, proce-
dural, and cultural barriers to inclusion of EH&S in the negotiations. 
Despite these obstacles. in our view, the ultimate benefits outweigh the costs. 
This would seem particularly true for the host country, which would more lilcely 
atuaa more responsible foreign investors. From the MNC perspective, considering 
the EH&S aspects of the facility in the context of multiple host country require-
ments regarding ownership, location, scale, and technology may be more cost 
effective than if EH&S continues to be treated as a discrete objective in facility 
planning. Funhermore, the cOStS of complying with cenain host country require-
ments may become a bargaining chip for a corporation arguing for relaxation of 
some restrictions. 
2. Define facili£y-specific criteria and perfonnance indicators of functional equiva-
lency. and implement an explicit program for monitoring and implementation. 
Concensus seems to be emerging at all levels of corporate management that func-
tional equivalency is a worltable EH&S norm. The three cases indicate, however. 
that operationalization of that principle is decidedly case-specific. It also appears 
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that this opcrationalization is ohen accomplished implicidy and incrementally , 
and over multiple stages of facility developments by various individuals n:sponsible 
for its design and management. 
Several advantages would acaue if the funaional equivalency were explicitly 
defined by MNC and accompanied by an appropriately designed monitoring pro-
gram. First, the host country would have an opponunicy to participate in setting 
standards to a degree not too commonly seen otherwise, owing to the lack of gen-
erally recognized performance indicators, its limited 1c.nowledge of technology, 
and inadequate resources. Second, an explicit facility-specific definition of func-
tional equivalency would reduce the risk of adverse effects owing to future changes 
in management, the work force, or the corporate or host country commitment to 
EH&S principles. Third, it would at least partially immunize the corporation 
from accusations of cutting corners and applying lower EH&S standards at the 
foreign. facilities. With an emphasis on outcomes rather than methods, official 
oversight and public scrutiny would be properly focused on the EHacS bottom line. 
J. Specify the EHt5cS goals and objectives in the formal joint vcnturc agreement. It 
appears that infonn.al arrangements between joint venture partners play no lesser 1 
and perhaps a gn:ater, role in specifying the division of n:sponsibilities in managing 
EH&S. We earlier argued that this may actually be a strength, as it gives the affil-
iate and the partners the Oexibility necessary to adapt to changing cirOJmstanccs 
and the freedom to develop a sustainable EHacS culrure at the affiliate. However, 
such informality may also become a weakness? especially when there are strong 
differences in EH&S philosophy and commitment between the parmers or when 
the management arrangements undergo major changes. These weaknesses may 
be minimized by explicit recognition of the EHacS principles in the formal joint 
venture agreement, while stopping shan inttoducing a rigid presaiption for man-
aging EH6::S. For example? an agreement may openly state the principle of func-
tional equivalency at the affiliate and define its criteria, 0< it may specifically address 
which environmental and occupational standards would be used and under what 
circumstances (including those when there are no applicable standards). 
We recognize that in some cases such tenns and conditions may not be 
appropriate in a joint venrure agreement, and that, once specified, they may 
have limited usefulness. Nevenheless, the process of articulariing the goals 
and objectives of EHacS management at the facility during the negotiations 
is likely to benefit both parties in the long run, by setting fonh expectations 
established through a process of shared development and consent. In shon, 
such proa:ss may be a significant first step toward creariing a sttong culture 
at the new enterprise and toward building a sustainable EHacS system. 
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